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Mission of N.P.
Ignat'ev
to Khiva
and Bukhara
in 1858

Edited with notes, introduction and translated by
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Main Square of Vernoe (Alma-Ata) in 1857. (From B. Lincoln, P.P. Semenov-Tian-Shanskii: The Life of a Russian Geographer (Newtonville, 1980))

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Closing of the Lines, 1864-1865

P R E F A C E

The period of 1839 to 1860 marked a turning point in Russia's relations with Central Asia. It was during this time frame that diplomatic endeavors driven by economic, scientific and military considerations marked the initiation of the expansionist policies of the 1860s. Perhaps the most influential individual in the chain of events marking the transition to the use of military force for subverting Central Asia's interests to those of Russia was N.P. Ignatiev.

This book describes one of the links in this chain of events - a diplomatic mission led by Ignatiev to the khanates of Khiva and Bukhara in 1858. Coming near the end of the khanates' independency, the Mission's purportive economic and scientific investigative objectives played a secondary role to Ignatiev's primary concern for gathering information to be ultimately used for the conquest of Central Asia.

The majority of this book consists of the abridged memoirs of Ignatiev's 1858 Mission to Khiva and Bukhara in Central Asia which I have translated into English from the original Russian. Ignatiev wrote these memoirs almost forty years after the event in 1897 (*Missiia v Khivu i Bukharu v 1858 godu*, St. Petersburg, 1897). He felt the need to set the record straight regarding his significant accomplishment in Central Asia after a long career in government. His memoirs make fascinating reading, for they combine danger, intrigue, excitement and humor. They also provide an important historical footnote for understanding the environment and mentality of Russia's foreign policy toward Central Asia.

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

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МИССИЯ

ВЪ

ХИВУ и БУХАРУ

ВЪ 1858 ГОДУ

ФЛИГЕЛЬ-АДЪЮТАНТА

Полковника Н. Игнатъева.



С.-ПЕТЕРБУРГЪ
1897.

INTRODUCTION

Central Asia has had as long a period of recorded history as any area on the globe. Moslem expansion reached the area in the 7th century and from then on the dominant religion was Islam. Communicating with the Mediterranean world through Arab contacts, it produced brilliant scholars such as Avicenna (980-1037 AD) and Ulug Beg (1394-1449 AD), the famous astronomer and grandson of Tamarlane who died in 1405. On the eve of the Mongol invasions (c. 1220 AD) a state called Khorezm just south of the Aral Sea was expecting a Persian invasion at the same time the Mongols under Genghis Khan were attacking from the East. With the defeat of Khorezm and the rest of the Middle East the Mongols secured trade routes between the Mediterranean and China. The Polos' journey through Central Asia (1270s) gave Europe its first real knowledge of the oases. As long as the Mongols were in control of China (until 1368) a lively trans-Asian caravan trade ensued. The "silk route" passed through Khiva, Bukhara and Kashgar. Marco Polo has left brilliant descriptions of these towns which are among the oldest continuously settled cities in the world. Excavations in Bukhara date the town from 500 BC. These fixed locations in the midst of a giant desert and their relationship to the Russian Empire before annexation are the points of interest for these memoirs.

From ancient times the city of Bukhara lay in the valley of the Zeravshan River. The world knows but few cities which possess such a host of architectural monuments having a heritage of so many centuries as does Bukhara. They represent the material culture and art of so many different periods. One of the city's oldest structures is the Ark Citadel, the residence of the rulers of Bukhara, dating back to the first millenium BC. Khiva to the north of Bukhara has as incredible a history as Bukhara. By the late 18th century both these oasis towns had attained semi-independent status. Khiva was ruled by a Khan indicating its Mongol inheritance. The ruler of Bukhara was called an Emir a ruler supposedly descended from Mohammed. In Russian and European historical literature the term khanate is applied to both. A third khanate, Kokand, also had an illustrious history. Located in the luscious Ferghana Valley it had produced Babur (1480-1530) who founded the Moghul Dynasty in India. In the beginning of the 19th century Kokand was able to conquer Tashkent, a very important trade center situated on an oasis.

In the early 19th century Central Asia had a population of about four million; by 1850 the population had increased to five million. The Khanate of Bukhara (which included the city as well as much outlying territory) held three million people. The Khanate of Khiva had 500,000 population clustered about the oases and river

valleys. The major rivers were the Amu and Syr Darya, Zeravshan, Kashka Darya and Surkhan Darya. Large cities included Tashkent (60,000), Bukhara (70,000), city of Kokand (30,000) and Samarkand (30,000) located in the Bukhara Khanate. The major part of Central Asia was covered with desert and mountains where nomadic tribes herded flocks of sheep, cattle and camels.

Ethnically the area was a polyglot. In the Khanate of Bukhara lived Uzbeks, Tadzhiks and Turkmens. In Kokand one would have found Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kazakhs and Kirghiz. In Khiva were located Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kazakhs and Karakalpaks. However, throughout the cities Persians (Sarts), Jews and Arabs who had emigrated from India and China were the traders, merchants and bankers.

Livestocking, agriculture and fruit growing were the main occupations. Cotton and silk fabrics were manufactured in the major cities and had become in the 18th century important sources of trade with the Middle East and later the Russian Empire.

Central Asia was rich in resources. One could find silver, copper, iron and petroleum. However, because of primitive operations it was cheaper to import metals from Russia.

There was great political unrest in the region. Bukhara and Khiva had hostile relations right up to the time of Russian annexation in the 1860s. Bukhara and Kokand were at war in 1858 when Ignatiev arrived. The Emir of Bukhara attempted to restore his power on the left bank of the Amu Darya and to suppress an independence movement emanating from Shakhrisiab (formerly Kesh) oasis. In Kokand different groups vied for power continuously. Tashkent attempted to throw off the Kokand yoke after its defeat. In Kokand ethnic differences produced wars between the Uzbeks and Kirghiz. In the Khanate of Khiva a never-ending struggle ensued between the Uzbek and Turkmen landowners. Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries the three khanates were kept from complete anarchy only by the cruel and oppressive rule of the khans.

In the political realm the khanates represented the typical feudal, Asiatic despotism. The khans' power was limited by no law other than the Koran. All three of the dynasties: the Mangyt in Bukhara, Kungrad in Khiva and Ming in Kokand were of Uzbek nationality.(1)

Any attempt at economic improvement met with serious difficulties. Heavy taxes were laid on the people prohibiting any surplus investment in developing industry. However, by the beginning of the 19th century there was a switch from a tax in kind to money and this stimulated a moderate expansion of trade. Central Asian merchants began visiting the annual fairs at Nizhni-Novgorod on the Volga, Petropavlovsk and Troitsk.(2) Trade was carried on also with Iran, Afghanistan and China. Before the 1830s trade with Russia was sporadic. No legal treaties guaranteed rights to traders because diplomatic relations had not been established between the Russian Empire and the khanates on a formal basis. All kinds of obstacles stood in the way of profitable trade relations. The problem of tariff regulations, the routes that the caravans had

follow and the fact that non-Moslem merchants were not permitted to trade in the Khanates - these and more obstacles made trade difficult.

Another factor limiting the khanates' economic connections with Tsarist Russia was the fact that nomads roamed the desert separating the khanates from Russia. The Ust-Urt Plateau which surrounds the Aral Sea was an area inhabited by Kazakhs. The Kazakhs who were called Kirghiz in the 19th century were divided into three groups (*zhuzy*). The Little Horde lived the closest to the Russian frontier being separated from Russia by the Ural River. The Middle Horde was located slightly to the east and the Great Horde inhabited Turkestan.

In 1726 the Khan of the Little Horde requested the Tsar to grant him Russian citizenship. When this was done in 1731 one of the khans of the Middle Horde also received Russian citizenship. However, both Khiva and Kokand strove to subordinate the desert nomads to themselves. They sent tax collectors among the Kazakhs and erected their own fortresses on Kazakh lands.(3) Khiva was especially active in the Mavernakhr (area between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya) and on the Ust-Urt Plateau.(4) Kokand pursued the Kazakhs on the middle and lower Syr Darya and in the Semirechie (north-east of Turkestan). The Kazakh tribes vehemently protested this intrusion into their affairs and military encounters often took place.

In the first part of the 19th century there was a move on the part of the Great Horde to unify all Kazakhs who had received Russian citizenship. They needed unification because another nomadic tribe from the East was menacing them. But the main threat to the Kazakhs still came from Khiva and Kokand. Furthermore because some were Russian citizens they invited the Russian Empire to help them in their struggles with the khanates. This, of course, meant that sooner or later the Russian Empire would have to make some new decisions about the khanates.

* * * * *

Russia did not pose the only threat to the independence of the khanates. To the south the British were completing their domination over India by the 19th century. Their expansion north through the Khyber Pass into Afghanistan and Central Asia occurred because of the weakened position of Persia and Afghanistan. In the overall scheme of things the city of Herat became the goal of British policy. It was located south of the khanates but could be used as a control point for further northern penetration and consolidation. After the Napoleonic Wars a renewed British intensification made England a direct competitor with Russia for control of Central Asia and the drive for trade outlets would probably lead to an inevitable clash. All of this boded ill for the khanates. Yet up to the Crimean War which ended in 1856 this rivalry was muted partially because of the British failure to gain a strong foothold in Afghanistan.

Political considerations aside British interest in Afghanistan opened up the question of economic penetration of

of Central Asia. In 1820-1825 the British East India Company sent an expedition under William Moorcroft to gather information on trade and defense in the region of Afghanistan. Alexander Burnes, who was later murdered in Kabul, led another expedition in 1831-1833 which reached Bukhara; the first visit there by an Englishman since Jenkinson in 1559.(5) Burnes made a detailed study of the Indus River and its tributaries to learn if it would be possible to bring trade into the depths of Asia. Burnes returned in 1836 to Kabul. He was obsessed with the idea of turning the Indus and its tributaries into a major artery for transportation of British goods. He envisaged the establishment of an annual fair or bazaar on the banks of the Indus similar to the one at Nizhnii Novgorod on the Volga. This trade center would receive goods from all over Central Asia.

Burnes in an interview with Dost Mohammed (1826-1862) demanded the opening of Afghanistan for British trade.(6) Dost agreed but said his country was so wild and lawless British forces would be needed to keep the peace. Because of these conditions it was impossible to keep economic activity separate from military.

Although Burnes' ideas on trade were overambitious he left many interesting accounts of the area: "Description of the Khyber Pass; Ferrying Locations across the Indus and the Passes through the Hindu Kush". He also gave the British in India first hand information about Herat. He was able to map trade routes north of Afghanistan to Bukhara and he gave the first English description of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya in his "Notes about the Journey from Kabul to Turkestan".

The Russians were not idle. From Orenberg Governor-General Perovskii had offered Dost Mohammed trade and diplomatic relations. He promised support against the Sikhs if they should attack Afghanistan and Russian help would be forthcoming in Dost's struggles with the Afghan rebels.

Perovskii went on:

The English have gotten to within a stone's throw of Bukhara. Central Asia is already subordinate to their influence. Our Asiatic trade is disturbed by this. They supply arms to Asians for use against us.(7)

Perovskii with St. Petersburg's approval dispatched his adjutant, Ivan Vitkevich, to Kabul to gain the favors of Dost. He was to warn the Afghan ruler of the dangers of getting too close to Great Britain. He was to offer Dost support in his goal of gaining Peshawar.

In the "Instructions" Vitkevich was told "the main reason for his mission was to bring peace between Dost and the feudal (Afghan) lords and for him to beware of foreign enemies...".(8)

Alexander Burnes and Ivan Vitkevich met in Kabul and apparently had a friendly discussion in 1838. However, British public opinion was highly indignant at this intrusion of the Russians in an area considered by London to be an exclusive British

preserve. As a result of the uproar Lord Auckland, the Governor-General of India (1836-1842), and members of Parliament openly talked about going to war with Afghanistan. Auckland's "Army of the Indus" did invade Afghanistan in the First Anglo-Afghan War which resulted in a complete disaster. Under siege 65 days in Kabul the British began their retreat. Out of 16,500 people who had come to Afghanistan from India which included 4,500 fighting men (690 Europeans, 2,840 Indian troops and 970 Indian cavalry) and 12,000 family and camp followers only one European, Dr. William Brydon, made it safely through the mountains to the south.(9) The British public's fear of the Russian threat to India was born because of it.

At the same time the Tsarist Empire was having its problems in Central Asia. In 1839 General Perovskii led an attack in winter against Khiva which was an absolute disaster. However, this action brought a swift response by Great Britain. Serious plans were under way to plant British influence in the khanates north of Afghanistan.(10)

Colonel Stoddart arrived in Bukhara in 1840 under the pretense that he was going to free Russian prisoners held by the Khan. According to F.H. Fisher he was organizing anti-Russian activity among the Bukharans. Other British agents began appearing in Khiva and Kokand.

The Governor-General of Orenberg, General Perovskii, was extremely concerned with this new British presence. He wrote Foreign Minister Nesselrode in 1839 that "the English were intending to annex Bukhara and Khiva and turn the Amu Darya into a British water way".(11)

In Khiva the British were more successful than in Bukhara and they could instigate Kazakh depredations against the Russian trade caravans plodding across the desert. The British hoped to convert Khiva into a large market for their cheap goods arriving from India.

James Abbott who was a representative of the East India Company appeared in Khiva in 1840. He hoped to turn Khiva against Russia and bring it into the British orbit. Abbott also tried to get an alliance between Khiva and Kokand against Bukhara. He wanted to influence the Kazakh nomads against Russia.

Abbott did gain economic advantages for Great Britain in Khiva but he was unable to get a military alliance against Russia. Another negative factor was that St. Petersburg would not grant any rights to British merchants or diplomats in the khanates nor would Russia allow them to act as middle men in the transit of trade from India to Europe via Russia. However, Britain did not give up its attempts to maintain a presence in the khanates. Public opinion in England was constantly being told that British penetration into the area was for the defense of India. Perovskii's attack on Khiva from the north in 1839 was blown up out of all proportion in the British press as the launching of an attack on India.

On March 24, 1840 Palmerston wrote:

That the loss of Khivan independence will be viewed as harmful to British interests and will bring a counter attack through the Hindu Kush. The occupation of Khiva will give Russia an opening on the lower Amu Darya while England will be able to gain control over the upper branches of the river by taking precautionary and defensive measures.(12)

Those "defensive measures" might mean a British occupation of the khanates. However, the khanates were saved from becoming a British colony by their remoteness.

The attempt of Britain to gain a foothold in Bukhara failed miserably. Colonel Stoddart and Captain Connolly were executed by Khan Nasrullah as spies in 1842. The khans were adept at playing the big powers against each other.

The reported execution of the two Englishmen caused such a public uproar in Great Britain that a special committee was established funded from the Sunday church collection to investigate the grisly affair. A prominent ecclesiastic and world wide peripatetic, James Wolff, took on the task of discovering the true fate of the intrepid Britishers. After an incredible journey through Persia he arrived at the Court of Nasrullah in Bukhara. Except for the fact that he travelled under the watchful eye of the friendly Persian Ambassador who apparently had the closest foreign contact with the wily Emir he, himself, surely would have disappeared. According to Wolff the reasons for Stoddart's and Connolly's execution were the following:

"... the Ameer was induced to kill them because people from Afghanistan demanded their death ... also the Ameer had proceeded against Stoddart for having despised his warning and continued his correspondence with his countrymen in India and Connolly for having gone to Kokand ... I was determined to demand their bodies to put them in camphor and carry them back to London".(13)

In a final interview with the Vizier Wolff revealed:

During the stay of Connolly and Stoddart they took every opportunity of despatching, in the most stealthy manner, letters to Kabul; and on this account His Majesty became displeased, and both Captain Connolly and Colonel Stoddart were brought with their hands tied, behind the Ark (palace of the King) in presence of a high official, when Colonel Stoddart and Captain Connolly kissed each other and the Colonel said to the official, 'Tell the Ameer that I die a disbeliever in Muhammed, but a believer in Jesus - that I am a Christian, and a Christian I die!' And Connolly said, 'Stoddart we shall see each other in Paradise, near Jesus'. Then the order was given to cut off, first the head of Stoddart which was done; and in the same manner the head of Connolly was cut off".(14)

Another British agent, Richard Shakespear, was sent to

Khiva in 1840. The base from which British embassies left for Central Asia was Herat where Major Todd presided over British attempts to penetrate the khanates.

Britain attempted to penetrate the khanates in the same fashion it had in India. It wanted to gain influence by means of treaties which included generous subsidies to the native rulers. Such a practice had been very successful with Dost Mohammed in Afghanistan.

In the long run, however, British policy was not very successful in the khanates.(15) Russian penetration of the oases had certain advantages. The Russians were geographically much closer to the area. Very high mountains and inhospitable terrain made access difficult and extremely costly for the British. Also English lines of communication ran through Afghanistan where internal unity was very fragile. Dost Mohammed's rebellious brothers and others controlled the outlying areas in the mountains and they were violently anti-British. Actually the Dost really only held sway in Kabul, Kandahar and a few other towns.

Another factor inhibiting British economic success in the khanates was the fact that the British received for their manufactured goods (utensils etc.) precious stones and small amounts of silk. Russians imported from the khanates cotton, yarn, cloth and other goods. Thus the population of the khanates was more inclined to trade with Russia than England. It seems that the khans were more at ease with Russians than English probably because they had been dealing with Russians for a longer time.(16)

However, the threat of British economic competition in the khanates influenced Russian public opinion in St. Petersburg, Moscow and other European Russian cities. Even though British economic penetration was limited north of Afghanistan because of geography Russian merchants exaggerated the problem, feeling inadequate to deal with a major influx of British trade competition. In fact in western Europe Russian manufactured goods could not compete with British goods. The markets in Central Asia never experienced a major British onslaught to drive out Russian goods.

Britain became very interested in making Kashgar in western Turkestan (in the Chinese Empire) a major center for economic penetration of the khanates. Geography made it easier for the British to reach Kashgar not having to traverse Afghanistan; they could proceed directly north from Kashmir which bordered on Kashgar.

Because Kashgar had come under the control of Kokand in the late 1850s British goods could then reach that Central Asian Khanate. This new approach which could have led to an expansion of British trade into the khanates alarmed Tsarist officials and can be seen as one of the reasons for the Russian Empire to annex the khanates thus driving out British goods.

The British presence in Afghanistan and Kashgar forced the hand of the Russians to take military measures against the

khanates after the Crimean War (1856). However, the British never enjoyed a strong position in Afghanistan which could have given them a base for political and economic expansion to the north along the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, the rivers which led to the khanates. The British vacillated between two opposite policies in Afghanistan. One was to annex the country to India by occupying Herat and Kabul; the other was to retreat behind the Indus making that the boundary with Afghanistan. (17)

* * * * *

The political situation in Asia in the 1850s begged for Russian intervention. In Peking the Manchu government was almost toppled by the Taiping Rebellion in southern China, a Moslem revolt in Sinkiang and the "Arrow War" from 1856 to 1860. In Central Asia both Khiva and Bukhara were at war, the former with Turkmen tribes and the latter with Kokand. Furthermore, the Great Indian Mutiny of 1857 which threatened to end British rule, was a signal for some factions in the Foreign Ministry to believe that immediate action to invade India would be in Russia's best interests. In fact, rumors spread in India during the Crimean War stated that Russia, leading a coalition including Persia and Afghanistan, was ready to invade the country and help the Indians regain their independence. (18) Immediate action was urged to bring Persia and the Central Asian khanates into the Russian orbit as a bulwark against British influence.

British influence, the Indian Mutiny notwithstanding, was definitely on the upswing in Central Asia during the 1850s. The Crimean War proved that the British were powerful enough to threaten the Russians in Central Asia as well as in the Near East. Allied expeditions against the Russians in Eastern Siberia and Kamchatka, and joint Turkish-British intrigues to form a Central Asian coalition detrimental to Russian interests significantly influenced the Foreign Ministry after 1856.

The Crimean War (1853-1856) triggered great changes in Russian foreign policy. The overwhelming defeat of Russia by the Anglo-French-Turkish forces in the Black Sea was a causal factor in awakening interest in the Far and Middle East, and a renewal of concern about trade opportunities with these areas became a preeminent theme for the St. Petersburg planners. To the new Tsar of Russia, Alexander II (1855-1881), the khanates of Central Asia and the western province of China (Sinkiang) represented a golden opportunity to further Russian influence.

Alexander's instrument for exploring these opportunities came with the appointment of Prince Alexander Ivanovich Bariatinskii (1844-1879). Bariatinskii, acting as the Viceroy of the Caucasus, distinguished himself not only by resolving Russian's problems with the Moslem renegade, Shamil (1797-1871); but was instrumental in unifying the command, improving the communications and reforming the methods, tactics and organization of the Caucasian Army Corps which became the model for the later national reform of the Russian Army under D.A. Miliutin (1816-1912). (19)

Bariatinskii became a symbol in the Tsarist administration of the change of orientation from Europe to Asia of the Russian government, based upon his concepts for expanding Russian influence in the East. His belief that Russia must be the civilizing force in Asia, a kind of "White Man's Burden", was proposed as the official policy for the Russian government. Using economic development as a lever to successful Russian penetration and domination, he hoped to regain Russia's stature as a major European power and eventually move southward to Turkey, Persia and India. As Napoleon had tried to defeat Great Britain in the East to enhance France's position as the major world power, so too did Bariatinskii hope to break Britain's control over the world economy by using military means for defeating it in Asia.

Russia recognized that Britain's economic growth was accelerating in Central Asia due to her presence in India after the close of the Crimean War. British merchants also began appearing in Persia who could remove Russian traders' advantages.

Consequently, Bariatinskii urged a more active Russian policy in Turkomania and in Central Asia. He felt that diplomats should be stationed in the khanates to prevent British incursion, and theorized that England would not be in a favorable position to send troops to Central Asia because of concerns for overextension. Finally, the consequences of the Anglo-Persian War of 1856-1857 were viewed by Bariatinskii as an extension of the Crimean War. In that light, the city of Herat was to rapidly become an important piece in the Anglo-Russian struggles after the Crimean War.

One result of Bariatinskii's desire for an aggressive Asian foreign policy was strenuous opposition on the part of the Russian Foreign Ministry under Aleksandr Mikhailovich Gorchakov (1798-1883). Gorchakov wanted to restore Persia as a buffer state and did not want to provoke Persia against Afghanistan for Russia's benefit.

D.A. Miliutin, who became Minister of War in 1861 and lasted in that position for 20 years, was a major critic of Gorchakov's policy of restraint in Central Asia. Miliutin continuously warned the Russian Ambassador to England, Baron Brunnov, that:

... it was not necessary to apologize to the Prime Minister for any aggression in Central Asia. They never told us when they were going to occupy foreign cities and islands and we never asked them for an explanation either. (20)

The counsel of Bariatinskii and Miliutin concerning a more aggressive foreign policy for Central Asia convinced the Tsar that if Russia did not move toward the khanates the British would soon engulf Central Asia. Under their influence, the Tsar used the Sepoy Rebellion in 1857 in India as a pretext for developing a more aggressive policy in Central Asia.

There was fear, however, that an aggressive policy could

provoke war with Great Britain. Leaning heavily on Bariatinskii's military advice and at the request of the Tsar, the War Ministry under N.O. Sukhozanet prepared a report entitled "About the Possibility of a Hostile Conflict with Great Britain in Central Asia".(21) The Sukhozanet Report did not back up one of Bariatinskii's major assertions that England wanted to develop a military base in Persia and gain possessions on the coast of the Caspian Sea. However, the Report did agree that England would definitely compete with Russia economically in the khanates and would attempt to subvert the various nationalities located in Central Asia and especially the Kazakh hordes.(22)

The report also concluded that:

The possibility of a revolt by Indian nationals should the Russian Army approach India was remote.(23)

Russia's lack of allies in Central Asia in conjunction with a real or perceived threatening situation could provoke the reactivation of the Crimean Coalition against Russia.

Russia needed time to build up her military forces, particularly in view of the defortification clauses concerning the Black Sea as stated in the Treaty of Paris.

Russia must first build up its defenses in the Black and Caspian Seas, improve navigation and trade opportunities on the Volga and restructure the port facilities of Astrakhan and Baku.(24)

These conclusions in effect thwarted Bariatinskii's desires, and surprised Gorchakov and the Foreign Ministry. Gorchakov's position of strengthening relations with the neighboring countries of Asia, especially Iran, the Central Asian khanates and Sinkiang in western China, was adopted.(25) The central theme of Russia's Central Asia policy therefore became one of muted aggression. While not willing to back down from a fight with Great Britain if Russia's interests were thwarted, the Foreign Ministry saw economic and scientific diplomacy as a means to sublimate Central Asia's interests to their own. Bariatinskii and his supporters chose to view this policy as merely a stepping stone for expansion via conquest. In the 1860s they were proved correct.

Egor Petrovich Kovalevskii (1811-1868) was appointed Head of the Asiatic Department in the Foreign Ministry to develop and execute the new policy. His appointment in 1856 could not have come at a more difficult time. Defeat in the Crimean War, of course, had damaged Russia's prestige. Kovalevskii strove to restore Russian influence among the eastern and Asiatic tribes and attempted to weaken the onerous sanctions of the Treaty of Paris as much as possible.

A major concern for Kovalevskii's policies in Central Asia was based upon the fact that he recognized the need for a military presence in Central Asia, while supporting a non-militaristic posture. The absence of a "hard frontier" became a major obstacle.

Throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, southern Siberia was guarded from the incursions of steppe nomads by a string of frontier defenses from the Ural River to the Upper Irtysh River. Under Nicholas I, the Kazakh steppes north of the Aral Sea had been absorbed into the empire, and in 1853 the Russians conquered the fortress of Ak-Mechet (Perovsk) on the lower Syr Darya River. The key military problem in 1858 was to join the fortifications on the lower Syr Darya with the Ural in the west and the Irtysh in the east, forming an arc on the southern flank of the steppes. A second, political problem was the uniform administration of the area, divided between the Governor-Generalship of Orenberg and that of Omsk.

The political situation in the fertile regions of Central Asia had consolidated at the beginning of the century, when stable dynasties took over the thrones of Khiva and Bukhara, and Kokand split off from Bukhara as an independent khanate. But political relations between Russia and the khanates remained tenuous, almost nonexistent, and trade relations infrequent and hazardous. Occasional missions were sent to the khanates to secure free transit for Russian goods sent to Sinkiang and Afghanistan, the liberation of Russian slaves, and navigation on the Amu Darya. In one year (1858) three major missions, entirely different from previous embassies of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, would be sent out to the Central Asian khanates, Iran and Kashgar.

In Iran, because of its war with Great Britain, the Russians were concerned that Herat would slip under the control of the British subsidized Afghan ruler, Dost Mohammed (1826-1862). It was therefore felt necessary to send N.V. Khanykov (1812-1878) to Iran and the Herat oasis to gather information on British influence, but the purported objective of his mission was to be scientific in nature.

Another mission would be sent to Kashgar and would be led by Chokan Valikhanov (1835-1865). He was to find out whether it would be possible to significantly increase Russian trade with Sinkiang in the next few years in addition to gathering geographic information. P.P. Semenov Tian-Shanskii (1827-1914), the most eminent geographer of the age, noted his concerns by stating that:

... as our influence has successfully penetrated the southwest edge of mountainous Asia, in Dzhungaria, and northern Turkestan it is only natural to be concerned about the spread of geographical information and about the expectations of our commercial relationships from the side of the Caspian basin.(26)

In 1857 Semenov had led a geographical expedition that had crossed the heights of the Tien Shan Mountains which stretched into Chinese Turkestan from Central Asia. He discovered the routes taken by the ancient Huns and Tamarlane in their journeys across Asia; no other European had ever been in this area of the world before. His many writings about Central Asia on behalf of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society helped to interest Russian public opinion about Central Asia just at a time when the Government was on the verge of

sending out information gathering expeditions to Central Asia.(27) Semenov with his high level contacts in St. Petersburg would be instrumental in getting Valikhanov, the founder of the Kazakh intelligentsia, the position of leader of the mission to Kashgar across the Tian Shan in into Chinese Turkestan.

A third mission which would be led by N.P. Ignatiev was to visit the khanates of Khiva and Bukhara. Of the three this was by far the most significant. The focus of this work is the story of the unfolding of his journey to those two Central Asian khanates, Khiva and Bukhara. The results of this mission would have revolutionary effects on Russia's relationship with Central Asia in the years to come.

In August, 1857, Ignatiev was summoned to Warsaw for long discussions with the Tsar, Alexander II. Ignatiev pushed for an Asiatic orientation for Russian foreign policy in order to challenge England's hold over India and her recent incursions into Afghanistan. In complete sympathy with Kovalevskii, the Director of the Asiatic Department, he opted for the government to send scientific expeditions to Persia, Afghanistan and the Amu Darya River to study the geography of Central Asia. He also called for increased trade with Central Asia, because Russian industry could not compete with English, French or American trade anywhere else in the world. In the back of Ignatiev's mind was the frightening spectre of another war with Great Britain in Europe. However, Ignatiev felt that Russia could make a strong showing in Central Asia which would be "the best means of maintaining peace with England".(28)

The Tsar was so impressed with Ignatiev's ideas that he sent him back to St. Petersburg for more formal talks. In a letter to Bariatinskii, the Tsar wrote:

"The young Ignatiev, who has recently returned from London will soon be sent to you with a plan for counterbalancing English influence in Asia. Their activity in India from day to day is taking on a more serious character and I hope that we will be able to bring our influence to bear in the Orient".(29)

In St. Petersburg Ignatiev entered into talks with the Foreign Minister Gorchakov, War Minister Sukhozanet, Kovalevskii and Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich. In a long note Ignatiev summed up the results of the meeting:

In case of a break with England, only in Asia can we undertake a struggle with some hope of success. In times of peace, the troubles caused by England in Asia and the increase of our influence in countries which separate Russia from British possessions will serve as the best guarantee for keeping the peace with England.

Only Asia is left for our trade activity because the development of our industry is too weak to enter into successful competition with England, France, Belgium, America and other governments.

The investigation of Central Asia, the establishment of close relations and the strengthening of our influence and the lessening of British - all this would contribute to the benefit of Russia. Therefore, it seems to me that it is not necessary to hide all the expense for the investigation of local conditions in a great donation of the Treasury. Rather one would expect that rich merchants and manufacturers would express a readiness to cooperate with this enterprise.(30)

As a consequence of his concepts, relationship with the Tsar, abilities, and familiarity with the activities of British agents in Asia, Ignatiev became the obvious choice for leadership of the last of the three missions to the Central Asian khanates of Khiva and Bukhara.(31) One of the mission's objectives was to respond to letters from both Khans, who had expressed their hope through representatives sent to Alexander II's coronation (1856) that St. Petersburg would send an embassy.(32)

Ignatiev was a believer in a very aggressive Russian policy toward Central Asia. Although his views did not coincide with the Foreign Ministry, he received a good hearing from the War Office. His main theme was to subordinate the khanates to Russian influence which had not, to date, been possible. However, in the mid nineteenth century a different situation had arisen due to the encroachment of the British Empire.

A major question for the Mission that needed to be solved was the feasibility of ship navigation on the Amu Darya. Solid knowledge of the river would answer such questions as how easy it would be for Russian ships to reach Afghanistan from the Aral Sea. The Amu Darya (the Oxus River of Antiquity) is today the principal boundary between the USSR and Afghanistan for a distance of about 680 miles. It then snakes north into the Uzbek SSR (khanates of Khiva and Bukhara) and empties into the Aral Sea for a total length of 1,500 miles.(33) In 1858 Ignatiev knew only that the Amu Darya flowed into the Aral Sea, but no Russian knew where its headwaters lay or even the navigation potential of the middle portion. The possibility of using this route for the development of trade was the heart of Russia's renewed interest in Central Asia after the Crimean War.

The political cunning of Ignatiev manifested itself in an idea which he expressed to Kovalevskii, Head of the Asiatic Department, that "certain measure be taken that would exert influence on the Khivan and Bukharan khans, that a *sine qua non* for the Russian Embassy going there would be the granting of permission for Russian ships to use the Amu Darya".(34)

In early 1858 the question about sending the Mission was decided. A decisive role in the Mission would be played by the Aral Sea Flotilla under the command of Captain A.I. Butakov. Ignatiev received his "Instructions" from the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April, 1858 with the Tsar's approval. The general objectives of the Mission were:

1. that a study of the complicated situation at that time in Central Asia be made;
2. that a consolidation of Russian influence in Bukhara and Khiva take place and that broadening and improvement of conditions for Russian trade be undertaken; and
3. the destruction of the harmful interference of the English who are trying to penetrate Central Asia and lure it into its hegemony. (35)

Ignatiev was supposed to cement friendly relations between Khiva and Bukhara on the one hand and these two and Russia on the other. The most important goal of the "Instructions" was the attainment of "free navigation" for Russian ships on the Amu Darya. This, of course, affected relations with Khiva because of its location in relationship to the Aral Sea. In order to help the Khivan Khan make up his mind, presents would be showered on him. For example, an organ was to be lugged by camel from Orenberg to Khiva, a distance of 750 miles. If the assent of Khiva could be gained, Russian ships were to move as far south as possible on the river making exhaustive scientific experiments along the way. In fact, because a successful outcome of the question of navigation was considered so important, it was decided that Ignatiev should not insist on lowering tariffs on Russian imports to Khiva from ten to five percent.

The "Instructions" also stated that Ignatiev not stir up the Turkmen, Kazakh and Karakalpak (who lived just south of the Aral Sea) tribes against Russia. Ignatiev was not to play them off against each other to Russia's advantage. These tribes lived on the Ust-Urt Plateau between Khiva and Orenberg and it was in that no man's land that problems for Russia could arise. Khiva expected the tribes to pay tribute to them and Ignatiev was not to get involved in discussing this issue. Also he was not to bring up the very touchy question of where the northern frontier of Khiva ended and the southern border of Russia began. Neither Khiva nor Russia had control over that area as it was occupied by nomads mentioned above.

Discussions with Bukhara were to be of a slightly different nature. No agreement had ever been reached with Bukhara about liberating Russians sold to them as slaves by the Turkmen and other nomads. Previous missions had tackled this problem with only temporary success. Often an agreement to release prisoners depended on the good will of the Khan at the moment. As soon as the Russian mission left Bukhara the agreement would be broken.

Especially bothersome was the problem of British trade competition, because Bukhara was closer to British India and had felt the effects of English trade more than Khiva. A merchant explained it this way:

... that in 1841 and especially 1842 the English completely upset the market for Russian goods. They (British) brought in all kinds of goods at such low prices (even taking a loss themselves) that the populace (Bukharans) bought up the new cloth and paid no attention to our (Russian) textiles.

Driving out our goods, the English after a year or two, more than doubled the price.(36)

Ignatiev had to find ways to improve Russia's trade position in the khanates while analyzing the reasons for the successful entry of British trade enterprises there. Connected with this was the most pertinent question of all regarding Great Britain: to learn from spies, khanate officials, merchants, nomads and itinerant travellers what aggressive designs England had in the area. To this end, Ignatiev was also instructed to establish contact with N.V. Khanykov's mission to northern Iran.

Concessions were to be offered by Ignatiev in the event the Russian demands became stalled. Khivan subjects who resided in Russia and had Russian wives would be permitted to remove their families to Khiva. Merchants from Bukhara would be permitted to trade in all Russian cities and could maintain a permanent booth at the huge Makarevskaja Trade Fair at Nizhnii-Novgorod.

Hopefully the successful outcome of talks with the khans would result in a "binding document in writing" which would be announced to the people in a special decree.

The War Department gave Ignatiev its own "Instructions". (37) He was authorized to bring back topographical, statistical and in general any military information that might be useful for the future. He was to find out the loyalties of the various Turkmen tribes; and specifically whether their loyalty was to Russia or Khiva. Ignatiev was also ordered to seek out information about the military potential of the Turkmen including the system of roads linking Khiva with Bukhara; and the location of the trails that led over the Hindu Kush and Pamirs beyond to Persia and Afghanistan. He was also to investigate the flow of the Amu Darya, which was significant to the military planners as the upper reaches of the Amu Darya and the valleys of the Hindu Kush had not yet been charted.

The War Ministry, apparently in conflict with the Foreign Ministry, asked Ignatiev to establish contact with the leaders of the Turkmen who were located on the frontiers of Khiva. In case of emergency they could, perhaps, be utilized and subsidized by Russia against Khiva. These nomads were exceedingly unreliable and an alliance with them could prove disastrous to either Russia or Khiva.

Special military instructions related to the Aral Sea Flotilla placed Ignatiev in full command over all naval activities on the Mission. Nagging problems of command existed and according to Ignatiev the naval commander, Captain Butakov, was not easy to deal with. Personality problems would hound the expedition.

Regarding the exploration of the Amu Darya, a question arose as to what was to be done in winter with the naval expedition. Should the Flotilla be broken up and a base (*zimovka*) set up on shore? Of course, this might not be accepted by the Khivan authorities. In fact the entire naval aspect of the Mission was bound to raise the suspicions of the Khivans. It was felt that the Flotilla must remain intact but that Ignatiev would have authority to decide

on the spot what should be done.

Butakov had led an earlier expedition (1848) where he learned a great deal about the location of the Amu Darya's entrance into the Aral Sea.(38) Because of shifting sands, however, the exact delta or channel needed for the Russian ships might have changed over the years. Since Butakov had the only first-hand knowledge of the water route, his advice was valued even though later it would prove to be incorrect.

Butakov was not the only problem Ignatiev inherited from the start of the trip. The Governor General of Orenberg and Samara, General A.A. Katenin (1800-1860), suffered the same delusions of grandeur as Butakov. His resentment of Ignatiev's appointment knew no bounds due to the fact that Ignatiev was barely 25 at the time of the Mission, some 33 years the Governor General's junior. Further, Ignatiev's high level contacts with the Viceroy Bariatinskii (Katenin's rival), Miliutin and the Tsar made him a target for all aspiring bureaucrats. Katenin looked at the Orenberg steppe and Khiva as his own private domain. He could not stomach the fact that Ignatiev, was "Fligel-Adjutant to His Highness". In fact, Katenin had wanted to lead the expedition.

In a report to the Tsar in the spring of 1858 Katenin stated about a month before the expedition was to begin that Ignatiev's proposed plan (of course, actually prepared by the Foreign Ministry), was a bad one.(39) He reminded the Tsar that the Kirghiz (Kazakh) steppe was twice the size of the French Empire and claimed that only he could control the various nomad groups. Katenin offered to send out his own personal convoy from Orenberg ostensibly to protect Ignatiev. At the Emba River about 120 miles from Orenberg his convoy would be in a position because of its desert experience to assume leadership over the Mission.(40)

Katenin felt that Ignatiev would be glad to get out of the desert and return to the bright lights of St. Petersburg after only ten days. In actual fact, the Emba was hardly more than one-sixth of the way to Khiva. Apparently Katenin made little impression on the Tsar.

Ignatiev's journey to Orenberg, the last jumping off place before the wilds of the Central Asian deserts, began in St. Petersburg on April 20, 1858, after a gala farewell party given for him by the Tsar. At the railroad station he was seen off by Kovalevkii, the Head of the Asiatic Department and architect of the upcoming Mission.

Upon arriving in Orenberg, Ignatiev quickly contacted the other members of the expedition. The group came from a quite varied background and Ignatiev complained that he had received too many applications for the Mission.(41) It was very difficult for him to turn someone down especially if he was a friend of his family, and the expedition to Khiva and Bukhara had caught the fancy of the Court youth. A great deal of enthusiasm was displayed. And, of course, the way careers were made in Tsarist Russia, a chance to serve Ignatiev who certainly favored young people would not hurt one's future.

The route of the Embassy went from Orenberg which they left on May 15, across the Emba River southeast via the Ust-Urt Plateau along the western shore of the Aral Sea to where the Amu Darya entered the saline sea; then south along the river to Khiva and later Bukhara. The return journey would not be over the same terrain but north across the desert from Bukhara to where the Syr Darya discharged into the Aral Sea, and then north again across the Emba (here paralleling the first trek) to Orenberg.

Ignatiev encountered numerous difficulties. The situation in Central Asia was extremely tense at that time. Khiva was undergoing a long, drawn out struggle between the Uzbek ruling class and the Turkmen nomads. This altercation was in full swing when Ignatiev's Embassy reached the Emba. As Colonel Ignatiev's secretary, Kiulevein, reported:

Dissension and incessant wars gave rise everywhere to terrible inflation and famine. The fields were not sown and remained infertile. A pood (36 lbs.) of bread which cost usually 80 kopecks now sold for four rubles ... In the summer of 1857 a terrible epidemic raged, probably a consequence of the famine and emaciation. Especially hard hit were the children who became affected by cholera.(42)

Ignatiev was faced with the fact that the Turkmen Khan, Ata-Murad, was blockading two of the main cities of Khiva, Kunia-Urgench and Khodzheili. Ata-Murad had asked Katenin, the Governor General of Orenberg, for his people to receive Russian citizenship. Of this latter request Ignatiev was not made aware. Thus it seemed probable that Katenin might use Ata-Murad to try to gain control of Ignatiev's Mission. Ignatiev knew that if he negotiated with Ata-Murad the suspicions of the Khivan Khan would be aroused and he wisely decided to change the route to Khiva, bypassing Kunia-Urgench and travelling through Kungrad en route to Khiva.(43)

Later, Ata-Murad paid a special visit to Ignatiev's camp in order to gain Russian citizenship for the Turkmen. The Khivans did not know about these negotiations. Also, the Khivans intercepted a letter from Katenin in Orenberg to Ata-Murad, their chief enemy. Thus Ignatiev, right from the start, had gotten himself into a prickly situation with the Khivan Khan, Seid-Mohammed.(44)

Another problem faced by the Embassy was the conflict raging between Bukhara and Kokand. His instructions specifically opposed any Russian participation (to side with Bukhara, for example) in that struggle. Yet en route to Khiva, he wrote back to the Asiatic Department in St. Petersburg that it would be wise to side with Bukhara against Kokand, which would allow the connection of the Syr Darya line of forts with the Siberian line of forts (Semirechie), allowing Russia to eventually occupy Turkestan and Tashkent. Siding with Bukhara, Ignatiev alleged, would be most logical because Kokand was continuously hostile to St. Petersburg. His letter, a kind of amendment to his original instructions, opted for offering compensation to Khiva if Russian ships could ply the Amu Darya freely.(45) For example, Ignatiev proposed that all Russian caravans from Orenberg to Bukhara would go via Khiva, thus affording the Khivans

an assured 2% tariff on all goods.

In reply, Foreign Minister Gorchakov expressly forbid Russian military support for Bukhara in its struggle with Kokand. Gorchakov asserted that the stakes were too dangerous for Russia to get involved in a costly struggle thousands of miles from Europe. Also, the fear that Britain might intercede threw a complete damper over the operation. As for Russian caravans paying tariffs in Khiva on goods going to Bukhara, Gorchakov averred that a complete study of this question would have to be made by the Minister of Finance. (46)

These questions and others descended upon Ignatiev's caravan like a dark cloud as he daily ploughed through the desert from Orenberg. A new crisis arose when Captain Butakov's Flotilla, which was supposed to rendezvous with Ignatiev's land forces at Chernyshevskii Bay on the Aral Sea, failed to show up. The ships had, apparently, become completely lost along the marshy shoreline of the Aral Sea and he could not find the main stream because the current at that time of year was so weak. When Butakov finally did find the correct channel, the Khivan authorities would not give him permission to ply the Amu Darya south.

Butakov's Flotilla carried provisions for Ignatiev and was very important for his survival. Seid-Mohammed, the Khivan Khan, was extremely suspicious of what exactly the Russian Embassy was up to in his lands. The intercepted letter to his rival, Ata-Marad, and the appearance for the first time of the modern steam-driven European ships moving across the Aral Sea from the north into his country made Seid-Mohammed quite apprehensive. A major concern was Butakov's use of the cannonade to help serve as a means to determine the depth of the water. The terrified natives were convinced that the end of the world was at hand. Without permission to reconnoiter even the lower reaches of the Amu Darya, the Russians met with their first setback.

Colonel Ignatiev's Embassy arrived overland in Khiva on July 18, 1858; it had been on the road for over two months. Seid-Mohammed received the Russians very tentatively. He seemed very indecisive and was in no mood to make any concessions. (47)

The Embassy remained in Khiva about six weeks. Ignatiev wanted the Khan to sign "the binding document" establishing friendly relations between Russia and Khiva, which would act as a guarantee for Russian merchants, permit Russian ships to ply the Amu Darya, permit a Russian trade official to live in Khiva and would grant a 2½% tariff for Russian goods in Khiva. (48) Further, Ignatiev, on behalf of the Tsar agreed to forget forever all previous Russian-Khivan conflicts, including demands on the Khan for compensation for the pillage of Russian caravans on Khivan territory in the past. He agreed to grant Khivan merchants the same rights in Russia as other Asian merchants and to permit Khivans who were married in Russia to bring their families home to Khiva. A Khivan agent would be allowed to take up residence at Orenberg and, finally, Ignatiev presented to the Khan the possibility that the Russians would agree to a tariff on all transit trade on the Amu Darya (Khivan

territory).(49)

No direct results could be gotten from Seid-Mohammed. He agreed to most of the demands, but balked adamantly on the use of free navigation on the Amu Darya for Russian ships. The Khivan merchant class was afraid that with Russian shipping on the river, the local traders would lose a lot of business.(50)

While the Russians were waiting for the Khan's decision, an unfortunate incident occurred. Captain Butakov's steamship the "Perovskii", while making surveys of the Aral Sea, paid a ransom for and granted asylum to a Persian slave of the Khivans. The Khan was livid and demanded all Russian ships to leave his territory for he was certain the Russians were organizing a *coup* against him. Seid-Mohammed was especially incensed at the type of work the "Perovskii" was carrying out, namely, making surveys of the coastline with very sophisticated instruments. He claimed the topographers were the very epitome of Satan. However, Ignatiev refused to return the former slave.

The wily Khan waxed hot and cold. He obviously could not afford a major conflict with Russia. He professed eternal friendship with the Tsar in St. Petersburg but hinted that, perhaps, Ignatiev was not carrying out his mandate correctly. Ignatiev became wary of continuing negotiations, however, stating that treaties meant nothing to the Khivans and that it might become necessary for Russia to use physical influence on Khiva at which time Russia would get a fortified position at the delta of the Amu Darya to oversee Russian navigation.(51)

While the Khan kept stalling the signing of a treaty, the situation got more tense for the Russians in Khiva. Nobody in the Mission slept at night. Rumors flew about that the Khivan government would have them all murdered (which, of course, is exactly what happened to Bekovich in 1718). It was not so much when they would die as the means: murder, poison or arson.

Governor General Katenin in Orenberg heard of these happenings and in retaliation he ordered a Khivan caravan in Orenberg to be held back from returning home.(52) Nothing moved the Khivan Khan to sign a treaty. Increasing daily pressure was felt by the Russians but on August 31, 1858, after a visit of six weeks, the Ignatiev Mission departed Khiva for Bukhara to the south. Nothing had been signed and even if it had it would not have meant anything. Russian-Khivan relations reverted to the Treaty of 1841 made by Danilevskii which had already proved worthless.

Seid-Mohammed would have liked to have murdered the Embassy's members and probably gave it a lot of thought. However, he was in no position to add another enemy to his already long list. Also, a needless provocation of the Russians in the long run could be disastrous for him. A European power fought differently from an oriental one. Great Britain could have supported him against Russia and only with British aid could he survive. The problem was that the British main staging ground in India was too far away to commit the needed number of troops and equipment for a modern war.

Furthermore, the Khan's struggle with the nomads and the enmity of the Bukharans placed him in a precarious position.

The departure from Khiva was almost funereal, but Seid Mohammed was concerned about "face" and correct formalities were observed. Ignatiev's Mission followed the right bank of the Amu Darya southward toward Bukhara which lay 120 miles distant. Throughout Khivan territory the caravan was constantly concerned about a surprise attack. However, on September 20, 1858, the Mission reached the city of Bukhara.

Bukhara at that time was involved in a heated war with Kokand. Consequently, the Emir Nasrullah was out of the country. The psychological climate was much different from Khiva for the Russians. Distance had made the Russians the least possible threat to the Bukharans.

Ignatiev drew up the conditions the Russians hoped the Bukharans would accept for the improvement and formalization of relations. These included a reduction of the tariffs imposed on Russian merchants, a more equitable pricing system which did not discriminate against Russian traders, the stationing of a Russian agent in Bukhara, separate stalls for Russian merchants in the caravan-sarai, freedom of movement for Russian merchants in Bukhara, free navigation for Russian ships on the Amu Darya and finally the liberation of Russian prisoners.(53) One can see in contrast to the Russian-Khivan talks the tremendous emphasis placed on economic questions and trade.

A primary yet unstated goal for Ignatiev was to thwart British attempts to subvert Bukhara in every way possible. The British threat to Bukhara was real because it was much closer to Afghanistan where Britain had troops stationed. Ignatiev informed St. Petersburg that prior to his arrival, two Englishmen dressed as Afghans had appeared in Bukhara and upon his arrival he discovered that two other Englishmen dressed in Indian garb were in the city. Even when he was in Khiva, Ignatiev had heard about British intrigues in Kokand, which was not at war with Khiva that Britain had specialists in Kokand teaching artillery, engineering and other military skills.(54) Further, he had learned that Great Britain wanted to establish a military alliance with both Khiva and Kokand. When in Khiva, Ignatiev felt inclined not to believe what he later found out to be true.

On October 31, 1858, the Ignatiev Mission, after a six week stay, departed Bukhara. By November 26, the group had reached Fort #1 (now Kazalinsk) on the Syr Darya and in early December, after a seven months' absence, Ignatiev reached Orenberg.(55)

* * * * *

N.P. Ignatiev (1832-1908) was the godson of Tsar Nicholas I (1825-1855). He had impeccable connections which held him in good stead throughout his diplomatic life. A graduate of the Imperial Corps of Pages where his father had served as Director, he completed his education at the Academy of the General Staff and at 20 years of age was commissioned in a Guards Regiment.

Ignatiev came of age when Russia was becoming involved in the Crimean War (1853-1856). His political viewpoint was centred upon expanding Russia's position out of the Black Sea and into the Mediterranean. Of course, the main obstacle for this achievement was the Turkish presence at the Bosphorus and his first assignment after graduation was to study the Turkish language in preparation for his participation in Constantinople as a member of the Menshikov Mission.

The Mission's task was to work out some kind of arrangement with the Sultan, and because it failed, the Crimean War occurred. Ignatiev was recalled and sent to the Baltic provinces where he was eventually promoted to Chief Quartermaster of the Baltic Corps. It is interesting to note that he saw no action in the Crimean War, but received a coveted post after the war as Military Attaché to Great Britain, and was appointed an aide to the Russian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (1856).

Ignatiev made a speech at the conference castigating Austria (although neutral) for occupying Moldavia and Wallachia. He claimed that Austria was pressured into this action by Great Britain, so as to force Russia's Bessarabian border behind the Pruth River. Russia's inability to penetrate south of the Pruth (which she had done so many times in the past on the road to Constantinople) proved crucial to her defeat.

At the Conference, however, Ignatiev was able to save Russia the loss of southern Bessarabia which was considered a moral victory in comparison with the major defeat she suffered in having to raze all fortifications in the Black Sea.(56) By the time the Conference was over Ignatiev was made the head of the Russian delegation.

Ignatiev spent only one full year (1856-1857) out of his life in the West, but it had an enormous influence on him. It shaped his views toward the outside world and especially England. His research on the Napoleonic era influenced his sympathy with Napoleon's Anglophobia. Like Napoleon, he came to realize that if one could not make a direct attack on England then the next best policy would be to get at England through Asia.(57) This, of course, was the key to his views on Russian foreign policy, and eventually he became a prime instigator in developing a strong Russian policy away from Europe and toward Central Asia and China.

Ignatiev felt that, "The West is Russia's one danger and the West can only open our eyes to the fact that we must guard against her".(58) The incipient stirrings of Ignatiev's Pan-Slavism date from this period as an outgrowth of Slavophilism. He saw in the Slavophile movement only an expression of national self-consciousness and looked on all the Slavs outside of Russia as natural allies against the increasing aggressiveness of the regenerated Teutons (Hohenzollerns and especially Hapsburgs).(59)

As Russian Military Attaché (1856-1857) in London he showed extra-ordinary industry and indefatigable curiosity in ferretting out all kinds of information about British activity in the

Middle East. He also studied British artillery methods and equipment in order to "clarify all the military and political intentions of our enemies in Asia as well as in Europe". Ignatiev repeatedly warned St. Petersburg of British aggressive attitudes toward Russia. He stated in one dispatch that "English are actively preparing for war and will lead an attack from two sides: from the south, from the Persian Gulf, and from the East through Afghanistan".(60)

His stay in London, however, ended on a bitter note. According to his nephew, Ignatiev was caught red-handed trying to snatch a model of a new type of cartridge out of a display in the British War Museum.(61) He was eased out of his position but the Tsar was not at all displeased.

After the completion of his trek to Khiva and Bukhara (1858) Ignatiev spent a year in Peking negotiating with China. He became subsequently Head of the Asiatic Department in St. Petersburg. From 1864-1877 he served as Russian Ambassador to Turkey where he negotiated the Treaty of San Stefano which temporarily gave Russia a strong position in the Balkans. The results of the treaty were overturned by the Congress of Berlin. The failure of Russia to keep these gains caused his early retirement. He emerged briefly to serve in the reign of Alexander III; in 1881 he was appointed Minister of State Lands and later Minister of Interior. Within a year he was back in retirement because the Tsar on the advice of Pobedonostsev, his Prime Minister, felt by proposing the calling of a Consultative Assembly he was opening the gates for the enactment of a constitution.(62)

Ignatiev was one of the ablest, most forceful and imaginative Russian diplomats of the nineteenth century. His numerous memoranda reveal thorough knowledge, ardent patriotism and the ability to exploit an exponent's weaknesses. Yet his unilateralism and Panslavism blinded him to Russia's vulnerability to European powers. His bitter rivalry with Gorchakov and Andrassy prevented him from becoming Russia's foreign minister. His extensive memoirs published in Tsarist Russia before and during World War I are, despite their bitter polemics and tendentious self-justification a revealing account of Russian diplomacy in the Near East before and during the Balkan crisis.(63)

Ignatiev's memoirs of his Mission, translated from original Russian and abridged, are presented in the following pages along with a few concluding remarks. *Mission to Khiva and Bukhara* was originally published in 1897. These memoirs include many of Ignatiev's letters and correspondence with the Asiatic Department; the most interesting of which are those written to his father. Ignatiev had an eye for drama and a flair for intrigue which comes across quite strongly in his writings. And perhaps most importantly, the memoirs provide a historical context for understanding Ignatiev's politics and personality, which in conjunction with his high Court connections formed the driving force behind the change in Russian policy from diplomatic to military in the 1860s.

FOOTNOTES - INTRODUCTION

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17. Dupree, p. 405.
18. Ignatiev, N.P. *Missia v Khivu i v Bukharu v 1858 godu Fligelia Adiutanta Polkovnika N. Ignatieva*, S.P. 1897, p. 1.
19. See Zisserman, A.L. *Fel'dmarshall Kniaz' Aleksandr Ivanovich Bariatinskii, 1815-1879*, 3 volumes, M. 1890.
20. Zaionchkovskii's "Introduction" to Miliutin, D.A., *Dnevnik Miliutina I*, M. 1947, p. 35.
21. Khalfin, N.A. *Tri Russkie missii*. Tashkent. 1956, p. 20.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
23. Within two months of the Report the Sepoy Rebellion began.
24. Khalfin, *Tri....* p. 22.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 35. Quoted from Semenov, P.P. "History of the Russian Geographic Society". S.P. 1896.
27. Lincoln, Bruce, W. *Petr Petrovich Semenov Tian-Shanskii: The Life of a Russian Geographer*. Oriental Research Partners. 1980, p. 32.
28. *Missia....* p. 2.
29. Letter from Tsar Alexander to Prince Bariatinskii from Warsaw September, 1857 in Rieber, *Politics of Autocracy*, p. 107.
30. *Missia....* pp. 2 and 3.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
32. Zalesov, N.G. "Posol'stvo v Khivu i v Bukharu Polkovnika Ignatieva v 1858 godu". *Russkii vestnik*. 1871. Nos. 1 and 2, p. 450.
33. Dupree. pp. 34-35.
34. *Missia....* p. 4.
35. Khalfin. *Tri....* p. 43.
36. Nebol'sin, P.A. *Ocherki torgovli Rossii s srednei Aziei*. S.P. 1855, p. 45.
37. Khalfin. *Tri....* p. 45.
38. *Missia....* p. 37.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
40. Khalfin, N.A. *Politika Rossii v srednei Azii (1857-1868)*. M. 1960, p. 92.
41. G. Kiulevein served as Colonel Ignatiev's secretary. The Governor General of Orenberg had his own trusted agent, M.N. Galkin, on board, perhaps, to act as a spy or at least as one who could send dispatches back to Orenberg and be ready for action if Katenin so felt. Officers of the General Staff included Captain Salatskii and Headquarters Captain Zalesov (later promoted to General). Zalesov kept excellent notes and was a leading member of the expedition. Two topographers, Lts. Iakovlev and Zalenin, were included for surveying of the desert and the shoreline of the Aral Sea and the Amu Darya. The

Naval Lieutenant A.F. Mozhaiskii, later immortalized for his efforts to create an airplane, served as Captain Butakov's deputy on the Aral Sea Flotilla. The astronomer K.V. Struve who came from a very prominent Russian family, accompanied the group. His role was to gain new fixes on the stars from the desert. Ignatiev's Embassy also included one of the leading orientologists of the day, Peter Ivanovich Lerkh (1828-1884), who represented the Academy of Sciences and brought back important information, manuscripts and rare coins from Central Asia which are now in the Hermitage Museum in Leningrad. This material was important, for in 1858 only a few Russian writings about Khiva appeared occasionally in the Russian press. See Bartol'd, V.V. *Sochineniia*. IX. *Istoriia izucheniiia vostoka v evrope i Rossii*, Moscow. 1967, p. 441.

According to M.N. Galkin the number of people on the Embassy was 83. See Galkin M.N. *Etnograficheskie i istoricheskie materialy po srednei Azii i Orenbergskomu kraiu*. St. Petersburg. 1868, pp. 164-165.

However, A.L. Popov, the Soviet historian writing in 1940 cites a figure of 117 members. The discrepancy may result from the size of the convoy which was to accompany the Embassy. See Popov, A.L. "Iz istorii zavoevaniia srednei Azii". *Istoriicheskie zapiski*, No. 9, 1940, p. 203.

42. Kilevein (Kiulevein), E. Ia. *Otryvok iz puteshestviia v Khivu i nekotorye podrobnosti o khanstve vo vremia pravleniia Said-Mohammed-Khana, 1856-1860*. S.P. 1862, p. 9.
43. Khalfin. *Politika*.... p. 93.
44. Popov. P. 203.
45. Zalesov. P. 458.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 461.
47. Khalfin, N.A. *Rossia* p. 374.
48. Khalfin, N.A. *Politika*.... p. 97.
49. Zalesov. pp. 44-46.
50. Khalfin. *Politika*.... p. 98.
51. Zalesov. p. 47.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.
53. Khalfin. *Politika*.... p. 100.
54. *Missiia*.... pp. 211-212.
55. Khalfin. *Politika*.... p. 103.

56. Hunigen, Gisela, *Nikolai Pavlovic Ignat'ev und die Russische Balkanpolitik, 1875-1878*. Frankfurt. 1968, pp. 13-17.
57. Rieber, Alfred *The Politics of Autocracy*. Mouton. The Hague. 1966, p. 73.
58. Iotsov, Dmitrii. *Graf Ignatiev i nasheto osvobozhdenie*. Sofiia. 1939, p. 27.
59. Strakhovsky, Leonid. "General Count N.P. Ignatiev and the Pan Slav Movement" *Journal of Central European Affairs*. No. 3, October, 1957, p. 225
60. Khalfin. *Tri....* p. 20.
61. Ignatiev, A.A. *50 let v stroiu*. M. 1941, p. 10.
62. The Ignatievs had ancient roots in Russian soil. They are believed to have evolved from the "Chernigov nobility". The first one in recorded history, Biakont, worked for the Moscow Grand Prince in 1340. His son was the Metropolitan Aleksei who was in charge of construction of the first set of walls around the Kremlin in 1366. However, the Ignatievs were not of the highest circle of nobility in Moscow; they attained ranks of falconer and musketeer, Vas'ka participated in the *Strel'tsy* Revolt of 1698 and was executed on the *Lobnoe mesto* and Red Square by Peter the Great. Ignatiev's grandfather, a major, served as Commandant of a small fort in the west of Russia which never surrendered to Napoleon (1812) during the French invasion.

Ignatiev's father, Pavel Nikolaevich, graduated from Moscow University, was a member of the Preobrazhenskii Regiment and served in Paris during the Napoleonic Wars. Upon his return to Russia in 1825 he joined the Decembrist movement until December 14 (the last day) when his mother talked him out of participating. He was the Company Commander of the first company that came out on the square at the coronation of Nicholas I and was greeted in a personal friendly manner by the Tsar-to-be. All his life he spoke of the Preobrazhenskii Regiment with great respect. He later served as Director of the Imperial Corps of Pages where many of the leading officials of Alexander's reign had attended. For example, D.A. Miliutin had been a graduate. No doubt young Ignatiev benefitted from these contacts. As a member of the Army Medical Academy he attempted to liberate it from the German domination over its personnel and curriculum. At any event the elder Ignatiev was well connected in the Russia of Alexander II.

Ignatiev's mother was a member of a prominent industrialist family, the Mal'tsevs; her elder brother started a factory that produced railroad cars. Another brother founded a glass factory in Gus'Khrustal'nyi. Both of these enterprises were founded with a large amount of French capital. *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar'*, II, p. 784.

A.A. Ignatiev (1877-1954) was N.P.'s nephew who served

before 1917 as a diplomat. Before and during World War I he was Military Attaché in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and France. Until 1937 he worked in Paris trying to get Tsarist funds returned to Moscow. In 1937 he was recalled and worked in the Institute of Higher Education for Military. He retired in 1947 as a Lieutenant General in the Soviet Army. See Igantiev, Aleksei Aleksevich. *50 let v stroiu*. Moscow. 1941.

63. *Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History*. XIV, p. 129.

CHAPTER I

PREPARATIONS

It is clear from the start that Ignatiev, although a relatively obscure young diplomat in the Tsar's service, was a major factor in shifting the overall emphasis of Russia's foreign policy after the Crimean War from Europe to Asia. The hidden reason for the Embassy to the highly inaccessible khanates of Khiva and Bukhara was to acquire information of a military and political nature so that sooner or later a military campaign could be conducted. In 1839 under General Perovskii such a task had been undertaken which had ended in complete failure because of faulty intelligence.

Ignatiev was unable to impress his own plans for the expedition on the other government figures. He was forced to settle for a compromise on the mechanics of the expedition. From the beginning he had trouble setting up the point of rendezvous with the Aral Sea Flotilla. Communications between Ignatiev and Captain Butakov were bad. No location was ever agreed upon where Butakov's ship the "Perovskii" would meet up with Ignatiev's overland Embassy on the western shore of the Aral Sea. The general area of meeting was to be in the Chernyshevskii Bay. There was no telegraph at that time. Another negative problem was that Governor Katenin, the Governor-General of Orenberg Province, felt he should have been the leader of the Embassy since he had spent over 20 years in the area. Katenin's jealousy of Ignatiev with his most favorable credentials caused no end of problems.

The jumping off place from Russia into Central Asia in the 1850s, the last frontier outpost, was Orenberg situated over 700 miles from Khiva and 820 from Bukhara; these two khanates lay to the south over hostile deserts. Ignatiev arrived in Orenberg on May 1, 1858 leaving him two weeks to assemble his Embassy for the trek over the desert.

To make matters worse before he even began the trek the relations between Khiva and Bukhara were extremely hostile. Thus he had the additional problem of wondering whether the Khivans whom he was to visit first would permit him to cross over through their lands to their enemy, Bukhara. Each suspected the other of great duplicity in regard to Ignatiev's Embassy. Finally could Ignatiev expect to return home to Russia from Bukhara via Khivan territory where he had already visited? Ignatiev insisted on a return to Russia on a completely different route keeping him out of Khivan territory. At the same time Khiva itself was riven by civil



“The Main Square of Vernoe in 1857.” Pencil drawing by Pavel Kosharov, 1857. Courtesy of the All-Union Geographical Society, Leningrad, USSR.

war brought on by Turkoman tribes. Ignatiev's Embassy, however, in spite of all these problems and many others was able to depart Russian soil from Orenberg on May 15, 1858 .

* * * * *

In September, 1857, not wanting to get an official diplomatic post in the Orient, I asked for "a non public office", as an unofficial observer who was well acquainted with the East. I told Gorchakov, "In case of an explosion with Great Britain, only in Asia can we expect to win and harm Turkey. In peace time, difficulties started by Great Britain in Asia and the increase of our influence in those countries which separate Russia from the British Empire, will be the best guarantee of keeping the peace with Great Britain".

I felt that Asia was the only area remaining for our trade activities and development of our industry because we were too weak to enter into successful competition with Great Britain, France, Belgium and the United States of America. The investigation of Central Asia and the promotion of friendly ties in this region would increase Russian influence and lessen Great Britain's.

In conversations with Prince Konstantin Nikolaevich, Gorchakov, the War Minister and Kovalevskii, I continually showed the necessity to investigate this region in order to subordinate Central Asia to Russian influence, gain control of Amu Darya (if not in fact, then politically and commercially) for the use of our military ships and finally to threaten Great Britain in order to force it to value our friendship. Kovalevskii agreed with me about the investigation of Central Asia and the importance of the Amu Darya. I wrote several notes proposing to send expeditions to Persia and Afghanistan by spring, and insisted that an Embassy be sent to the Syr Darya and from there to the Amu Darya not later than April 15.

It was decided to send two expeditions: one scientific-political to Herat and possibly later to Afghanistan via Persia; another for the investigation of the Amu Darya, Khiva and Bukhara under the pretext of returning a Russian Embassy to Central Asia to reciprocate the Embassy of the khanates which had been sent to the coronation of Alexander II.

Knowing that Asiatics react only to material force and that diplomatic discussions rarely bring positive results, I suggested certain measures be taken that would exert influence by the Embassy on the Khiva and Bukhara khans and stipulate as a condition of the Embassy, that in these two Asiatic capitals, our naval ships receive permission to use the Amu Darya. Kovalevskii of the Asiatic Department agreed with my point of view. I also proposed the need for a Flotilla to accompany the Embassy, but details could not be worked out without a preliminary agreement with the naval administration and the Orenberg Governor General.

Soon after my departure from St. Petersburg to Turkey and Egypt (at the end of October), E.V. Kovalevskii, in agreement with

Konstantin Nikolaevich, wrote a report that somewhat changed the original proposal; but with the Tsar's support, decisive steps were taken giving the Embassy the power it needed by April, 1858. These changes marked the beginning of the problems, contradictions and intrigue which plagued the Embassy's conceptualization.

The biggest problems I faced came from the Chief of the Aral Flotilla (A. Butakov), who wanted to act independently and have the Naval Headquarters handle the whole affair (preparing the ships, etc.); and from the Governor General of Orenberg (Katenin) who wanted to maintain overall control of the Embassy and lead it via the steppe to the Emba with his own personal detachment.

The Chief of the Aral Flotilla, Butakov (Aleksei) had lived for several years in Fort #1 (Kazalinsk) in boredom and with the desire for glory. He considered the Aral Sea and Amu Darya his exclusive preserve, intending to control all investigations and research, and to get credit for bringing the first Russian naval ships on the Amu Darya. This dream meant that he would not put up with anything blocking his goal. It would be difficult for a newly arrived Chief from St. Petersburg to know what to expect.

The Governor General looked at the Orenberg steppe and the khanates as his own private domain. He could not stomach the fact that I, acting as "Fligel-Adjutant to his Highness", reported directly to St. Petersburg and not to him. Katenin was dissatisfied with the decisions of the Committee and orders which came from St. Petersburg, and proposed to personally lead the expedition and appoint his own "Chief of Staff" or Quartermaster as Chief of the Embassy. He suspiciously and negatively referred to my appointment. In spite of my personal relations with him as well as good family connections, my arrival was unpleasant. "General Adjutant" Katenin wanted to go to the Kirghiz steppe for the whole summer and approach Khiva, and proposed to separate the Embassy and its convoy from his own personal detachment.

As a sort of compromise, it was decided that Katenin would in fact accompany the Embassy with a military detachment from Orenberg until it reached the Khivan frontier across the Ust-Urt Plateau. Katenin felt that the detachment's presence would help to restrain hostile Turkmen from any action against the transport of the Embassy.

Once across the Ust-Urt, the Embassy was to meet Butakov's Flotilla at Chernyshevskii Bay on the Aral Sea. Butakov received instructions, "to bring a steamer with two barges and go along the eastern Ust-Urt, on a parallel with the Embassy, allowing them the continuous possibility to receive aid and supplies from the ships right up to the entrance of Khivan territory".

The Aral Sea and the delta of the Amu Darya were investigated by Russian sailors under the command of Butakov (in the steamers "Perovskii" and "Orbruchev") in 1848 and 1849. From this we learned that the Amu Darya (Oxus) flows into the Aral Sea through five branches. Butakov considered the branches Taldyk and Laudan accessible for the ships of our Aral Flotilla, and in order to allay the difficulties for navigation, he planned to lighten the load of the

"Perovskii" when crossing over the sand bar by transferring the fuel as well as some freight onto two barges. My whole expedition was based on those plans. When I was still in St. Petersburg I wrote a note to Butakov in which I insisted on more substantial information than just the paper suppositions.

I never received any explanation or answer to any of my questions despite my insistence on having explanations before departure in order to calculate accurately how the Embassy might coordinate closely with the Flotilla. Only limited assurances were given me that positive steps had been taken for the successful navigation of the "Perovskii" and "Obruchev" and that the former, with Butakov on board, would wait for us at Chernyshevskii Bay and would communicate to me all necessary information. In such a fashion the Embassy would depart from Orenberg, in complete ignorance about what to expect in the Aral Sea and not knowing whether Butakov's program could be completed.

In spite of the unexpected lack of preparation in St. Petersburg regarding the Aral Flotilla, I had warned Captain Butakov that it would be necessary to hasten the arrival of the steamship to the Aral Sea because I would arrive toward the middle of June at Chernyshevskii Bay. My plans were to transfer part of the cargo to the steamer for ferrying along the Aibugirskii Bay. Butakov was also to leave a supply of water for our caravan in the Ust-Urt Plateau. It seemed impossible for the Embassy to cross Aibugirskii Bay without the aid of the Flotilla, and in view of the upcoming dangers in Khivan territory I felt separating the caravan from the convoy (leaving only the convoy for defense) was implausible.

Thinking that orders could be issued and carried out as if this were Krasnoe Selo (headquarters of the Tsarist Army near St. Petersburg), Katenin had no idea of the political relationships between the Khivan Khan and Russia; nor did he understand the local conditions of climate in Khiva and Bukhara. He had made plans for the Embassy's return from Bukhara through Khiva and the Ust-Urt Plateau. I noted the inconvenience of his plan and I warned Katenin in writing about my preference for the route of the return journey. In Orenberg, I collected information about the hostile attitudes of the Khivans, the treachery of the Khan (Seid-Mohammed), and the protection rendered by him to the anti-Russian Kirghiz.

In an explanatory note to the Vizier in Khiva (the Vizier handled foreign affairs for the Khan), Katenin, at my request, pointed out that the Embassy's route "would be the way the Khan wanted". The letter stated that I was bound to go from Khiva to Bukhara and from Bukhara "to hasten back to Russia", and went on to state that I wanted to avoid a long stay in Khiva by conducting negotiations "in the least possible amount of time".

It was obvious that the expedition thought up by me in October, 1857, had become distorted and deprived of its basis. I felt that due to Katenin's and Butakov's interference, the movement of the Embassy would be slowed down, made complicated and made dependent on a number of chances related to the timeliness of Butakov's arrival on the Aral Sea, in addition to the necessity for the

Embassy to go via the steppe with a large military detachment and caravan which would subject us to delays and unhelpful deprivations.

All this would make a hypocritical impression in Khiva, for I felt that the significance of all this to the Khivans would hardly contribute to the impression the Governor General wanted to make. In St. Petersburg I could not have foreseen all the difficulties created by the need to implement a concerted program with the activities of the Governor General and the Chief of Aral Flotilla. It was difficult to gain a clear understanding of how to prepare and how to supply the expedition. The local Orenberg administration managed without restraint to fulfil its desires, both dreamed up and whimsical.

Before I had left St. Petersburg, I was aware of Kovalevskii's main goal, "to investigate the Amu Darya as much as possible and to draw a map of this region, discern whether the valley of the Amu Darya would be suitable for cultivation in the future; and to investigate the development of trade and navigation".

The long range goal of our Embassy was to find the best independent route to India via the Syr Darya and Amu Darya or via Kashgar, due to the fact that Russia was not permitted to go through Persia. In spite of the fact that the expedition had supplies for one and a half years, I wanted to return from Bukhara in November. If the Khans agree to the visit of our commercial agents in their capitals, then we would seek permission to leave some kind of caravan-base without any official sanctions. Kovalevskii begged me to avoid leaving my place of domicile in Khiva and Bukhara and to "never appear to the Bukharan Emir on horseback in the street".

He decided in case of a lack of money I was to borrow it in the name of the Foreign Ministry in Khiva and Bukhara. To my question, "What should be done if the Khan, in case of some imagined fear, received the Embassy in an insolent or negative fashion or if the approach of our ships to the Khivan shore evoked a response of gunfire?", Kovalevskii answered that "in the event of local hostile activity I was not to pay any attention nor attach any political significance to it; but if I have already reached Khiva and there is a disturbance or a slaughter, that I should learn from spies the nature of the situation and decide in good time to leave the Khivan territory".

Concerning the entrance of ships into the Amu Darya, despite the Khivan Khan, it was decided with great caution that the Khivans would not be allowed to hold up the Embassy by means of a ransom. We were not to risk having the Flotilla spend the winter in the river, and instead were instructed to drop back to the river delta at the entrance into the Aral Sea if this situation should arise.

The Ministry authorized me to promise to lessen the tariffs at the Customs on the frontier for the Khivan and Bukharan goods in return for our opening of navigation on the Amu Darya. To the question of "what point of view we should take in Khiva concerning an extension of the Syr Darya military line by our forces and what

should be the Embassy's position if Russian captives of the Khivans run directly to us for protection", Kovalevskii gave the following answers: "No attempt should be made to give our view on extension of the Syr Darya line; it would be better not to aid and abet Russian prisoners in Khiva or give them protection. This might endanger the whole Mission".

Concerning Persia and Persians the Mission was instructed to avoid contact with Persian emissaries, but to be friendly if they were met. We were to assist Persia, but not Dost Mohammed (Afghanistan) and were to speak up for Persian captives in the khanates and contribute a cash donation for their release.

In connection with natives from India that we might meet in Central Asia, Kovalevskii advised attempting to sow mistrust of the English, and if any Indians wanted to defect from Khiva or Bukhara, we were to promise them asylum. The Mission was given permission to communicate with Khanykov but was forbidden to send a Russian agent to Balkh, Kumduz, Gissar and others, and instead, was given orders to wait for a trusted official sent from the above towns, or if we had to send someone it should be a Kirghiz.

Keeping in mind the many rumors that arise in the East, I asked Kovalevskii "whether we should give support to a defensive union among Afghanistan, Persia, Bukhara and other independent states bordering on India with the goal of being hostile to England, and whether we shouldn't push for a similar grouping of states in Central Asia thus trying to include Khiva and Kokand in the alliance?" The Director of the Asiatic Department stated that, "we should attempt the above as far as possible, if it was feasible".

As a consequence of these decisions and in conjunction with Katenin's and Butakov's desires, I felt that the Ministry hadn't given me enough means for the realization of the goal I had in mind and it was already too late and not in my power to change Katenin's program. Heatedly, I told this to Kovalevskii and predicted deplorable results and the possible failure of the expedition. But because of youthful passion and courage, I considered it a matter of honor not to evade the difficult responsibility and to do everything that was in my power in order to serve the trust of my Tsar.

By the conclusion of my visit to St. Petersburg at the end of March, I found the whole affair decided including the appointment of a great number of unnecessary people from different departments, the majority of whom were taken from the Orenberg District (selected by the Governor General). I would make their acquaintance only on the eve of the expedition which was to depart on May 15, 1858. It was already too late to make that deadline, because it left me only 20 days at the assembly point. The Aral Flotilla, despite the assurances of Katenin and Butakov, could not be outfitted in order to be ready for our rendezvous at Chernyshevskii Bay.

A major problem we would face would be the necessity to wait out the confluence of the Amu Darya for a more favorable time, because the water in the river is very low in June. My objections

to the Minister of Foreign Affairs resulted in a reply from both the Minister and the Naval Ministry, and was in the form of soothing phrases such as: "that is the way it looks from your vantage point but actually, the obstacles are insignificant and Katenin and Butakov will receive orders to hasten the preparations".

Until April 15, I continued to send information to the War Ministry which I had already collected in England. On April 19, I received letters of credentials to the Khiva and Bukhara governments and instructions from the Foreign Ministry and War Ministry.

On April 20, I began to have great fears of the dangers concerning the upcoming trip. Several of my friends disturbed me with the suggestion that the Tsar and Prince Gorchakov "were attempting to get rid of me with these informal, detailed instructions in the hope that I would perish somewhere or that I would bring such shame on myself that the powers that be in St. Petersburg would forever avoid me".

Part of my fear stemmed from the fact that our relations with Khiva and Bukhara were far from satisfactory. The activities of our agents in Khiva and Bukhara was a witness to the infertility of our diplomatic conversations.

Khiva, considering itself unassailable, continued to harm us in the Kirghiz steppe as much as possible. They consistently referred to our notes as impertinent and impudent lies and did not pay any attention to the suggestions of the Governor General of Orenberg. The Khivans continuously harassed and robbed our traders, agitated and confused our Kirghiz, and sent our emissaries and tax collectors into the Ust-Urt and to the Syr Darya. Khiva also bought Russian citizens sold to them by the Turkmen after they were taken prisoner.

Bukhara was more restrained and not as ugly or bold as Khiva. The Bukharan Emir Nasrullah, although he understood the importance of trade relations with Russia, dreamed about his own personal role in Central Asia. He, too, permitted the purchase of Russian prisoners and harassed our traders by charging twice the tariff for Russian merchants of that for Moslems.

Faith in God and an unabashed desire to serve Russia buoyed my spirits. I would distinguish myself in the upcoming enterprise and felt that intrigue and gossip were beneath my dignity and not worth my attention. The farewell with the Tsar and Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich was very touching and showed their great trust in my expedition. It made a deep impression on me.

Many of my friends said farewell to me as if for the last time, and my parents made the direst predictions. What touched me the most was the quiet Empress Alexandra Fyodorovna. She blessed me with the ikon of the Holy Mother's beautiful miniature portrait and I knelt before her while she took my head in her hands and blessed and kissed me. Tears of emotion sprang from me when she began to reproach the Tsar who was just entering the room. She scolded him for sending me away on purpose "into that terrible country where he

will uselessly be risking his life while here he would be very needed". The Tsar replied that there was no one else qualified for such a dangerous mission.

On May 1, I finally arrived at Orenberg where I was given lodgings at the Club. I reported in full dress uniform to Governor General Katenin, who received me with affability and kindness. Reminiscences of former close family relations temporarily smoothed the unpleasantness of the orders I carried from St. Petersburg concerning my Embassy.

In my report to Kovalevskii from Orenberg on May 7, 1858, I stated:

"All my travellers have arrived in Orenberg. I have also met with the local people who have been assigned to the trek. Everything is about ready... The weather is warm, and food on the steppe is plentiful, but because of transport problems, unfortunately we will not be able to leave before May 15. Meanwhile, I have not lost hope and as a consequence of my insistence and because of the especial concern of Katenin, I am sure His Excellency will speed up the collecting of the needed camels so that I will be able to leave before the main detachment which will be convoyed by the Commander of the region and go without stop to the Aral Sea".

The main concern in steppe transit was the problem of supplies, including food for people, horses and camels. My first important decision was to leave Orenberg as soon as possible to get into the steppe so that the pasture land could be used before it dried up. Also, it was important to reach the Amu Darya before the extreme summer heat made life unbearable. The loss of each day was precious and the attempt of the Orenberg Commandant to time the departure of the Embassy with the maneuvering of the accompanying convoy was obvious. He could then reap the benefits of commanding the convoy through lands administered by him.

Before the departure of the Embassy into Central Asia, political and military goals of the trip had been emphasized, but trade possibilities could not be forgotten. It was hoped we could conclude trade treaties in Khiva and Bukhara which would improve the conditions of Russian traders and make easier their relationship with the local inhabitants. Therefore, at my suggestion, two Russian merchants were assigned to my Embassy as agents. I was successful in persuading a local merchant named Deev to accompany us as our agent. This took care of one of the main problems I had in assembling the Embassy, and I felt an experienced salesman like Deev could render valuable services. However, the absence of well informed commercial agents was extremely regrettable and deprived us of any possibility of forging closer trade relations between Russia and the khanates.

In a letter from Orenberg, I informed Captain Butakov of my wish to hasten the departure of the Mission. Also I wanted to inform the Captain that I would be arriving at the Aral Sea about

the middle of June, and would probably board the steamer, "Perovskii" in order to cross Aibugirskii Bay.

Governor General Katenin had issued the orders for our return trip to Orenberg from Bukhara through Khiva via the Ust-Urt Plateau. I informed his Excellency that this would not be possible and insisted that I would select the proper return route to Russia because a return by the same route might disturb the local people and by taking another route I would increase my knowledge about the country.

In order to ensure protection of the Embassy while in Khiva, I requested Katenin to supply me with a letter which would guarantee the Khivan Khan's protection. The letter is as follows:

"To the High Ranking Khan of Khiva and the Respected Vizier.

In fulfillment of the highest approval expressed in the charter of His Imperial Majesty - Most Esteemed Tsar which was sent by the messenger, Sheik Ul Islam Fazil' Khodzheir to the highest official of Khiva, the Imperial Embassy whose destination is Khiva in accordance with the desires of the Khan arrived recently in Orenberg and on May 10 departed Orenberg to the Kirghiz steppe. The leader of the Mission who is authorized to conduct negotiations with the High Ranking Khan is Colonel Ignatiev who was personally selected by his Imperial Highness and serves as a Fligel'-Adiutant, i.e. one of his closest and most loyal officials. The retinue of the Embassy consists of a Secretary, two interpreters, two medics and other officials. The total number is 16 people. The Embassy will be in Kunia-Urgench by June 29. Until that point it will be accompanied by my own personal convoy which at Kunia-Urgench must be substituted for by the convoy guard of the High Ranking Khan. This information was already conveyed to the respected Divan-Beg in a letter of February 22 by me. I consider it my obligation to inform the respected Vizier on the above subject so that the Khivan Government will be aware of the exact number of personnel of His Majesty's Embassy and the exact time of the Embassy's arrival on the frontier of Khiva so that he will have the Convoy-Guard there. Also I find it necessary to warn you that Fligel'-Adiutant Ignatiev is authorized to travel from Khiva to Bukhara and from Bukhara he is to hasten back to Russia. Because of his high rank he is needed in Russia. For the same reason he will in all likelihood be forced to shorten his stay in Khiva and therefore it would be extremely helpful if negotiations with him and the Khivan Government are conducted in the shortest possible time".

Written in Orenberg, May 6, 1858".

The preparations and preliminary conversation with the Governor General lasted two weeks and on May 15 the Embassy was ready for departure. Its personnel, along with the convoy, included 117 men with 178 horses, 352 camels and 22 wagons, a hospital wagon and field kitchen. We made an awkward and impractical looking sight for a campaign through the steppe.

It was necessary to set up a rigid system of rules for the security of the group and for the economy of the people, horses and camels, including such matters as in what order the people should line up during the march and how the nightly bivouacs would be organized. Dissension would be a problem and the farther we became removed from civilization, people who had been sponges in city life would become "do nothings" on the trek. I attempted to foresee all difficulties before they happened.

The Chief of the convoy was in complete charge of the caravan of the camels and the camel drivers, the servants, etc. He was responsible for the loading, feeding and organization of the line of march of the caravan and was in charge of the security of the Embassy as well as all personal property. Three senior officers (by rank) commanded the Ural, Orenberg and Archers battalions and three junior officers commanded the supply train which included the camels, drivers, horses, cattle, wagons, etc. By turn, officers were to do guard duty.

One of the two General Staff Officers, Captain Salatskii, was put in charge of topographical work. Two officers of the Corps of Topographers and two other topographers assisted him. They worked up a daily journal or log and they were always positioned at the head of the caravan and selected places for bivouac. All the topographers spoke Tatar and Kirghiz and were to be responsible for collecting interesting information from the inhabitants about the local regions.

Another officer of the General Staff, Captain Zalesov, had the job of keeping the official diary for the Embassy. It included political and statistical information and a depiction of the military forces in the area. Zalesov stayed with me to give orders and communication to the Embassy as well as to the Orenberg authorities.

A representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kiulevein, received an appointment as Secretary and handled all financial matters. Galkin was instructed by the Border Commission to carry out talks with the Kirghiz (nomads) and collect information about trade. He also kept a diary for the Orenberg Governor General Katenin. Lerkh collected ethnographic, linguistic, archaeological and historical information about the Kirghiz and later about the natives in the khanates.

Doctor Pekarskii wrote a medical journal and attended to the officers on the Embassy, while Doctor Batarshin served as the medical officer for the convoy and, because of his knowledge of Tatar and because he was a Mohammedan, treated the natives on occasion. Struve carried out astronomical observations, recorded barometric pressure and made weather forecasts.

I resolved to severely observe the systematic carrying out of rules and regulations and program for exacting compliance with orders. On the day of departure, May 15, my personal staff was to include 27 military and civilian officials, one Chaplain, 125 Cossacks and musketeers, 14 servants, 202 horses and 559 camels. But because the accompanying convoy had to depart from the Embassy

when it entered Khivan territory, 50 Cossacks and musketeers would remain.

On May 2, I wrote my father:

"Unfortunately no one counted on an early departure. The camels designated for the Embassy will begin to arrive in Orenberg only in the middle of May. We will hardly be able to depart before the 13th. Katenin wants the Embassy to go with him and his convoy to the Emba. It would be much better to have just my own single detachment proceed into the steppe".

"In spite of all I can do we will not be successful to leave Orenberg earlier than May 15 as was ascertained in Petersburg. Katenin insists that he go with us; together we would have one detachment to the Emba. But this would be exhausting for the people, for the horses and for the camels".

On May 11, I wrote my father:

"... for the whole week I have been so busy so that I didn't have time to write you".

"It seems that only on the steppe will I have the possibility to reset mind and soul and write you. Until departure my letters will be few".

"It has rained all week. The grass is high on the steppe and the weather is again warm. We have had two dances here. Today's was in the Illuminated Garden and the building of the Caravan-sarai. The day before yesterday there was a spit and polish parade. Especially the elegant Cossack uniforms which we will have to wear when we arrive in Khiva and Bukhara. It seems that it will be difficult for me to coordinate three conditions: (1) fulfill the desires of St. Petersburg (i.e., Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War and Navy); (2) do everything thoroughly; and (3) have a better personal relationship with the Chief of the Region (Katenin)".

On May 15, I wrote my father:

"By 6 a.m. all is bare in my apartment. My things and the people were sent yesterday evening to the other side of the Ural River but today at 4 a.m. I sent out my caravan. The camels and the carts were sent with the Chief of the convoy Sargent Bureninym with 12 Orenberg Cossacks to the first bivouac point which was about 12 miles from Orenberg. The rest of the convoy which consisted of 43 Ural soldiers, three Orenberg Cossacks and 22 infantry musketeers, that is troops on horseback, remained here for prayers. Katenin had set the time for prayers at 9 a.m. (he did not like to rise early). Because it was so hot the trip was short. Katenin will depart several hours

after me and will bivouac (his convoy) at the same location as I. To go together with the Chief of the Region makes me uncomfortable and my detachment, too. Because having arisen early in the morning I would try to make the second leg or even several miles into the third".

"Instead of a rest, Orenberg exhausted my nerves. With Katenin I kept on the best relations. It was difficult to do business with him because of his nervousness. Everything went well between us because we avoided difficult questions. The group which accompanies me is leading me into despair; there are so many naive people who are like little children, impractical, unprepared for difficulties and I expect very little support from them in upcoming adventure".

In a letter to Kovalevskii from Orenberg on the day of departure, I expressed my feelings more:

"The passion for representation of the local officials in all decisions and the insistence on detail of the local government (i.e. Katenin) occupied all our time. The supplying of the Mission and the arming of the convoy detachment which was of such a huge size but which lacked military discipline means my caravan soon will resemble Perovskii's expedition of 1839. ... I don't understand how I will traverse the Ust-Urt Plateau or even reach Khiva or the supplies".

CHAPTER II

ACROSS THE STEPPE TO KUNGRAD

Previous Russian embassies to Khiva had never made use of the great waterway, the Amu Darya, which flowed 1,500 miles north from the Hindu Kush to the Aral Sea. Khiva was located close to the Amu Darya; farther to the south by 120 miles was Bukhara also near the Amu Darya. The river was a link between the two khanates on the one hand and the Aral Sea on the other. Before steam navigation contact between Russia and the khanates, intermittent at best, had been made by camel caravan across the desert.

The Russian advance south and east from Orenberg in the 1830s and 1840s had focussed on establishing a major fort at the mouth of the Syr Darya on the Aral Sea. Fort #1, later named Kazalinsk, was made the naval headquarters for the Aral Sea Flotilla of some half a dozen ships of various size which plied the inland, land-locked salten sea. Fort #1 located on the eastern side of the Aral Sea had been the home of Captain Butakov for many years. He had sailed all over the Aral Sea and in 1849 had visited the delta of the Amu Darya where he was supposed to have charted the channels in the delta; that reed-laden river had never been traversed by a European steam driven ship.

The novelty of Ignatiev's Embassy lay in its attempt to use steam navigation as a support for the caravan journey through the desert. The object of Ignatiev's trek was Khiva which lay about 80 miles south of the Aral Sea near the Amu Darya. Unfortunately Captain Butakov just did not have enough information concerning the water level in the delta of the Amu Darya from his previous journey to make the trip very successful.

On the other hand the second major river flowing into the Aral Sea, the Syr Darya, had been charted several hundred miles inland. In contrast to the situation on the Amu Darya where the Russians had no forts before 1858 a major fort had been established at the confluence of the Syr Darya with the Aral Sea (Fort #1). Because of Fort #1 the Russians would undertake a military push by gunboats up the Syr Darya which by 1865 resulted in the successful occupation of both sides of the river. The two rivers were the key to Russian expansion in Central Asia and their accessibility was enhanced by the advent of steam navigation.

Ignatiev's Embassy was to make use of the new navigational technology. Thus Butakov's Aral Sea Flotilla was to meet up with Ignatiev on the western shore of the Aral Sea after Ignatiev's

Embassy had traversed the Ust-Urt Plateau from Orenberg. The steamer, "Perovskii" after meeting Ignatiev was to carry supplies and push southwards along the coast some four miles off shore while the camel caravan continued its trek on land. Each night a rendezvous was to occur. Later it was ordered that the "Perovskii" still heading south would enter the delta of the Amu Darya, select the correct channel and make reconnaissance by a sounding of the depth of the river. It should proceed charting the river as it went up river for about 350 miles. Bear in mind that the natives had never seen a steamship and didn't make use of the river for trade because their navigational skills were so primitive; sailboats were even unknown. They employed barks as ferries but only for river crossings

Aside from the delayed meeting with the "Perovskii" Butakov had misjudged the location of the deep water channel in the delta of the Amu Darya. Since his previous visit the channels he had charted had filled up with silt.

The hostile incursion of the Turkmen into Khivan territory proved to be another problem for Ignatiev. When Ignatiev's Embassy reached Kungrad on the Amu Darya it was forced to split up. Part was to be transported by Khivan barks on the river some 30 miles to the town of Urgench which was the terminal point for the city of Khiva. The barks were propelled by poles and oars at a speed of 1½ miles an hour. The cavalry were to proceed on foot on the right bank of the Amu Darya in order to avoid the hostile Turkmen who were on the left bank. The two groups under Khivan supervision were to meet up at Urgench, the main port for the city of Khiva about 80 miles from the Aral Sea.

Ignatiev now suspected treachery on the part of the Khivans who thought he might be on the side of the Turkmen in the civil war in Khiva. In case of a blood bath (which had happened to a previous Russian Mission in 1718) Ignatiev wanted to be able to evacuate his forces to the gunboat, "Perovskii" and escape out on to the Aral Sea. But because the "Perovskii" could not find the correct channel in the delta of the Amu Darya the ship was no longer available as Ignatiev and his Embassy were painfully rowed in Khivan barks under Khivan escort up the 30 mile stretch of the Amu Darya from Kungrad to Urgench (Khiva). The Khivan escort behaved perfectly correctly but Ignatiev could not be sure of their trustworthiness. The farther from European Russia he proceeded the more truculent the Khivans became. They gloried in their inaccessibility and found solace in it

The "Perovskii" continued to have great difficulties. Its presence made the Khivans very suspicious. What were the Russians up to with their "gunboat"? Was it there for genuine reconnaissance or was it a part of an invasion of which Ignatiev's Embassy was the main focus? The Khivan Khan heard all these rumors reported to him by his officials and began to wonder .

* * * * *

On May 15 the Embassy departed. It would have been better to have left 10 or 12 days earlier to avoid the terrible heat, but this was impossible despite the persistent energy which overcame the many difficulties resulting from faulty planning. In view of the stubbornness and autocratic manner of the Chief (Katenin) of the Region, we were forced to depart ill-prepared. In retrospect, it would have been much better to have decreased the number of officers and officials and we should have simplified the cost of outfitting the Embassy while providing me with larger discretionary funds.

I began with rather short marches of 12 miles, increasing them gradually, and kept an eye on the condition of the caravan cattle and the amount of water at our disposal. We experienced all the difficulties which could befall a large military transport in the steppe. There was much unnecessary baggage and most of it quite heavy. The blacksmiths on the march had great problems, as did the huge hospital wagon which could not be turned around. From the first marches, there were several junior officers who had nose bleeds and one had a Siberian ulcer.

I was forced to adopt strong security measures in view of my knowledge of the dangers we faced. The caravan stood in a square with the provisions and packs forming a temporary defense. Inside were the various kinds of carts and wagons. Although the guards and sentries kept a close watch during the night, I always slept with a loaded revolver under my pillow and made numerous inspections.

On the first 17 days of the march we travelled about 275 miles. I wrote Kovalevskii that we wanted to give the steamer "Perovskii" time to reach the west shore of the Aral Sea and, accordingly, I was forced to travel slowly. Our junior officers were not downhearted by our rate and when we finally reached confluence of the Emba River and the Aty-Dzhaksy River their morale was very good.

I wrote my parents from the first bivouac:

"I never get accustomed to saying goodbye to our native frontiers and further wandering in unknown lands but nevertheless I become very pensive when I go out on the steppe and from my house in the middle of this green endless sea (steppe). I feel very bold and my soul is completely at rest. It is difficult for me to analyze our future because much hardship and deprivation await us. I am heading into a disastrous situation with a firmness of purpose to do everything humanly possible in order to fulfill the will of the Tsar and serve the Motherland. But I do not dream about success; rather I blindly put my faith in God for good results from this unusual trip".

"I always ride horseback in front of the convoy on each march and even speed up when riding with the Cossacks".

"What I do is necessary because 75% of my retinue is scattered about on carts and wagons. I never get tired. The weather is beautiful and if I was not on such a

lengthy trip with an uncertain future staring me in the face then I would have to confess that I was in my element".

On the steppe there was a noticeable sudden change of temperature in the evenings. During the day the temperature was 80 to 85° F. in the shade, and as soon as the sun went down, it became clear and damp. At night in the tents it was so cold (in comparison to the day) that one had to cover up and put on a woollen cap.

In order to instruct my detachment about the order of march I warned them about negligence at night when we would be marching in areas convenient for an ambush by nomad robbers. We maintained military discipline at all times.

At bivouac, we formed into a square formed of the camels, their packs and goods. At the edge of it were the Cossacks and musketeers (each unit had its own special location in the square) and then the tents of the convoy officers. My tent was located at the very center of the bivouac and behind it stood the kitchen tent, my two personal carriages and another tent for other baggage.

Guards were posted for the night in front of the line of outside packs. Inside the square the animals grazed under special protection. When darkness descended they were driven to the center of the ring and at dawn they grazed till the moment of departure. The convoy had expert officers but I could not say the same about several of the other travellers who were assigned as my closest aides.

At 4 a.m. the buglers sounded reveille and the loading of the camels began. At 5 a.m. our baggage and tents were ready. I usually remained half an hour at the bivouac while all the horses from the corral were brought in and fed. Then, approaching the main part of the convoy who were still sleeping, I would say good morning and sound the call for departure. When moving the Ural Cossack, Leremen, was continually at my side. He was a man of inestimable value who had eyesight like a telescope and spoke excellent Kirghiz and Tatar. A Kirghiz driver accompanied me as well as someone from the "Missions" group. The others scattered along the whole caravan and were usually stretched out over a considerable distance. Using my Cossack as an interpreter, I questioned the Kirghiz and other travellers that I met coming from the opposite direction.

Daily I had lunch with 16 to 20 people. We ate about 5 p.m. or I might say as soon as the cook, Dubrotskii, had time to fix lunch. I scheduled three or four meals a day.

On June 1, I wrote to my father:

"From the time of our departure from Orenberg the weather has been wonderful and hot. It rained only twice. But yesterday occurred so sharp a change that we began to shiver. At night the thermometer went down to 35° F but in the day barely reached 40°. At the same time a strong cutting north wind came up which rattled our tents and

deposited sand and dust into the bivouac. Our last march was through the sand, a foretaste of what we can expect on the other side of the Emba".

"Our travelling to the Emba has been a stroll (piece of cake!). We have had no problem with the water supply; there has been plenty of feed at each bivouac for the horses and camels. Our daily meals are almost as good as those in St. Petersburg. We are doing about 18 miles in a 24 hour day. We do not have strenuous marches and so far on the Ust-Urt we have not encountered any unpleasant neighbors. The only unpleasantness stems from the minges and mosquitos who devour us".

"As I said I consider our trip to the Emba a "stroll". That is only my impression and that of my convoy officers, of the lower ranking officers, of the Kirghiz, and of those few members of the Embassy who have been out on the steppe before. But my travellers from St. Petersburg have turned sour. They press me continually for a day off, want an extra hour of sleep and straggle along at a snail's pace. When we arrive at a place they immediately lie down and go to sleep and only wake up for dinner. In time of need I could not count on them at all. The majority of them in such easy conditions can hardly be expected to attain the goal of the Embassy".

"We are passing through a fascinating part of the steppe. Among our Ural Cossacks there are 12 Old Believers who adhere to a strict fast. Daily they eat some biscuits and simple soup (that is hot water in which biscuits are put) and occasionally fish which they have caught in the creeks. They are furious at the Priest because he fasts only on Wednesdays and Fridays and even "dared" to drink some kumiss, a nasty, drink in their opinion. I am divided on this opinion".

"My nose, ears and especially my lips have been terribly sun burned and my skin is peeling. Such heat with no cover has forced me to shorten the length of the marches for the benefit of the camels and horses. You probably want to know what I do from the time of arrival at Bivouac until we depart again. Arriving at a place I make the final selection for the bivouac which the avant-garde has picked out earlier. Then usually I drink tea, lie down on my cot in order to sleep one and a half hours and after that I go to my writing table and read or write for five to five and a half hours; then they serve lunch. We stay at table one and a half hours and talk. After that I inspect the bivouac and the junior officers and Kirghiz. At 8 p.m. I return to my tent, question the reconnaissance men or some newly arrived Kirghiz. I then give the orders for the next day's march, look over the accounts, the cipher books of Kiulevein, as well as the information recorded by the topographers, meteorologists and astronomers. Having drunk some tea, I go to bed about 10 p.m. or maybe 11 p.m.

This kind of life as you can see is healthy and monotonous. The heat and the endless small problems that need to be solved keep me from writing my diary as I would like".

"Katenin went on one march with me but after today we parted at the Emba. Thanks to the good will of Kovalevskii supported by you it seems possible that I could return to St. Petersburg by winter. This, I know, is really doubtful because all plans from the very beginning have been awry (not o.k.). It is very impossible that all will go smoothly. Years ago we always sent separate embassies to Khiva and Bukhara and each lasted less than five months; it took eight or nine months for those trips to be carried out. I had been instructed to connect the activities of two embassies. I have had to calculate the time needed for these trips and for the two long sojourns in the Khanates. I wrote E.P. Kovalevskii, the Director of the Asiatic Department, my thoughts on the political instructions given to me which are based on information drawn from various sources in Orenberg. Expressing some doubt, nevertheless, I warned "that I will not shirk from my responsibility when the time comes for negotiations with the Khans. In case of doubt or contradictions of local authorities with the orders given to me, I will decide what will be the most advantageous for Russia at any given moment and that which conforms in the best way to the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs".

"Informed about the contradicting information which had been received on the various questions, and which led to inquiries on the part of the Central Asians. I requested of the Director (Kovalevskii) that if he finds out that I am wrong he should send me a positive order from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before negotiations with the Khans begin. I concluded my note to Kovalevskii saying "because generally our promises should be exchanged for needs of the Bukhara and Khiva Khanates; they will be in essence negative and concluded in empty but flowery phrases. Thus wouldn't it be better to try to persuade the Khans of the necessity of accepting and signing our proposed documents? In case of refusal we could take away trade privileges which the Asiatics have held up to this time. In this way we would show that we are not dependent on their trade. Does the Ministry agree with my plan and will it back up if necessary the words with action? At any rate I do intend to attempt this kind of persuasion".

"Concerning the Kokand Khanate, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, obviously, wants to maintain good relations with them. I will instruct in case of a request of the Bukhara Khan (who was in a continuous struggle with Kokand) about our giving aid in a war against Kokand. But I will evade a direct agreement with him and thus leave a way out for us if the situation should change. Further we must look very closely at Bukharan-Kokand relations and be careful. While not coming to terms with a favorable opinion for

Kokand I have developed something much more direct. "According to the latest information", I wrote Kovalevskii, "the Kokandtsy will not give up an underground struggle and often it is obvious they are openly hostile toward us. It seems to me, therefore, the honor of Russia demands we should deal with the Kokandtsy as with people deserving a just reprimand and not negotiate with them. The Bukharans speak of them as robbers and we agree. Therefore, at their first hostile act we intend to judge them severely. It would be advantageous to us in case the Bukharan Emir asked aid of Russia in a war with Kokand to refuse and not use the incident as a means to close the Syr Darya line with Siberia by occupying Turkestan (town) and Tashkent. The Bukharan Khanate even if it was stronger than Kokand could not make trouble for us because of the passive nature of her people and because the Bukharan Emir would have great difficulty (there already are many examples) in subdividing Kokand". I proved that our siding with Kokand against Bukhara would be inimical to our interests. Keep in mind that our Embassy was accepted by the Emir of Kokand in 1841 but ended badly because we could come to no agreements. I have pointed out the necessity of giving the Bukharans some proof of our intentions by having an alliance with us. This might make the Emir dependent on us".

"Concerning the Khivan Khan I pointed out to the Director that only a financial advantage might occur from the transit of our goods in ships on the Amu Darya. We would hope to receive free navigation of the Amu Darya. Therefore I proposed that the Khan collect a two and a half percent customs tax on the actual price of the goods on the ships on the river. Having collected this for two or three years maybe he will lessen it because we will upgrade the riverine facilities on the Aral Sea and Amu Darya in the meantime".

"At the time of the day trip on the Emba I met with the Governor General for the last time. We drank tea together in my tent. He had checked out the caravan and noted that all was in order. At this "reception" Kirghiz and Turkmen delegations appeared the next day and for five hours we had conversation. Because of the long discussions I let my caravan get 18 miles away. With me was a detachment of six Ural Cossacks. We were drenched in a cloudburst. At the discussion at Katenin's it was explained that Iset Kutebarov had been expected and that was why the delegations were there. Kutebarov, however, never showed. I had hoped that he would make good on his original promise and would appear on the Emba with his submission as a consequence of the already announced general pardon by the Russian government for obedient nomads".

My first "test" on the march involved the opportunity to

deal with the nomad rebel, Iset Kutebarov.(1) The strangeness, as Katenin called it, of the "Revolt of Iset" was that Iset considered himself insulted and wanted to avenge himself on the Russians and his enemies on the steppe. However, with others on the steppe he remained on friendly terms. His friendly nomads came from many auls to visit him and the closest clans went on "marches" with him for several days and when they returned to their auls they became peaceful again. They turned to Iset when they needed to search for runaway cattle, horses and for the return of stolen property. Merchant caravans asked him for protection and security. He presided like a judge over disputes among the nomads. The charm of Iset among the nomads was considerable. For the most part they considered him a just man and trusted his word, but felt that he was terribly repressed by our local power.

From a friend of Iset I learned that he knew of my arrival in Orenberg and about our Embassy to Khiva, and wanted to meet me somewhere on the Ust-Urt. I decided not to shun this meeting because it would be a loss of face in the eyes of the Kirghiz if I displayed the slightest fear of a fight with an armed band of deserters.

Our meeting is best described in the following letter written to my father:

"On June 4 in the morning I was getting the detachment ready for departure and had given the order to take down the tents in order to go to Mt. Karage when a scout reported the swift approach of a party of Kirghiz who were taken by our Cossacks at first as being hostile. I halted the taking down of the tents and ordered the "square" formation for defensive purposes. Quickly we prepared for battle. Armed Kirghiz horsemen showed themselves in the surrounding high land under our command. Our Kirghiz camel drivers with terrified faces became agitated and began to bustle about. Very swiftly a Kirghiz jumped out as fast as lightning and right behind Kzhingil'din, our acquaintance, explaining that Iset Kutebarov with his "band" was approaching and asked to be admitted to our bivouac along with his relatives and

(1) Iset was a typical example of the Kirghiz nomad leader who lived in the no-man's-land between Russia and Khiva. Those who followed him believed in him completely. At times he gave allegiance to the Khivan Khan but now because of Ignatiev's impressive Embassy coming through the desert he desired a meeting with him in order to give allegiance to the Russian Tsar. He tried in many ways to overcome his former hostility to Russia aiding and abetting Ignatiev's Embassy. For example several times Ignatiev lost the way but one of Iset's men would show the way back on the road. Also he helped them find water. After his meeting with Ignatiev he never again gave allegiance to Khiva. Thus he represents a kind of signal that Russian power was come to stay in Central Asia and he wanted to be on the winning side. Finally he got more privileges for himself and his people by accepting Russian citizenship.

dearest friends in order to meet me and give submission before a worthy representative of the White Tsar. To turn back the request of Iset would have been unthinkable. It would have turned him to despair, forced him back out on the steppe to continue his raids and pillaging or else he would have been forced to seek protection from Khivan authorities. The Khivan Khan had already extended him a written invitation. I foresaw that my reception of Iset would bring on jealous dissatisfaction on the part of the Governor General toward me and might put our relations in a delicate situation. But there was nothing else to do but to make use of this propitious moment which was becoming more favorable by the minute to cease forever the disorders which had agitated the steppe and compromised our power in the eyes of the Central Asians. I agreed, therefore, to accept Iset but, aware of the treachery and the sensitiveness of Asians and not wanting to demean the ringleader of the rebels in the eyes of the Kirghiz, I let my charm fall among them. I instructed an officer to go out with an interpreter together with Kzhingil'din to meet Iset and tell him categorically that he will not be admitted into our "Square" until he makes a sign of submission, by placing his weapons on the line of our first (outer) packs. He and his retinue must approach me unarmed, with submission, as a defeated runaway. Iset fulfilled the demands without any backsliding although giving up his arms to "our" Kazakhs caused him confusion and wavering. He was obviously fearful of some harm to himself".

"He was very tall, with an athletic build. He had on a white high Kirghiz hat and a thin black cloth shirt with silver buckles. Iset was easily distinguished from the horsemen who accompanied him by his clear and intelligent presence. Not more than six months ago he was a powerful and arrogant rebel, self-willed, who had control over all the population on the steppe from the Ust-Urt Plateau to Ilek, i.e. to our old frontier. Iset now was peaceful but without dignity. He entered my tent with three of his closest companions".

"To make a favorable impression on the Kirghiz I did not go out to meet Iset but only stood when he entered, listening while standing and watching the confession of full submission to the Russian Emperor with a request for forgiveness for his past rebellious activity. Meanwhile Iset was invited to sit down and my negotiations began".

Our negotiations were recorded by General Zalesov in the official diary of the Embassy:

"The Chief of the Embassy expressed his satisfaction to Iset for his arrival, listed clearly and in a positive manner how for a number of completed crimes the Government had shown leniency towards him and that

equalled the hopeless situation that he and his cohorts now found themselves. Iset noted the comparison between his past and future situation. He was told that at first he had slithered away as a fugitive who was subject to legal arrest and sentence. But that now because of his sincere repentance a quiet life awaited him in freedom and if he showed further proof of his loyalty he could hope for the attention of the Government if he could bring an everlasting peace to the Kirghiz. It was also told to Iset that the powerful Russian Government if it had spared him so far would not be so lenient in the future because a huge army would be sent in to catch him. It was also explained to him that any hope he might have in gaining support from the Khivans would be useless because we now have very friendly relations with them; the proof of this would be our trip to Khiva at the request of the Khan. Also the Khivans had asked the Governor General to tell them if we should catch Iset. But because the word given by the Russian Government at such a high level is scrupulously observed we opposed telling the Khivans the whereabouts of Iset and decided to receive him in our own camp and instead of penalizing him we have kept our word and because of his repentance extended our hand to him".

"When I received Iset", I wrote to Kovalevskii, "I expressed to him in very severe terms that I had expected some sign of his bringing in his submission. I received him in conformity with the dignity of Russia and in my personal capacity as Emissary of the Tsar and accepted him not as a leader of an independent nomad tribe but simply as a repentant rebel who already had been promised a pardon (Governor General in the name of the Tsar). I did not receive him out of weakness or for a desire to have close relations. Having ended the official talks with him I offered him and his followers some refreshment as a form of hospitality with the goal of certifying to him that he can without fear continue his trip to the Governor General's knowing that the promise of pardon given to him would be honored".

The defeat of Iset was complete and from that moment, the Orenberg Administration could use him for pacifying the Kirghiz steppe and against the intrigues of Khiva. It was incomprehensible to my travellers, who witnessed Iset at the reception, how he was able to morally influence all the Kirghiz even at the moment of his submission. He continued to relate to his own Kirghiz and even with those of our caravan in an authoritative and arrogant fashion and all who came near him seemed intimidated, although they knew we held him captive. The harm which Iset Kutebarov had done to the tranquility of the steppe was considerable, but now that he had surrendered, it remained for us to support him in a positive fashion and

to maintain his legal submission in order to secure peace on the steppe.

We resumed our journey but the lack of news about the Flotilla strongly bothered me and was more painful to bear than the minor incidents of the march from the Emba to the Ust-Urt.

The only information I received about Butakov was a letter dated May 27 from Lieutenant Mozhaiskii who was formerly with the Embassy. We learned that a Sea Command under the leadership of Lt. Kolkotsov left Orenberg and would arrive at Fort #1 on the Syr Darya much later than we had supposed. I wrote to the Director of the Asiatic Department from the Emba, "All our considerations have gone awry if the Aral Flotilla will not be able to fulfill the task that had been assigned to it".

I sent Butakov a note by special messenger (the Kirghiz maintained an excellent messenger service across the steppe, reminiscent of the Mongol system) from the camp at Bish-Tamak, announcing that I would arrive June 9 at Chernyshevskii Bay, and requested that he have the steamer at that location. When the Embassy got to within a five days' march from the Aral Sea I dispatched the topographer, Nedorezov, who spoke fluent Kirghiz and was dressed in Kirghiz outfit, and two of our Kirghiz to the Chernyshevskii Bay with letters for Captain Butakov. The Bay was the last place where the "Perovskii" could receive the Embassy.

I knew that Butakov was an enterprising and zealous sailor and I was at first afraid that having received my note regarding our arrival on June 9 at Chernyshevskii Bay and because of the slowness of the caravan, they would hasten to arrive there earlier and not be able to find us. Through the messenger, Nedorezov, I warned of misunderstandings and expected to establish direct communication between the caravan and the Flotilla. Unfortunately, my expectations were not justified.

I described some of the events which occurred while approaching the Bay between June 5 and 12 in a letter to my father:

"June 5 and 6 we made some rather long marches; twice we made 49 miles. The cold continues. We get up very early before sun-up in the cold but with fires. This is rather difficult especially for the civilians. Everyone yawns, complains and begs me to give them more time for sleeping. A march of six hours I am told is too long. On the trail a Kirghiz overtakes us bringing a letter from you, precious parents and from my sisters. Those who have continually lived in a family situation and in an educated society can not imagine what an impression it makes to receive written material hundreds of miles from the frontier and then to read these letters listening to the sounds of cud chewing camels. Having received a letter I put it in my wallet and ride ahead, maybe 15 miles before realizing the contents. This was like the fox eyeing the grapes Dr. Pekarskii is a good doctor but a natural coward. We are amused while he is afraid of Kirghiz robbers, the

Turkmen, Khivans as well as scorpions and tarantulas. On June 7 I give the detachment the day off. June 7 we have been visited by unusual thunder storms and we had to get supplies to the topographer who we had sent to the Aral Sea for reconnaissance and to discover Butakov from whom not a word. We served Mass with prayers and in the evening (it was Saturday) we had vespers. I read the Acts of the Apostles and Book of Psalms and sang with several officers. Ieromonakh did the service in my tent. The officers usually stood with me there and the junior members were outside the tent. Kirghiz with curiosity and with respectful attention looked on silently. Religious services took place on the salt flats at the foot of the Ust-Urt in such a place where never before since the Creation of the earth had a Christian service been. I turn to you wishing that everyone could have celebrated this day with me. I gave to the junior officers of the convoy and Embassy a cup of vodka and a pound of meat (In Orenberg I had acquired these goods for just such an occasion with my own money). All the officers and travellers dined at my table. Dobrudskii prepared for us an outstanding meal. The holiday was for all. In order to provide entertainment for the junior officers I constructed a target; anyone hitting the bull's eye received a stipend".

"The next day at dawn we climbed up on the high Ust-Urt Plateau and with difficulty searched until 4 p.m. for a suitable place for bivouac. In Orenberg they had given us such drivers who knew absolutely nothing about anything. They were unable to find wells and often led the caravan from the main route. I had to go out with them every day and make sure we were on the right trail. Nevertheless almost every day the drivers would get us lost. When the caravan had strayed we would make inquiries of oncoming Kirghiz or reconnaissance or else just by accident we would get back again. This expedition thanks to a successful selection of companions has given me considerable experience in moving on the steppe. If they ever send me out on another trip I would never take anyone whom I had not personally selected. Several of my companions have been simply awful. Thank goodness that the Commander of the convoy is a Headquarters Officer of the Ural Troops (Burenin) and along with him are several promising officers but other than that much grief has been spent with this clumsy caravan. The convoy it seems loves me. Especially the Ural Cossacks displayed affection to me. They wanted me to take them to Khiva and Bukhara".

"June 9 we crossed the "sands" (Barsuki) and we got lost. Suddenly a Kirghiz appeared out of nowhere, leapt from his horse, and respectfully approached me on foot. He stated that he was sent by the brother of Iset (a disappointed brigand who had submitted together with the older brother) to direct the caravan on the correct trail because we had slipped off the trail and on the direction we were there was no water. He told me that Iset Kutebarov had returned from the Governor General's, and waited for us for two days

based on the schedule of our normal movement. Finally he had gone out looking for us and he had sent people out in all directions. We followed the Kirghiz and arrived soon at a bivouac. That evening two brothers of Iset showed up and gave us a huge sheep, a camel, horse and pitcher with Kumiss. All this was a warmup for our entertainment. I gave the sheep to the cook for preparation, put packs on the camel, but the horse to the extremely surprised Kirghiz I gave to the Ural Cossack who had just lost his and therefore was in great grief. I gave the Kumiss, that unattractive drink, to my beloved travellers".

"I conversed at length with the relatives of Iset and gave them, as is the custom, presents and money. Tomorrow Iset intends to come out and meet me and invite me to his aul".

"June 10 in the morning as soon as we had departed from bivouac Iset on a horse met me surrounded by his retinue. The meeting was carried out in oriental fashion. We rode on ahead, in front of the convoy singers who gaily sang distant Cossack and soldiers' songs during the entire march. Iset, conversing with me, walked on ahead with a mark of deference as if he was serving as leading driver of the detachment until the next bivouac. I am going now on shorter marches because Butakov still had not answered my note about his arrival in the Aral Sea. The scout we had sent ahead to Chernyshevskii Bay told me that by the morning of June 10 no ship was visible in the Aral Sea. I will arrive at Chernyshevskii Bay on June 12 in order to give Butakov time to collect himself and to feel that in good conscience I had completed everything required of me".

"Iset let us have for my bivouac a very comfortable location in the sand dunes which he had occupied before his roamings. I rested three hours in the camp and once more all the relatives of Iset appeared with an invitation to visit their aul for two days. Because of their sincere request I went along with some of my companions on horseback with the retinue to Iset's as a guest. Near us a bunch of Kirghiz milled around increasing gradually after our arrival in Iset's aul. They accepted us with full honors and they had placed a trunk with a rug over it in a big tent, making a kind of throne for me to sit on. The onlookers sat on rugs on the floor. They prepared for us a magnificent feast. The more prestigious the guest, the more courses are served. Kumiss was given to all the guests. A huge plate of fried foal, bullion soup, Pilav (rice with mutton) served also in large bowls and finally tea poured into cups. It was impolite to refuse anything because refusal might imply that you were afraid of being poisoned and my distrust of Iset. Woe to me because thanks to my rank I was always given the largest portion of everything. I found a way out of this regrettable situation. Eastern custom has it that to give an uneaten dish or divide it with someone means to render the highest attention to that person and it distinguishes him from

those surrounding him. I began to pass out portions of food served me to Doctor Pekarskii (we had brought him along in case of poisoning) and then to the close relatives of Iset. Having spent about 45 minutes in the tent and having received a horse (pacer) as a gift, I said goodbye to Iset and returned happily to the bivouac. I took the elder son of Iset with me to Khiva as a driver. He would serve as a living witness of the submission of his father so recently rendered the protection of the Khivan Khan. Also Iset had many friends and acquaintances in Khiva. I gave the father a present, my double barrelled revolver which I had brought abroad".

"In general the presents given to me in St. Petersburg turned out to be more or less useless. I had to send to the Khans in compensation for the entrance of our ships into the Amu Darya the bulkiest and most splendid of the Tsarist presents, and the main one, the organs. After inspection it was found that it could not utter a single sound other than a weak squeak. I was afraid that the glass facade and mirrors would be broken in the camel caravan. Trinkets which had been brought to give away did not correspond to the Asiatic taste and understanding. Women's products suitable to our women hardly found any interest in Khiva and Bukhara. If I had not bought several presents in London and Paris with my own money then I would have disgraced myself in the eyes of the Asiatics".

"On June 12 my caravan reached Isen'-Chagyl. I went out with a small convoy and came out on the shore of the sea about 6 miles from our bivouac. My own eyes convinced me that Butakov was not there. The heat got worse. On the last march we did 21 miles but it was 84° in the shade. It was rather exhausting. I was too lazy to write and I had to write to the Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, Katenin and the Director of the Asiatic Department".

On June 12, the caravan advanced to the sandy hillock of Kum-Suat', which provided a wide view of the Aral Sea. Armed with telescopes, Struve, Mozhaiskii and I searched the horizon but there was no ship to be seen anywhere, nor smoke, nor masts, nor the slightest sign of any Flotilla. The absence of the Flotilla upset my whole plan which had been agreed upon in St. Petersburg.

Now the question was, "What is to be done?" Should we spend an indeterminate amount of time on the shore of the sea with absolutely no information of when to expect the Flotilla? It was unthinkable in these circumstances because the feed was of poor quality and the water in the wells was not sufficient for even a one day stand of the caravan. Going on meant risking the rendezvous with the Flotilla and giving up on our main goal - the investigation of the Amu Darya and the introduction of ships on it. Thus, the Embassy had to extricate itself from the difficult situation regarding feed and water, while on the other hand, we had to keep a look out on the sea for some sign of the "Perovskii". The situation was unpleasant, unexpected and crucial.

Problems of supply had held up the Flotilla and Butakov had not prepared his ships to depart on time. This placed the Embassy in a difficult position in regard to how we were to get to Khiva without ships. It was nevertheless necessary to go from Isen'-Chagyl, over 35 miles of rough trail without food and water, in order to come closer to a place near the seashore where there would be water.

The heat was unbearable during the day and we were concerned that we would not be able to stand a very long march. It was decided to halt until nightfall and we departed at 6 p.m.

On June 14th, I wrote to my father:

"... and the march went off in a favorable manner. Only the "pacer" which Iset had presented to me as a gift suddenly got sick and refused to go on. I was forced to give it back to Iset's son. For the most part we went along the almost perpendicular ravine of the Ust-Urt. In the distance was seen the shining silvery reflection of the moon on the Aral Sea. All night valiant Ural Cossacks sang my beloved songs. When the moon came out the troubadours sang fishermen's or sea songs of the Urals but when the moon went in they sang soft, extremely romantic, charming ditties. My thoughts returned unwillingly to reality when my horse stumbled and almost fell down into one of the ruts which cut through the slopes of the Ust-Urt. At 9 p.m. I stopped the detachment and we dismounted. The trumpeter played taps. We took off our hats and prayed zealously. We got back on our horses, hit the road and again on the steppe was heard the mournful songs of a handful of Russian people. At 7:15 a.m. we arrived at the bivouac and by 8 a.m. we saw on the horizon of the Sea a black moving spot. A great shout went up in our camp and all hastened to the rocky precipice which stood out over the sea. We unfurled flags and started a huge bon fire from the dry sea weed, the wadding from the empty packs and boxes, etc. Finally when we had used up all the combustible material we began burning the heavy government carriage which I had decided to sacrifice foreseeing that at the crossing of the Amu Darya we would have to abandon some of the string of carts which would not be permitted to be sent with the additional convoy. The steamer kept its course for us. It seemed to be coming closer. We could make out the outline of the ship. Our travellers from Orenberg recognized it as the "Perovskii" and we already had begun to descend from the cliffs to the shore in order to receive our sailors in a happy fashion. But suddenly to our keen disappointment the steamer at a distance of 3 to 3½ miles turned to the left and went along the Ust-Urt in a direction well to the south of where we were. In order to exhaust all the means at our disposal to find out where the ship would land, I sent 20 men with rifles on the shore and we began firing salvos in the direction of the ship. The bugler and the trumpeter got down right to the edge of the water and gave out signals. Finally we sent off six military rockets

(the apple of one's eye to be used only against the Turkmen). They flew way out over the Aral Sea but did not stop the steamer. All was in vain. The "Perovskii" proudly passed in front of us in the direction of Devlet-Girei which was located about 72 miles south of our bivouac. My spirits still have not fallen from this mournful misunderstanding which blocked the fulfillment of the instructions given to me and I will have to attempt the last resort. I will send my two topographers to different points of the seashore in order to somehow get in touch with Butakov. I don't need the Flotilla any more. Just the opposite; in my present circumstances it has become an unnecessary burden. I can reach my goal by other means although, without doubt, I would have been more comfortable and happier on the steamship. But to leave the caravan to the mercy of fate I could not permit. I would do everything in my power to let the sailors participate in our expedition and complete the peaceful navigation on the Amu Darya thus fulfilling the desires of Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich who had insisted on that in the Committee when the above instruction was given to me. I was not concerned whether they appreciated my problems in St. Petersburg but I would fulfill my duties to the end".

I discovered that the Khivans for some reason or another (probably rumors from Fort #1 about the hasty and strenuous outfitting of the Flotilla) were leery of our desire to introduce ships into the Amu Darya and decided against it. On the basis of this fact and in order to avoid losing any more time I decided to change the route of the Embassy. Another reason for changing the route was a decision on my part to avoid having the Embassy travel through areas where fighting was taking place between the Khivans and Turkmen. In fact, the Khivan towns of Kunia-Urgench and Khodzheili were under full blockade by the Turkmen.

Using the embarrassing position of the Khan (i.e. giving advanced notice of his refusal to permit our ships on the Amu Darya), I proposed to bypass Kunia-Urgench, in contradiction to original plans, cross the Aibugirskii Bay in hired boats and go on to Kungrad. A part of the presents and goods of the Embassy would be loaded on the "Perovskii" when found and sent with two members of the Embassy who were instructed to see that the goods arrived safely in Kungrad where we would meet up with Butakov.

In order to avoid misunderstanding and to warn the Vizier (in Khiva) about the arrival of the Embassy via a new and different route, I dispatched an official letter to him on June 14. I informed him about the "Perovskii" carrying presents to the Khans and freight of the Embassy to Kungrad. My letter had to reach Khiva quickly, because the "Perovskii" had to enter the Amu Darya immediately before the water level fell, and more importantly, before the Khan would have the possibility to inform me of his refusal and carry out his order blocking the entrance of the Amu Darya to our ship.

As messenger, I selected the keen-witted and efficient Russian salesman Grigorii Panfilov, who in addition to delivering the message was instructed to:

- (1) collect information about affairs in the khanate, about Turkmen and about any difficulties of my new route; and
- (2) to try to get in touch with the "Perovskii" if he could find it somewhere near the shore.

By the 17th of June there was still no news about Butakov. According to rumors of the Kirghiz, he passed over to the Khivan shore of the sea and reconnoitered the estuary of the Amu Darya. The nomads on the shore definitely noticed him. He had made no end of trouble for me, and he irritated both the Khivans and Turkmen. The strange rashness and thoughtlessness on the part of Butakov to explore the estuary without conferring with me completely upset our original plans. Officially the Flotilla had been turned over to my command. Butakov had not fulfilled the orders of the Grand Duke nor of the Governor General who had ordered him to rendezvous with me at Chernyshevskii Bay (where I had remained for six full days).

He never showed up nor sent anyone to the shore and without caution went to the Aibugirskii Bay long before we could arrive and unfortunately, the Khivans noticed him. It is unfortunate for Russia that we had (and have) officials who put their interests over those of the state and hasten after a kind of tawdry, transient distinction sometimes forgetting their chief responsibilities. Judging from the way his mind worked, I imagine he thought that I acted egotistically avoiding on purpose participation with the Flotilla so that I could get all the credit for conducting the expedition on the Amu Darya. Butakov was greatly mistaken.

Finally, on June 18 our continual searchings along the shore turned into a success. Early in the morning travelling along the Ust-Urt and turning north, Butakov saw Lt. Mozhaiskii with six Cossacks and the rocket launcher located about 18 miles from the bivouac. The "Perovskii" went to our location and approached at sunrise. By accident, I was the first to notice the approach of the ship and having halted preparations to depart the bivouac, I hastened down the rocky cliffs of the Ust-Urt to the sea. The Commander of the Flotilla landed at the very spot where I was standing. We talked for three hours while I ordered the caravan to start moving. I went on board the "Perovskii" with Butakov and sailed with him to our bivouac the next night. The steamer could not get closer than seven miles to the bivouac because of fear of running aground and the steepness of the cliffs made it extremely difficult to reach the camp after I stepped out of the launch. I stumbled around the cliff in darkness until 11 p.m. when I reached camp. My absence had caused great alarm in the bivouac.

At my meeting with Butakov, I explained to him his position in relation to the Embassy and what the government expected of the Flotilla. I produced orders from the Committee (in St. Petersburg) detailing instructions for the chain of command. He told me of the need to make a preliminary reconnaissance of the lower part of the river as far as Kungrad before a conclusive decision that the "Perovskii" could navigate the river to Khiva (the town) could be made. I had strenuously attempted to talk Butakov out of the above enterprise which could have negative consequences for the Embassy, for if carried out, it would cause a large loss of

time which could affect our precious supply of water.

From information collected by Butakov it seemed that the Taldyk channel of the Amu Darya which he had earlier (1848-49) thought to be the deepest had now become too shallow. Butakov had explored the mouth of the Taldyk channel as it was the assembly point for the Flotilla consisting of the steamers "Perovskii", "Obruchev", two barges with sail and a tow boat which was to lead the ships into the river. He discovered that the steamer "Obruchev" could not row against the current with the barge and the tow boat and both steamers carried so little fuel that without the fuel supply on the barges continuation was impossible. All the above happened because of faulty programming in St. Petersburg, the late arrival of the Naval Command (June 3 on the Aral Sea), the status of the ships, the inaccuracy of the previous information and the fact that the entire plans were changed by Butakov without the knowledge of the Embassy. I had insisted all along that it would have been expedient to have departed in the first part of May directly to Bukhara and from there return to Khiva. If that had been done the entrance of the Flotilla into the main channel of the Amu Darya could have been achieved.

In spite of all the above I arranged with Butakov that he was to drop anchor at Cape Aksuat and wait for the arrival of Captain Salatskii from the General Staff who had been appointed to take care of the presents for the Khans which, of course, served as the pretext for the "Perovskii" to navigate the Amu Darya. Then Butakov would take the "Perovskii" and one other ship, load the presents, and sail as quickly as he could to Kungrad in conformance with my recently delivered letter to the Vizier.

I requested Butakov not to pay any attention to the personal struggles of the local population, nor any local authorities and not to take action even if the Khivans try to halt the ship. Furthermore, I stipulated that he send me news of the ship's progress as often as possible especially if there was to be any delay which might prevent its arrival in Kungrad. The date of our meeting in Kungrad was designated to be June 25.

On the Ust-Urt we had met several caravans coming from Khiva with goods and Kirghiz who held Russian citizenship and were returning from their roamings or wanderings in the Khivan territory. We solicited as much information from them as possible, and learned several important things regarding the Khiva/Turkmen hostilities, including where military action was taking place, safe routes of transit, and the general dissatisfaction on the part of the Turkmen with our Mission to visit the Khivan Khan. This information confirmed any decision that the original route via Kunia-Urgench was wrong and that the route via Kungrad would be much more satisfactory. Anyway, by following the new route it was now possible for us to study the Aibugirskii Bay, survey the lower part of the Khivan Khanate, and make scientific, political and military observations.

Our trip along the Ust-Urt was attended by various adventures. I wrote my father about the further procession after saying goodbye to Butakov:

"We had three people bitten by scorpions. The first two were Cossacks taking sugar from a sack in which dwelled an uninvited guest. A third one put his hand in his back pocket in order to pull out his handkerchief. The doctor was out riding and fearing almost as much the Cossacks carried the man away, shouting "a scorpion has bit him". But it is not as bad as travellers say it is if you have enough time as well as the necessary means, it will cure very quickly. The inflammation must be localized".

As we approached Aibugirskii Bay and the bivouac at Adzhibai on June 20, we met three Kirghiz returning from Khiva. Two were messengers of the Governor General's who had been sent from Orenberg before my departure into the steppe with a letter to the Khan about the Embassy to Khiva and Bukhara. The third messenger was a Khivan who offered greetings from Azbergen Mutantmakov the Kirghiz Sultan, leader of the Kirghiz population living in the lower part of the Amu Darya.

The messengers delivered a letter to me from the Vizier of Khiva which stated that he had received my letter and that the Khan had ordered the Kungrad Commander, Makhmud-Niaz, to meet with the Embassy and escort it through Kungrad to Khiva.

I learned from the messengers that the Khan asked them detailed and long questions about the reasons for the movement "of large numbers of Russian detachments on the Kirghiz steppe infringing on Khivan territory". Apparently, the Khan expressed suspicion that we were entering into close relations with the Turkmen by giving them Russian citizenship, and then would join hands to fight against Khiva.

It was obvious that a simultaneous appearance near the Ust-Urt of several detachments of Russians (the Embassy, the convoy of the Governor General and two survey parties) which the Governor General had so valued, raised the Khan's fears while Katenin felt that these strategic movements would help the Embassy and make the attainment of our goals easier. This plan had negative consequences by arousing mistrust and suspicion in the Asiatics.

Our own Kirghiz tried to calm the Khan by explaining that Governor General Katenin could only go to the Emba on the same route as the Embassy but from the Emba he was to go on to the Syr-Darya, while the Embassy went along the Ust-Urt. Wishing to omit the possibility of my meeting with the hostile Turkmen Ata-Murad and to certify our actual intentions regarding Khiva, the Khan suggested (through the messengers) that I change my route avoiding Kunia-Urgench and travel directly to Kungrad.

Luckily, this information was received before my messenger, Panfilov, had been received by the Vizier and the Kungrad Commander regarding my decision to change the original route and go to Kungrad. To me, this coincidence proved that I correctly appreciated the state of affairs in the Khanate.

I took this information as an opportunity for writing

letters (June 20) to the Vizier in Khiva and the Kungrad Commander, re-emphasizing that it would be impossible to transport the bulky presents sent by the Tsar to the Khan by land, and that these items could only reach Khiva by water. I further went on to state that I was forced to transport them on two of our ships which "usually plied the Aral Sea and had instructed several officials to take them up the river to the nearest, most suitable place to Khiva for unloading cargo". Also, I requested the Khivans to send boats "in order to accompany and lead the "Perovskii" above Kungrad".

I also tried to point out to the Kungrad Commander that he would have to take responsibility for any unfriendly acts of the local population "in relation to our officials and ships on which they are located", and requested that my officials be accepted in a friendly fashion, including rendering every aid for a non-stop journey.

In my letter to the Vizier, I expanded upon my desire for shortening my visit in Khiva based upon the reason that my Embassy would have to push up the Amu Darya (by ship past Khiva) in order to reach Bukhara quickly and ultimately avoid crossing the waterless sands of the Kyzyl-Kum desert in summer or early fall. Further, in order to remove suspicion regarding our relations with the Turkmen, I expressed sorrow at the rumors I heard from on-coming caravans about the military activity which was taking place near Kunia-Urgench. I hinted at the intention of Ata-Murad to meet with me about the possibility of the Turkmen receiving Russian citizenship, but assured the Vizier of the pleasant disposition of the Imperial Tsar toward the Khan Seid-Mohammed (of Khiva) and that it was necessary to explain to Ata-Murad our good relations with Khiva.

The messengers also advised us that preparations for an honorable reception of the Embassy were being made. In Kungrad the mayor and a good friend of the Khan, Mekhmed-Niaz', was ordered to receive us.

On the night of June 20, a strong northeast wind blew so hard that Butakov was unable to get into contact with the caravan on shore until the morning of June 21. When he arrived at our bivouac, I sent three officials to go with him on the steamer. They were to transport all the presents and bulky items and a five day supply of provisions for the Mission and the convoy which would lighten the load of the caravan, make ferrying the Embassy in small boats across the Bay easier, and would make life easier for the camels.

I had a lengthy discussion with Butakov, and we seemed to see eye to eye. I requested him to:

- (1) Coordinate the movement of the ships with the information from my letter to the Khivan Kungrad Commander.
- (2) Not to pay any attention to any attempt of the natives to delay the Flotilla, nor to pay heed to any other hostile action.
- (3) Inform the Khivan authorities that he was carrying the presents

for the Khan from the Tsar of Russia and that no kind of delay would be permitted.

- (4) Arrange the transport of the presents on Khivan boats if the "Perovskii" could not navigate the river, but under pretext of guarding the presents he was to send Headquarters Captain Salatskii, a naval officer and two sailors to survey the river and investigate the main channel.
- (5) Use any chance to send a messenger to me with information about the ongoing difficulties of the navigation.
- (6) Give me all the facts and information he had from his previous stay of several years at Fort #1.
- (7) Give me his daily program of action for the Flotilla including instructions he would give the naval officer in case he had to send him in a Khivan boat to communicate with me.

After transferring our freight to the ship I said goodbye to Butakov and gave him in case of explanations with the Khivan officials or meeting obstacles from local population during his navigation up the Amu Darya) written material in Russian and Tatar which stated:

"... it is ordered that the two trusted Russian officials deliver to Khiva by water the presents of the Emperor to the Khan because these items could only arrive in Khiva without damage by water. Therefore, I request that the local Khivan authorities give full support for a clear direct passage on the Amu Darya for the two Russian ships, to accept the officials in friendly fashion in accordance with the correct relations which exist between Russia and Khiva. The Commander is also to send news to me from the ships so that I may follow the navigation and inform him of my orders in conjunction with the desires of the Khan who already has been advised of all".

It only remained for Butakov to head up river boldly, not paying any attention to attempts to stop the vessel, and in case of an appearance of trouble, he was to send my written message to the Kungrad Commander and to the Vizier. The most important thing was for him to reach Kungrad as quickly as possible.

If the steamship (as it was supposed by all) could arrive in good time then the success of our expedition would be secured. The late arrival of the ship would upset the basic future activity of the Embassy in Khiva. In order to give an explanation to the Khivans about the entrance of our ships into the Amu Darya and to lessen their basic suspicions of us, it was not to be stated that the Embassy served only as a decoy for our naval (military) ships. The sailors were instructed to put off any talk about the presence of the commander of the Flotilla and were to concentrate on carrying the presents and the two members of the Embassy. It is strange that such an educated, experienced and intelligent man like Butakov was completely unable to understand the situation and still insisted on

playing the role of Commander of the Flotilla, as if he was out in the Aral Sea.

On June 21 in the afternoon I proceeded to the camp at Urga at the ferry terminal across the Aibugirskii. After travelling 3½ miles we were met by three Khivan officials, one of whom was our former Kirghiz, Azbirgen. His whole face just glowed with energy and he exhibited qualities of keenness and resourcefulness connected with cleverness and aggressive tendencies.

The son of Iset received them first for he had gone ahead of our avant garde as a driver. The Khivans gave me full honors in oriental fashion, but when they went with me to the bivouac they besieged us with questions as to what our real goals were. Didn't we intend to use the anarchy situation in the Khivan Khanate to support the Turkmen against them? The main question they had was whether we intended to give protection (meaning Russian citizenship) to the numerous Kirghiz and Karakalpaks who lived in the lower part of the Khivan Khanate.

By the morning of June 24 we began crossing the Aibugirskii Bay. The boats prepared by the Khivans to carry us across the Bay were just not adequate, they were much too small for our large caravan. First, I sent half of the convoy over with the horses and ordered the senior officer to set up security on the opposite shore of the Bay. The camels, after an understandable hesitation, had to move off a considerable distance and detour by a pond at the front of the Bay (it took the camels two days to reach the place where the convoy was). A large number of carts were left because it was impossible to land them on the small Khivan boats and then pull them from Kungrad to Khiva.

The ferrying was completed by June 24 and I calculated that we would arrive in Kungrad no later than June 25. We hoped to find the "Perovskii" tied up at the wharf on the river. I wrote Kovalevskii while sitting on a boat in the Bay, "I have had so many difficulties concerning the ferrying of the Embassy, the return of the additional convoy, expenditures, and our relations with the Khivans that I do not have time to write you at much length".

It was comforting to note that at least my attempts to lighten the caravan and save the wear and tear on people and horses had been a success. Our favorable passage across the Ust-Urt and especially the large detachment which made the trek with the large carts and artillery helped to dispel the myth which had been created by V.A. Perovskii's disastrous trek to Khiva in 1839 across the Ust-Urt in winter.

I wrote my father from Kungrad about the crossing of the Bay:

"On June 24 in the morning I crossed over to the Khivan shore. In the boat several members of the Embassy (Secretary Kiulevein, Captain Zalesov, the interpreter and the doctor) were with me. Ahead in another boat were 6 Ural troubadours as convoy with their drums and other

types of musical instruments. The crossing of the Abugirskii Bay made a special impression on me. It is 18 miles wide at the point of crossing. We plied eight hours between two walls of green formed by the reeds. The heat was unbearable (87° in the shade). Minges and mosquitos were plentiful. Approaching the other shore we could see the tents of our camp which housed our convoy and that of the Khivans who awaited us. Members of the Embassy who had crossed earlier met us at the wharf. I got on my horse and rode over to my convoy. No sooner had I greeted the members of the convoy I moved on to the three Khivan officials who had been sent to meet us with 100 cavalry troops. Passing, as is our custom, in front of the Khivan convoy I delivered to the Khivans a welcoming speech which was translated into Tatar and then I retired to my camp. The crossing of the Bay had been difficult and complicated by the lack of order and muddle-headedness of the Khivan officials and also the fears of the boatmen who at first refused point blank to transport us. Therefore it wasn't until the evening of June 26 that we completely finished with the ferrying of all our goods. We had become so accustomed to the daily caravan marches that to remain in one place was boring and I didn't feel very well at this stop. On June 25 I received and entertained at my tent the Khivan officials and the most honorable members of the convoy. The entertainment ended when I presented, according to local custom, all the guests with sugar loafs (in front of each there had to be placed a sugar loaf intended for each individual) and various things".

"At 5 a.m. on June 27 we moved on with a much smaller convoy of Cossacks and surrounded by a crowd of Khivan cavalry. I went up ahead and arrived at our new bivouac near Urga and garden of Azbirgen two and a half hours before the arrival of our caravan. On the road the Khivan horsemen tried to amuse us by prancing about on their swift and light horses and by hunting for wild boar among the reeds and rushes. The garden of Azbirgen was a pleasant surprise for everyone. The first shade and the first fruit after a six week trip across the steppe. How the soul rested under the poplar and apricot trees. We had become jaded living in a tent near a pond. Drinking green tea served in wide Russian cups, eating fruit and other Khivan dishes, I then returned to my tent as soon as it was prepared. Don't imagine that the Khivan garden enraptured us. It resembled our gardens, with planted trees but not like the ones we have in the north. Good and bad, beautiful and foul, the understanding is relative based on the enlightenment of time and conditions. June 28 we went through the fields, meadows, groves, ditches and orchards of a very populated and cultivated country. At 11 a.m. we arrived in Kungrad. We passed through the City gates amid singing. On the Emba River I had bought from a Kirghiz an excellent horse especially suited for triumphant parades. Continual visits and also the need

to issue money orders for our future movement, subject to many changing conditions (consequently the absence of Butakov and impossibility of remaining long in this place), have interrupted my correspondence by absence with you. By fits and starts I am sitting in this dark closet in this clay court of the Khan, consisting of a study and one of the best apartments in the Khivan Khanate (the French would call it the "salon de reception de la majesté chivienne"), in order to tell you that on June 29 inspite of all my negative feelings we celebrated in a family fashion. All the members of the Embassy and the junkers (I have three) of the convoy came to my apartment to congratulate me on your birthday. Toasts were drunk in your honor. The junior officers also didn't forget to congratulate me. In the morning they killed a bull and gave out wine. Thanks to the touching attentiveness of Miti upon waking up in the morning I saw your protrait and those of the family".

"Approaching Kungrad, I became convinced after repeated assurances of Butakov that I would find the ship, "Perovskii", in the river in front of the town. It would have been difficult to meet him earlier on the river because of our on again off again march from Urga".

"Before leaving Butakov at Ak-Suat I had given him orders in writing which previously had been only verbal. The written message informed him that although in the very beginning the Committee in St. Petersburg insisted that Russian ships could enter the Amu Darya only with a preliminary agreement with the Khivan Khan, I decided to introduce our ships into the river in order to gain time in consequence of the Khan's expected refusal".(2)

"It was more important for us not to pass up any chance for the investigation of the lower part of the river to Kungrad in order to certify whether we could calculate on navigating our ships in the river or not. I convinced Butakov not to lose time (because since the Flotilla had been late in arriving we risked losing the high water we needed) on the proposed reconnaissance of the estuary which could only arouse the Khivans and raise more obstacles for the future navigation of our ships. Although on the basis of earlier information received by Butakov in Petersburg it had been decided that the ships would enter the main Taldyk channel in view of the information we had received that the main current had

(2) Ignatiev felt that any attempt to get a preliminary agreement with the Khan would be futile because he would use the incident to get concessions from Russia and would haggle over every small point in order to gain some advantage. Ignatiev claimed that if preliminary agreements had been reached no Russian ship would have ever gotten into the river. Ignatiev wanted to send the ships in first to set a precedent and then negotiate.

changed. Therefore, we should use the eastern channel which separates from the original channel above Kungrad. I permitted Butakov to use two ships in that channel".

"He was to reach the main channel of the Amu Darya. There he was to stop and get news concerning the whereabouts of the Embassy because Butakov would have to conform to our movement. In my written message it was stated that "in any case the navigation had to be so calculated that the steamer, the "Perovskii", arrived at Kungrad no earlier than June 25 and no later than the morning of June 26, but that if it pulled anchor above Kungrad on the river then June 27 in order to time the arrival of the Embassy in the neighborhood of your place of mooring".

From the very moment of our reaching the Khivan shore, the Kungrad Commander requested me to halt the steamer and "to forbid our ships from searching in the central waters and in the channels of the river which was confusing and scaring the inhabitants and destroying friendly relations between neighboring states". I received a letter in the same vein from Esaul-Bashi in which he repeated that he had not received any permission concerning Russian ships from Khiva. He wrote further that the Khan formally and strictly forbade Russian navigation on the Amu Darya. The Khivan officials who received me assured me that a great deal of silt had accumulated which banned passage for steamers at the delta and that our ships could ply the river at Kungrad only after receiving permission from Khiva which would come after the Khivans had dredged the main channel.

The Khivans announced that Russian ships had already attempted to enter into one of the channels of the delta and had carried out surveys (soundings) in small boats. We heard well-spread rumors on the day of our crossing Aibugirskii Bay that our ships had started hostile actions against the Khivan detachment keeping our Flotilla under surveillance. Wanting to give Butakov time to overcome his problems and to find the best channel for navigation to Kungrad, I intentionally did not push for a speedy trip to Kungrad. We spent two days going 24 miles and on June 28 arrived at Kungrad. In the course of time spent at Kungrad, Esaul-Bashi and Divan-Beg, invoking the name of the Khan, stated that I should depart immediately for Khiva and hinted that if I didn't they could not guarantee the consequences of the actions of the people in the Khanate against us. They certified that our ship (the "Perovskii") could not enter into any channel because it was "too big and the water was not deep enough and it will never reach Kungrad now because the river is too shallow".

It turned out that Butakov had reconnoitered almost all of the Amu Darya delta and finally found an unknown channel (to us anyway) near Karadzghara, Ul'-Kum Darya, upon which he began slowly to move up river. I had requested Captain Butakov to set up his timetable so that he arrived in Kungrad no later than June 26. If he had to use the most eastern channel then he would arrive above Kungrad on June 27. I proposed that he not stop in Khodzheili in order to avoid misunderstanding with the City Administration

and local population.

In spite of an honorable meeting at Kungrad the situation of the Embassy was made extremely tenuous because of the failure of the "Perovskii" to arrive. A large commotion had occurred in the lower Amu Darya when the "Perovskii" gave a salute to the "Obruchev" which had appeared in the delta. This along with other stupid acts such as the inability of our sailors to get along with the Khivans and the fact that a friendly letter from the Orenberg Governor General to the Turkmen was intercepted by the Khivans and given to Seid-Mohammed (the Khivan Khan), made the position of the Embassy quite uncomfortable. I wrote to Kovalevskii, the Director of the Asiatic Department, "The friendly letter sent by order of the Orenberg Governor General to the Turkmen was intercepted by the Khivan Khan who saw it as evidence of our duplicity. Of the four Kirghiz who carried this letter, three were caught and turned over to the Khan and the fourth was saved and came to me with complaints against the Khivans".

Because of exaggerated stories, the Khivan Khan began to call up his troops expecting a Russian attack in alliance with the Turkmen. The appearance of several of our ships near Taldyk estuary and the appearance of two of them in the river made a bad impression on the Khivans of our intentions. Obviously, the situation dictated the need for an urgent meeting with the Khan where I could make a personal explanation of the situation.

Thus, it was necessary to speed up our arrival to Khiva. It would be unthinkable to stop long in Kungrad for it would only strengthen and justify the Khan's suspicions. We remained at Kungrad for three days and the Embassy was requested not to loiter any longer, but to go to Khiva immediately and explain all to the Khan.

We learned, however, that the presents stored on the "Perovskii" had to be unloaded in the estuary from the ships of Khivan barks (small boats) for the rest of the trip. The information we received from various sources stated that the "Perovskii" had attempted to enter several different channels of the Amu Darya. The ship signalled the others by firing its guns to give its position, and the sounding went off at regular intervals. Unfortunately, the noise terrified the Khivans and cast doubt and evil intentions on the Russians.

From June 22 to July 1, a whole eight days, the "Perovskii" disappeared from our ken. It never reached Kungrad and we received no message. In such a situation I finally had to accept an offer of the Khivans to use their barks to transport some of the Embassy's baggage while travelling on the right bank of the Amu Darya to Khiva. Under this plan the Embassy would have to go on land without baggage, leaving not only the freight but even the tents on the Khivan barks. We had to let the camels go, being content with pack horses, and I would not permit the caravan to go by land. The Khivans complained at the lack of boats for transporting our caravan with 182 horses on a 14 day trip on barks on two lines.

On June 30, the order was given to send us forward. Our

horses and a part of the convoy with ten camels under the command of the Ural officer, Borodin, departed by the right bank of the Amu Darya for Khiva. They were to arrive in Urgench (near Khiva) in eight days and wait for us there. The members of the Embassy and I with all the freight and the other half of the convoy left on seven barks on the evening of June 30. We travelled upstream with the aid of boat hooks amidst the gaiety of the Khivan boatmen (five to seven people were in each bark). The longer we became used to the unsuitable and dangerous division of our smallish detachment, the more it became apparent that we would not succeed.

The land road to Khiva, according to the Khivans, was impassable because of the immense amount of additional water on the path. At this point, we could have been persuaded to turn back and abandon the whole Central Asian adventure at Kungrad; however, my indomitable will prevailed. The reasons that convinced me to leave Kungrad on July 1 in the extremely uncomfortable, open barks of the Khivans and not wait for the "Perovskii" were as follows:

- (1) The conviction that if Butakov was so late then he must have met up with some kind of obstacle in the eastern channel. He was supposed to be in Kungrad no later than June 25, one week before.
- (2) The persistent requests of Esaul-Bashi and the personal emissary of the Khan, Divan-Beg, and finally on June 30 the personal invitation of the Khan, for me to use the prepared barks and without delay continue our journey to Khiva by water.
- (3) My original instructions affirmed that I was bound to use peaceful means to investigate the Amu Darya and I was not to quarrel with Khiva. It was necessary to refute the rumor which had spread among the people that, coming to Kungrad, I intended under various pretexts to await the arrival of our armed, military ships in order to take over the town and open military activity.
- (4) The desire to quickly visit Khiva was due to the circulation of bad rumors concerning Russia in the Khanate and unfavorable news about Butakov's activities in the delta. Officials who were sent to the delta to follow our ships reported on the cannonade firing of June 24, about the sending of a boarding party, and finally the irrelevant answers given to them from the "Perovskii", which strengthened the agitation and fears of the Asiatics.
- (5) Convinced that nothing good would come from arguing with Esaul-Bashi because of his rudeness, lack of education and impudence, I had intended to ask the Khan directly for permission for our ships to enter the river. I didn't want to waste any time in Kungrad and make use of the overflow of water before the level went down in the river. The problems that Butakov faced, such as the unforeseen obstacles in the estuary, proved the need for our Flotilla to proceed up the river and make its way over the sandbar at the entrance to the estuary as soon as possible.
- (6) The unhealthy, foul, humid and extremely touchy situation of the Embassy and convoy in the streets and at the Court of the Kungrad Palace had an influence on the health of the people and horses who were used to the fresh air of the steppe. In two days, the

horses began to get thin and the people began to get sick. The doctors prayed for me to take the convoy out in the clean air forecasting more disease if this were not done.

- (7) The horses, having departed with a part of the convoy for Khiva via the City of Urgench (near Khiva), would arrive in eight days. I was afraid to leave them alone and expose them to catastrophe if we were delayed in Kungrad because they would be completely in the hands of the Khivans without any support from the main Embassy.

Divan-Beg and Esaul-Bashi swore that we would meet with our detachment on the right bank of the Amu Darya in three days. Even if we were tricked by the Khivans, who managed to break up our force, I would remain in control of our future moves because I could use the Bukharan Emir's good offices against Khiva or play on the dissident Turkmen bands that were roaming about the Khanate. Then I could re-unite with the convoy plodding along the right bank to Urgench, and take the appropriate measures and not go to Khiva, but turn and head for the Syr Darya.

I could then announce that the onus for our problems lay with Esaul-Bashi, the Vizier and his officials. However, the rumors we heard in Kungrad, as reported to Kovalevskii, were that:

"Khivan authorities inform us that the Emir of Bukhara has declared war on Russia, has cut off the ears of our Kirghiz messengers who arrived carrying letters from Governor General Katenin about our Embassy. They also have sent an emissary to Khiva and intend to grab our Mission by force on the road and have arranged this with the Khan. I do not believe that they want to frighten me and make me complacent. I will linger here to play for time and get an explanation about what has happened to the Flotilla but I will go ahead. The Embassy is sitting in boats in Kungrad, June 29, 1858".

In view of the absence of information from Butakov, the Khan's fears, and my desire to keep the channels of communication open, I devised a strategy to half-heartedly comply with the Khan's order regarding use of our ships. To this end, on June 29, I dispatched Lt. Mozhaiskii with two Khivan officials to receive the presents for the Khan from Butakov, and with the support of the local authorities, transfer them to the barks for the ride up the Amu Darya to Khiva in secrecy; for this would only be carried out if the "Perovskii" found it absolutely impossible to get through to Kungrad and overtake us on the river. In such circumstances Lt. Mozhaiskii, under cover of his official command and under the pretext of love of knowledge, had to make as full a reconnaissance as possible of the river and even complete an eye survey with sounding for depth. If it turned out that it was possible for the "Perovskii" to fulfill its preliminary program, i.e. overtake the Embassy without delay, Mozhaiskii was instructed to persuade Butakov to go as quickly as possible. Mozhaiskii was to escape and cross over to the steamer with the announcement that the presents and the bulky freight on board could not be moved to the smaller local boats out of fear of damage and that the Captain of the "Perovskii" had the

responsibility to permit transporting of the presents to the Khan. This came from an order of the Tsar himself.

Having dispatched Mozhaïskii, we left Kungrad at 11 a.m. on July 1, hoping that we would see the "Perovskii" as a consequence of the meeting with Moshaiskii and its finding some other unknown channel to the Amu Darya. Worn out by the delay and having lost hope of seeing Butakov again, we began moving up the river along accessory channels created by the overflow (*razliv*) and among the reeds and rushes along some very unattractive banks. Our navigation in Khivan boats was most primitive; we moved slowly for the most part by rope and poling.

C H A P T E R I I I

KHIVA

{The tortuous boat ride from Kungrad to Urgench (Khiva) over flooded canals which connected branches of the Amu Darya ended on July 16 just two months after the Embassy had left European Russia. However, eight days passed before the cavalry (the second part of Ignatiev's group) arrived having taken an entirely different route. Ignatiev was convinced that something negative had happened to them. The Khivan Khan was still suspicious of Ignatiev because of the movements of the "Perovskii" which remained stuck in the delta of the Amu Darya. This would cause Ignatiev no end of difficulty.

In Khiva Ignatiev spent a very uncomfortable time. The population was forbidden by the Khan to speak with his Embassy. Seid-Mohammed, the Khan of this closed society had no idea how to deal with the Russians. The Khan trusted no one including his own officials. He called many meetings among his faithful advisors who warned him to be wary of Ignatiev who they claimed sought his assassination. The advisors admonished the Khan that the "Perovskii" was a hostile force bent on his overthrow.

By the third week of the visit some of the hostility departed. However, because of their inaccessibility the Khan saw no reason to compromise on Ignatiev's demands because how could the Russians ever enforce them? The stumbling block to any treaty was the fact that the Khan refused to permit Russia free navigation on the Amu Darya. No formal treaty was ever signed between Russia and Khiva. The longer the Embassy remained in Khiva the greater became the fear that they all would be murdered. However, on August 28 after a six weeks' stay Ignatiev was permitted to leave for Bukhara, the implacable foe of the Khivan Khan. On September 2, 1858 Ignatiev's Embassy crossed the Amu Darya and entered the territory of the Emir of Bukhara}.

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Butakov informed me that the arm of Ul'Kum Darya was deep enough for the steamer, "Perovskii", but in the Taldyk channel there was so much silt that navigation was extremely difficult and the ship would have a difficult time reaching Kungrad. Not having enough supplies and with only 700 poods(1) of coal, he was in no condition to go far up the river past Khiva. Butakov was afraid of remaining in Kungrad until the end of my negotiations because at the expected lowering of the water level, he would risk all possibility of bringing the steamer to the delta and would find himself in a very critical situation among the hostile population. Thus Butakov requested permission to take "Perovskii" and the barge to Ul'Kum Darya, nearer to the sea and behind the silt bars.

Keeping in mind that the statement of Butakov had been made before his entrance into the river, and due to the fear for the security of the ship, without enough fuel to make its mobility secure, I could not accept personal responsibility for the decision against the opinion of Butakov and expose the "Perovskii" and the barge to dangers which Butakov should have foreseen during our lengthened stay at Kungrad. I considered myself further bound to agree with his plans because my talks with the Khivans would last less than a month in Khiva, and the fall supply of water in the river, according to several sources, was too low for ships. Therefore, the navigation of our ships on the Aral Sea after October 1 would be extremely dangerous, if even possible.

On the basis of these considerations and to prove our friendship to Khiva (despite the hostility and insults we received in Kungrad), I decided to withhold a formal request for permission to have the ships explore further up river until my talks with the Khan. I sent an order to the "Perovskii" to move away from Kungrad, closer to the sea, and told him to move the presents from the Tsar on board the "Perovskii" into the Khivan boats.

This disappointing turn of events made me feel that Butakov deprived the Embassy of the help which had been counted on in St. Petersburg. However, Butakov felt and insisted that the main goal for the Flotilla as attached to the Embassy had been completed. In retrospect, Butakov made the following mistakes:

- (1) lack of communication;
- (2) late arrival in Kungrad (seven or eight days);
- (3) no information on how to handle unforeseen difficulties;
- (4) the additional fuel of anthracite necessary for long range navigation of the "Perovskii" was located on a barge which had no chance of getting up river because of the flooding of the banks (no tow was possible), and it became impossible to explore the Amu Darya (as was decided in Petersburg as a basis for his proposals);
- (5) raised the fears of the Khivans by firing salutes and soundings, rather than the peaceful and quiet transportation agreed upon.

(1) A pood equals 36 pounds.

(6) Butakov should have thoroughly questioned the Kirghiz who resided in the area of the Syr Darya and even studied secret intelligence which he had from 1848 when he had visited Amu Darya. He then would have had information about the length of time of the "overflows" (*razlivy*), etc. and the existence of the Ul'Kum Darya.

However, Butakov's main mistake occurred when he finally reached Kungrad on July 3, when the Embassy was no more than 30 miles away. He took it upon himself to categorically announce to the Khivans that he was responsible for turning over to me the personal presents of the Tsar and that he had received orders from me either to catch up to us immediately further up the river or at the very least send Headquarters Captain Salatskii in his launch or in some kind of Khivan "speed boat" under the official pretext of bringing me news about the arrival of the steamer and to receive further orders. But after anchoring at Kungrad, he stopped to engage in harmful and useless conversation with Esaul-Bashi who tried to dissuade Butakov from further navigation in the "Perovskii" (up river). He did not handle himself as a diplomat but rather as the Commander of a ship that was carrying officials of the Embassy and presents. I was travelling on the barks and in the first days had not lost hope of having the "Perovskii" overtake us, figuring that in some way or another he would reach Kungrad and would find out about our miserable predicament. I finally gave up hope only upon receiving letters from Kungrad almost two weeks after we had left the town.

In his letter, Butakov pointed out that the chief goal of the naval expedition had already been attained and asked permission to return to the delta while the water level was adequate. He expressed the fear that because of the difficulties of travel to Khiva I would lose a large number of horses and considered it suitable for me to get down river to the Flotilla in Khivan boats and board the "Perovskii" in order to save the whole Embassy.

Butakov also complained that all his letters had been intercepted and the seal broken by the Khivans for it seemed that the Khivans had several of our deserters (Moslems and Kirghiz) working for them. In fact, letters from Kungrad carried by Khivan messengers had been opened and were dirty.

I wrote to Kovalevskii:

"The heat was awful. It was over 90° F. in the shade. Occasionally a wind blew but it was warm and stuffy. At night without mercy mosquitos and minges devoured us. The overflow (*razliv*) was not over the banks there. Where the water level was lower, base reeds appeared almost everywhere, or impassable bunches of bushes. Where the soil was somewhat drier it was difficult to get out of the boats where we had to remain day and night. The fourteenth day running".

We navigated in such a fashion to Urgench. I recall the slow movement of our boats and the primitive methods of our boatmen,

a kind of sailing of argonauts. There was no change for two weeks, no sleep, a lack of circulation at night and stifling tall reeds. This pernicious environment had a deleterious affect on everybody's health; many became sick with bloody noses as I, and by the end of the journey we were in a weakened condition.

The absence of news from Borodin, Commander of the Detachment which had left on the right bank from Kungrad, disturbed me, and in the back of my mind I wondered whether the Khivans had ruined our horses and half of the convoy with their devilish tricks. Esaul-Bashi, Divan-Begi and the drivers repeated their promise to have Borodin's detachment in Urgench in eight days via the usual crossings, and stated that by taking the right bank of the Amu Darya, we would see them in three days. I calmed down with the assurance that communication between us could occur and that after three days in bivouac or camp we could change the orders of the Khivans in case of need.

Patiently enduring all the hardships of the navigation and even the moral suffering, the Embassy was still continuing the survey and investigation of the river during our unbearable torment on the barks. I finally lost patience because of the intolerable and insulting tricks the Khivans were playing and, wishing to teach them a lesson that I did not intend to put up further with their activities, I stopped to select a place on the dry bank where we could easily get out to stretch our legs a bit.

I called Divan-Begi to me and asked him in a stern but clear voice to explain the improper and inexcusable acts of the Khivans. Expressing complete indignation regarding the ill will and hypocritical activity of Esaul-Bashi, I told him that if my dissatisfaction and indignation were not conveyed to the Khan immediately and if our horses and convoy were not treated better on their route to Khiva, then I would return to Kungrad without entering into conversations with the Khivan authorities, connect up with the Flotilla, return to Russia and give an account of these happenings to the Imperial Tsar.

Divan-Begi was terrified and blamed all the difficulties on the low level of water in the Amu Darya. He begged us not to return to Kungrad because that would put him on the executioner's block and promised to send a note to the Khan stating that my requests would be granted and that Esaul-Bashi, the Commander of Kungrad, would receive a strong reprimand.

I refused to budge until I received a satisfactory answer from the Khan and, in case of a negative or evasive answer from the Khan or some kind of treacherous attempt by the Khivans to attack us, I assembled the officers and convoy officials on the bank (under the pretext of offering prayers) and told them in a whisper that they should get ready to defend themselves. Arms were inspected, guns and pistols loaded and at a given signal (I kept a whistle around my neck at all times) the junior officers were to throw the Khivan boatmen overboard and push the barks away from the bank. They were not to fire unless given the order by the senior officer in each boat. The barks were then to be turned into the current and

travel without stopping to the "Perovskii".

I tried to soothe my travellers and told them that we would get through with God's help, with honor, and arrive at the steamer in good shape. My words had a sobering effect on my officers. We gave the sign of the cross, prayed and promised that "we would not surrender to the Asiatics for the honor of Russia".

Early in the morning a messenger from Khiva appeared and Divan-Begi came to tell me that the Khan had agreed to carry out my orders concerning the convoy and the horses and would send a personal explanation via a high-ranking official. After some questioning I agreed to continue, but warned Divan-Begi that if it turned out that the explanation of the official was unsatisfactory or if we were insulted as in Kungrad, then I would go back to Russia.

We arrived at Urgench in the morning.

In spite of the entreaties of Divan-Begi and the local officials who invited me to leave the boat and make myself comfortable in a house, I flatly refused to go ashore. Much to the chagrin of Divan-Begi, it was in my bark that I received the Embassy of the Khan, consisting of the Darga, one of six of the most important and closest officials to the Khan, and Isakhaul', the Protocol Minister, with his retinue, and an Honor Guard. The modest conditions on my bark did not correspond to the status of an emissary of the Russian Emperor, and the Khivans were somewhat confused by my obstinacy.

The Darga scattered pleasantries and courtesies from the Khan and offered assurances of friendship with Russia. He expressed the Khan's dissatisfaction with the activities of Esaul-Bashi and that he sent him orders to expedite the transfer of our horses "which should have been here already because they came on a much longer route on which Esaul-Begi had sent them by mistake".

Our horses were not in sight and no trace of our detachment could be found in spite of my demands to the cunning and clever Divan-Begi. Only when I almost lost all patience and decided on a confrontation did I categorically announce that I would not present myself to the Khan of Khiva on horses other than our own (of which we didn't know the whereabouts).

Only after making the threat did I learn that Borodin and the horses were already in Khiva. It seemed that Esaul-Bashi, keeping with his general goal of splitting up the Russian forces and placing obstacles to our communication, directed Borodin's detachment over a route where an overflow of water created an impediment to its forward movement. The dishonesty, thievery and foul play of the Khivan officials who accompanied Borodin were the reasons why our people did not have the supplies and fodder needed. It was thus necessary to acquire supplies from the local inhabitants in these unknown local villages.

It seemed that instead of going up river, our detachment had been directed "down", i.e. toward the Aral Sea. In order to arrive in Urgench by July 8, our horses had to fly for five days.

On July 6, they returned to Kungrad. The officers who worked with the horses complained about the obvious ill will of Esaul-Bashi. The first news I received about our horses came from the son of Iset who had been with Borodin.

He cautiously pulled a concealed envelope from his jacket, presented it to us and gave his account of the kind of tricks the Khivans played on them. A half an hour later after the son of Iset had ridden off, a Khivan messenger gave me a letter from Kungrad. It was obvious that the last message sent by Butakov and his officers never would have reached me if the Khivans had not been afraid to arrest the son of Iset. Although he might not have liked us a lot, he liked us enough to give us the information about what happened in Kungrad. From Butakov's letter I finally learned that he lost much time reconnoitering the entire delta of the Amu Darya before he certified that the instructions given to us in St. Petersburg were unrealizable. The Darga urged me in the name of the Khan to leave the boat and ride horseback to Khiva on one of the Khan's horses. But I categorically side-stepped these suggestions and announced that until the horses and second part of the convoy arrived, I would not leave the boat until it reached Khiva. Also, I told him that I would not be able to pay my respects to the Khan because I considered his actions improper.

Up to this point, the things that happened to the "Perovskii" as well as the situation of the convoy placed the Embassy in a very difficult and dangerous situation. All our troubles were not in vain because the main goal of our expedition had been realized. Butakov investigated the delta of the Amu Darya and its main channel Ul'Kum Darya; Mozhaiskii had investigated the Taldyk channel in detail and later the whole lower part of the river; Borodin's detachment had made a topographic study of the locale; Nedorezov had made a survey of all the channels of the Amu Darya; and Struve had made his astronomical observations.

I refused to land in Urgench in order to make the Khivans understand how insulted we felt because of their actions in Kungrad. I insisted upon the speedy arrival of our horses and convoy and considered the transfer of the Embassy on Khivan horses and carts troublesome and improper. While leaving, the Darga announced that he would give our report to the Khan and requested us not to turn against Khivan hospitality.

Through Nazar Iset (son of Iset), I sent money to Borodin and ordered him to go without stopping to Khiva, protect the horses and not pay attention to the intrigues of the Khivans. Meanwhile, I ordered Butakov to keep the "Perovskii" in the river, in the hopes that I could still get an agreement from the Khan to complete our original proposition, i.e. the navigation of the "Perovskii" up the Amu Darya.

Before departing on the inner canals of the khanate of July 16 I sent to Esaul-Bashi, the Khan's Commander in Kungrad, information about what I had ordered Butakov to do about the presents, etc. Although untimely, the presence of our ships in the delta would be absolutely necessary and vital for our survival. We

might have to return via the Amu Darya to the delta and if we had no protection, we could never make it back across the desert.

On the morning of the next day (July 16) we were transported by boats to the City Hall. The Khan had proposed at first to meet in Urgench, but because I had insisted on going on in boats, he decided to meet us at his palace in Khiva. I arrived on July 18, 1858, after 18 days of exhaustive navigation on the Amu Darya from Aibugirskii Bay in the most unfavorable circumstances, and still had no idea concerning the whereabouts of Borodin's detachment.

The oppressive spiritual atmosphere in Khiva aggravated our already dismal outlook regarding the whereabouts of the convoy and our horses. In Khiva, I became quite sick as did many of the others in the Embassy and I began to doubt whether I would be well enough to continue on to Bukhara and fulfill my instructions.

For eight whole days I sat in our lodgings waiting for the appearance of our detachment, while continuing to pester Divan-Begi and other Khivan officials in preparation for my negotiations with the Vizier and Kush-Begi. Finally, on the morning of July 27, Borodin's detachment arrived. In spite of all their difficulties, deprivations, and wanderings about the Khivan Khanate, our people had a bold look.

The horses (with the exception of two or three) survived thanks to the toughness and favorable handling of them by Captain Borodin, the Chief of the Detachment, and his officers. The mutual happiness of our meeting was overwhelming. Fortunately, none of the detachment failed to make it but they were all terribly tired and the junior officers were annoyed at the Khivans. With any encouragement they would have gotten involved in an unequal fight. Having given them a day off, I heard on July 27 that I was to present myself to the Khan in the evening of the next day.

On July 28 I was presented to the Khan and delivered my credentials from the Tsar, which the Secretary carried on a pillow, at first on horseback and later behind me on foot to the Palace of the Khan. We went up to the Throne Room where the Khan received me sitting on a raised dais and surrounded by his courtiers, ministers and a crowd of armed warriors.

I wrote to my father later that evening:

" ... I sent a message to the Khan and was received July 28 at 5 p.m. Many people were in the streets. Our bright looking group, large retinue and convoy made a strong impression on the population of the town. They received me with great honor and according to the local people the Khan paid special attention to our Embassy. I am quickly trying to get a conclusive written agreement but it seems that here things move slowly so I do not know when I will be able to depart for the remaining part of my trip. They intercept my letters. Being extraordinarily careful, I must write you in French which is unknown here at the Court. I have just been accredited

to it. It is demeaning and stupid to force a Russian representative to speak with such scoundrels as the Khivans and to even consider them equal to us. It doesn't make sense to dispatch an Embassy to such countries because nothing worthwhile can come out of it. Butakov did not want to go up the river because he lacked coal or any other fuel and was not outfitted from the start with enough supplies. He was basically afraid of being deprived of the possibility to go out of the river after the water level began to drop and requested of me to be permitted to go out of the river. I had to agree. Deprived of the Flotilla on which was based the whole calculation of the expedition, it would have been impossible to investigate the river and move upwards along its channel especially since the Khivans were hostile to my trip to Bukhara. But due to my persistence I was not disposed to yield and would not risk going to Bukhara in spite of certain obstacles unless there had been with me so many people and so much difficulty. All the information that I received here about Bukhara did not predict favorable results for my talks with the Emir. The goal of our expedition was the investigation of the Amu Darya which was fully accomplished. I think that we should now go to Fort #1 (Kazalinsk) in order that from there (if St. Petersburg permits) we undertake the march to Bukhara. In my opinion it won't work to go from here directly to Bukhara. But to wait here for more favorable conditions and renew the (better to be prepared now) Flotilla for travel up the Amu Darya will be next spring! To carry out more reconnaissance and the transfer back to their home base of several of the ships, bringing in new ones to the delta, all the time while the Embassy is languishing in Khiva is not very practical especially since in Khiva there is absolutely no understanding of how to carry out normal diplomatic relations. Departing on the Syr Darya I will be able to save the Government 50,000 rubles. We could get a lot of use out of these funds next year but if I go to Bukhara this year that money would be completely paid out. We have made excellent and detailed surveys of the Amu Darya and have collected all necessary information for a more serious expedition in the future. It is necessary to recognize that I landed in this country at a very critical time and that I am going ahead with my head high! Now it seems that our business is going better here but the negotiations do not meet the desired goal with such stubborn blockheads as the Khivans. It is marvellous that before his departure into the Amu Darya, Butakov only dreamed about how to enter the river and once he had passed into the estuary did not want to risk in any way but only wanted to aid the Embassy in a voluntary fashion. All my travellers reproach me that for the fulfillment of the instructions given me it is too risky to go directly to Khiva in spite of the obstacles met en route for the Flotilla and which we suffered in Kungrad. Many of my travellers try to persuade me to return as quickly as possible to Orenberg so that winter won't find us in this

inhospitable place. If I saw the slightest possibility for the Embassy to reach Bukhara I would risk all to get there. But for my own personal self-esteem I would not consider it correct to risk uselessly the lives of my whole convoy and my travellers. I predict that they will not blame and reprove me if I do not do that but I would be willing to accept their verdict. If everything that had been planned in St. Petersburg is not attained the just responsibility should not fall on me but on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on Butakov and especially on Katenin. We are victims of light heartedness, lack of foresight, administrative misunderstanding, obstacles and other disagreements. The Amu Darya is a tremendous river and can give us all the political and trade advantages which I had surmised. But to make them a reality that will take a lot of work. If they want to possess these advantages and achieve lasting results in Central Asia it will be necessary for us to set up a plan of action which we can realize in actuality in order to achieve completely what we want. Now I am in the situation of being able only to collect facts and necessary information for working out long-range goals. We will fulfill the investigative work. If the government does not make use of our information in order urgently to come to some kind of positive decision and devise a clever plan of action, then our work will have been in vain. With two steamers of appropriate power (at the present time we have only one powerful enough and that one only just managed to do it), with two large barges, a tow boat, a detachment of 1,000 infantrymen with several hundred Cossacks I will be able to take with the greatest ease next spring the lower part of the river for a distance of 20 marches from the present day frontier of the British possessions in India. Unfortunately, at the moment there is not a strong enough government resolve or initiative to undertake such a huge endeavor which will need a great deal of persistence on our part to see it through".(2)

"Mozhaiskii arrived with Salatskii and the presents which had been designated for the Khan ... I thanked Mozhaiskii that he had given you some news of me but I am afraid that the absence of my handwriting must have frightened you. Don't worry. Live patiently. Hope for God's mercy and on the strength of your prayers. It is true that we got into a rather dangerous situation but at Kungrad were spread unfavorable, terrifying rumors in order to frighten and slander us and to force us from our plans. I earnestly beg of you not to believe the rumors which could reach St. Petersburg from the Kirghiz steppe. These rumors are an outgrowth which increase in size and meaning of the original thought and expand through the passage of time as a lump of snow which is transformed in the same way as an Alpine

(2) If only during the winter they will have time to get at Fort #1 a better steamer from Sweden (The Motall Factory) assemble it and arm it by the middle of April.

foundation which collapses into the valley below. The danger and difficulties of life, the critical situations in which a normal person is put purifies him morally, raises his spirits and puts him out on the main road which he has gotten off because of artificial satisfactions and the comforts of an ordinary life. At the moment of danger a man with faith will be strengthened and will boldly try to learn from experience and boast the absence of imaginary prejudices and begin to rush about swaggering with his atheism while infrequently unintentionally turning his attention to the Highest Protector whom he has forgotten during the peaceful usage of earthly goods. Not for the first time must I be present at these mental changes of spiritual mood and feel deeply their moral influence. This lifts the spirit and inspires contempt for human weakness. By such a road living experience is acquired which replaces many years of ordinary life".

"If there should be any actual danger, I confess to you and beg of you not to worry if you hear stories about me from indirect sources. The unchangeable memory of you, wonderful parents, forces me to be sensible and take precautions which is unusual for me but no matter what follows you must not be aggrieved by my disappearance... The Khivans are cattle who only know how to lie, cast suspicion on everything, and relate to everybody with mistrust. They are cowards, mean, evil and perfidious. Permit me to speak about the diplomatic negotiations and about the conclusion of the treaties with these people who answer all your eloquent arguments which would be convincing to any European in the following manner: we can not accept your proposals because things were not done that way in the days of our ancestors who lived in a happier manner than we; we do not wish the introduction of new ways; we do not need new wealth because we already have enough; we do not even need better equipped and trained troops in order to defend ourselves from your invasion of Khiva because we have many Holy people like Polvan and others who will pray for us and intercede for us as was done at the time of the "Perovskii Expedition" (1839), which included an innumerable number of troops to take over the Khivan Khanate but was unable to reach even the present day frontiers of our lands, etc."

"In order to have discussions with them in a peaceful manner one must await a complete regeneration of these Asians and inspire in them a healthy respect for us and then accept negotiations which can then gain with them the desired results: to secure for us free navigation on the Amu Darya and personal security for Russian citizens in the Khanate".

The next day I visited the office of the Grand Vizier and gave him a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. On August 1, I presented our gifts to the Khan and his retinue and on August 2, I began formal negotiations. Our demands included the following:

- (1) Never to undertake any open or secret hostile action against Russia nor to arouse tribes located near the Khivan territory to hostility against Russia or to mutual hostility one to the other.
- (2) Not to indulge in any robbery, seizure or imprisonment of Russian citizens.
- (3) To be responsible for the personal safety and the security of property of all Russian citizens who are on the territory of the Khivan lands.
- (4) Authorize Russian ships to freely navigate the Amu Darya River.
- (5) To establish a constant tariff on imported Russian goods of not more than 2½% of the actual value of the goods and to levy this tariff equally on the sale of such goods.
- (6) Permit a permanent Russian trade agent to be stationed in Khiva.

I wrote to Kovalevskii:

"Realistically everything is done. Seid-Mohammed ... does not have enough toughness of spirit, experience in affairs and self-confidence in order to make an independent decision. He incessantly calls for the judgement of the numerous members of his Soviet (council), who can never come to any kind of consensus while the Khan expresses his will. The council moves with the speed of a glacier! Embarrassed on the one hand by the Turkmen and knowing the intentions of the Kirghiz to accept Russian citizenship, he still has a much greater fear of Russia. He is extremely alarmed by our detachments in the steppe and by the Flotilla on the Aral Sea. Seid-Mohammed sees each concession as the beginning of the end for him, and the wily Nasar-Ull, the Bukharan Khan, plays on his real and imaginary fears".

"None of the Khivans, not even his closest relatives, dare to speak up for our cause, fearing that they will pay for it with their lives".

Our situation in Khiva from the very beginning of our visit was extremely uncomfortable. Under pain of execution it was forbidden for the local inhabitants to visit or even to speak to us. The Khivans forbid members of the Embassy, convoy officers and junior officers to leave their houses or gardens without special permission. We were put under guard and kept under arrest. Armed Khivans guarded our living quarters and were located on the flat roofs of the clay structures where we had our meals. They were with us day and night, inspecting us through the windows or openings in the ceilings.

Members of the Embassy and the officers were housed in a clay-wattled cottage located on the palace grounds. The convoy was housed in a bivouac in the courtyard and in a part of the garden. Our own guards and sentries were on the alert for a Khivan attack

expected at any time. The people of the town cursed at us and made threatening gestures which reminded us of the unfortunate fate of Bekovich (in 1718 he and his retinue were murdered here). In order to intimidate us even more, Khivans often approached our quarters in the morning, evening, at sunrise and sometimes in the middle of the night with drums and loud music. The Khivan Guard and Divan-Beg would say there was nothing they could do to save us.

The Khan did not have the faintest idea how to handle the Embassy or what to do with it. Daily, during the first weeks of our visit he assembled his huge council which included representation from absolutely every imaginable group in the Khanate. They discussed what to do with the Embassy: how to receive me, how to answer our proposals about the Flotilla and especially how to avoid giving us any direct answers about anything.

Not wishing to bore everyone with the dull conversations between us and the Khivans, as well as the continuous bickering and quarrels, I will mention that I had to make numerous personal appearances before the Khan, Seid-Mohammed. Our affairs were handled very stupidly, although at one time it seemed as if the Vizier would accept a large part of our proposals. From the very initiation of our conversations, it was impossible not to notice that the present state of affairs in Khiva was most unfavorable for the visit of a Russian Embassy and the signing of a treaty.

Seid-Mohammed did not trust any of his officials, was afraid of intrigues, suspected everyone and wanted to know everything that went on. He wanted to do everything himself, avoiding the possibility that his advisors might come under our influence through bribery. Only two officials made use of their relationship with the Khan (Emir El-Omer, older brother of the Khan and Kush-Begi, brother-in-law of the Khan) and both had some basis to consider themselves insulted by the Russian Government because I had not written them any letters nor given them any presents.

Their ignorance was complicated by the stupid suspicion that I intended to follow the example of a Turkmen emissary who had killed the predecessor of Seid-Mohammed during an official audience. They debated this question in a serious vein at length and decided that I would not be permitted to get too close to the Khan, could only bring one interpreter and was to leave my arms at the entrance. I turned down these insulting suggestions.

The security was so tight and overwhelming that I was unable to send one of our loyal Kirghiz to Bukhara until August 2 in order to make inquiries of the situation there and to give the Bukharan Vizier news about my intended route to Bukhara from Khiva. I also had to correct rumors the Khivans tried to plant in Bukhara about our evil intentions. All the local inhabitants who rendered me or the Kirghiz messengers a service were taken into custody and interrogated by the Khivan officials. Several of the elder Kirghiz, including Azbirgen, were forbidden entrance to Khiva while the Embassy was there.

Esaul-Bashi continued to plague us any way he could. He

continually sent reports from Kungrad about imaginary hostile plans that our ships had entered the river without his approval. Out of fear, he stated that Butakov had some kind of submarine "which could make itself invisible under water", and that we were threatening Kungrad with other ships. Further, he claimed that on the Ust-Urt Plateau, Russian military detachments(3) were stationed at the Fort Devlet-Girei and that at Fort #1, the Governor General Katenin was assembling a large aggressive force. At the same time, news was spread about the close relations and war plans between the Governor General and the so-called Black Kirghiz, who are considered by the Khivans as their citizens. Finally on July 25 came news that in Kungrad, three steamers had arrived and a fourth was in the delta of the Amu Darya.(4)

The bewilderment and wicked cowardice of the Khivans are exemplified by a situation where the Khan sent two of his closest officials late one night who questioned me and demanded definite answers. They wanted to know whether I considered myself a peaceful emissary, and whether I had arrived with friendly intentions or not. This sharp discussion with the Khivans and my lack of knowledge concerning the whereabouts of the Flotilla compelled me to announce to the Khan that I was sure he had been receiving false information (lies) from Kungrad. But because Esaul-Bashi would not permit direct communication with the "Perovskii" I could only command one of my trusted officials to go there and get an explanation. My official instructions were given to M.N. Galkin, whom I requested to persuade Butakov to cease his useless and even harmful stay at Kungrad and depart for Ul'Kum Darya, ending his relations with Esaul-Bashi and the useless movement of his ships in the deltas and channels of the Amu Darya. I wrote to Kovalevskii, the Director of the Asiatic Department, in code that:

"we must be very careful in our activities that we do not put the Embassy in a desperate situation. Really our investigation of the lower part of the Amu Darya has been fully achieved. The Emir of Bukhara through his emissary requests the Khivans not to permit us to remain longer on the river. The Khivans want to force me to return to Fort #1 (Kazalinsk) in order to go from there, if I want, to Bukhara. The Khivans do not agree to permitting our ships in the Amu Darya nor do they like the appointment of a permanent Russian merchant in Khiva and they consider the left bank of the Syr Darya, the entire Aral Sea and the Ust-Urt their own territory. And they demand that Russia (through me) recognize their ownership to

(3) This was a Russian survey party from Orenberg which was under the protection of the convoy. According to legend this fort was built by Bekovich-Cherkasski who had visited Khiva in 1718 and was murdered with his whole retinue. Fort "Bekovik" is what the Khivans called it.

(4) In their ignorance the Khivans took the two barges to be of the same type of ship as the steamship "Perovskii". The fourth was the "Obruchev" in the delta, which was a steamship.

these lands. Despite our not inconsiderable military presence in Khiva and the weakness of the Khanate the Uzbeks are convinced that they will be saved (from us) by their inaccessibility. I do not expect favorable results in Bukhara either. The messenger who brought me your letter faced great danger. His sick comrade was jailed as well as all the Karakalpaks who had contact with our Kirghiz messengers. They wanted to arrest the son of Iset and keep him as a hostage in Khiva. They threatened Azbirgen for getting out our news. Yesterday they seized our messenger and Kush-Begi questioned him. I have insistently demanded the freeing of our arrested Kirghiz".

I wrote my father around August 1, 1858:

"I have not been able to get an answer to our proposals. My patience is running out. I told the first Minister (Kush-Begi, a robber, albeit of small, small dimensions) that I can not stay here past August 15 and that in no way can he delay me without fully explaining the intentions and position of the Khan to Russia".

In a firm and peace-loving manner of conduct, I finally succeeded in gradually improving our position and had time to inspire a feeling of trust while forcing the Khivans to fear the consequences of improper conduct.

At the end of the third week of our visit the Khivan authorities asked forgiveness for the way they had acted toward us. They became courteous, well-mannered and likeable. The members of the Embassy, junior officers and our Kirghiz began to walk freely about town, enter stores, make purchases, etc.

The Khan accepted the presents of the Tsar but did not accept our plan concerning ship navigation and let the Embassy go affectionately, but without any definite answer. He finally agreed that we could leave two of the ships of the Flotilla in the Ul'Kum Darya and that M.N. Galkin could be sent to Butakov in Kungrad with a Khivan official who would set up immediate postal communications between Kungrad and Khiva. Still, the Khan would not permit direct communication between the Embassy and the Vizier or even his relatives because of mistrust and his desire to have direct personal conversations. When it was necessary for me to communicate with them, I sent a secretary with a translator or one of my two interpreters.

The Khivans protested our right to have ships in the Amu Darya as did the Bukharan Khan, "who demanded that the Khan dare not to permit ships in the river". The local merchants were afraid all trade would fall into the hands of Russian merchants if permitted to go by water. In order to weaken the prejudices of the Khivan traders and prove the advantage of water transport, I offered the Khivan merchants free transit to Fort #1, which could become a port for sending caravans to Orenberg. Goods destined for Russia, but still in Kungrad because of lack of camels as a consequence of the plague could thus be moved quickly. However, the Khivan

merchants decisively refused my gift and preferred to let the prepared goods rot in place and remain unsold rather than transporting them on a Russian ship. Overcoming such basic ignorance, mistrust and ill will could not be attained by flowing speech or even by means of reason. They needed some kind of strong shock or change by physical force from without, which would make change inevitable.

Almost every day I had to refute the remarks, views and ill-conceived conclusions made by the Khivans. Although things in general moved slowly, we were moving toward a favorable conclusion. However, I was convinced that a successful agreement for an obligatory document for the Khivans would only come about as a result of the presence of a military force. I mentioned in my reports and letters to the Director of the Asiatic Department and to my father that "If we want our ships to sail on the Amu Darya, we must sooner or later occupy the delta of the river and build a fort for securing access for our ships".

In regard to my proposal on stationing a Russian Commercial Agent in Khiva, the Khan announced agreement in principle but expressed the desire that he remain only temporarily, arrive annually with the first Orenberg caravan and depart when all the trading activity of Russian citizens had ended by the close of the year. I found it unnecessary to defend my proposal, for I realized that he would have to defend Russian interests toughly and be constantly subjected to personal danger and the high probability of some kind of confrontation not only with the Khivan officials but also with the Khan.

While continuing to insist before the Khan on our right to have a permanent agent in Khiva, I told the Director of the Asiatic Department, Kovalevskii, that in my opinion it would be more sensible to begin with a temporary agent and move to a more permanent arrangement only when local conditions point to the necessity for this move. Also, the position for our Russian commercial agent in the caravan sarai could eventually be upgraded into a consulate.

Concerning the tariff on Russian goods, I went somewhat beyond the instructions sent to me and demanded both a lowering of the tariff to 5% of the actual value of goods and complete equalization in the relationship between our Moslems (who lived in Russia) and the Russians which would necessitate a lowering of the tariff to 2½% (i.e., one-half the size of the actual value) goods going from Russia into Khiva. A lowering of the tariff in the Khanate would not help our trade, would remain only on paper, and would not lead to anything if the Khivans did not simultaneously introduce a more just and honest valuation of the goods by the tariff officials. In their self-willed way, they arbitrarily marked up goods 1½ to 2 times above the price of the same goods at the local bazaar. Thus our merchants were systematically discriminated against and the customs agents extracted an amount above what the budget tariff would bring in. It was very difficult to arrive at a value of goods, taking into consideration the desires of Khivan officials who were trying to exclude our goods.

As a counter to the above, I proposed that the collection

of the tariff not be made on our goods at the frontier or in Khiva, but should occur after the sale of the goods at the local bazaar. This, of course, would be of great advantage for our merchants because it would result in lowering the tariff. Informing the Director of the Asiatic Department that the Khan expressed his agreement on this arrangement, I noted that an exact fulfillment of these conditions would make Russian trade in Central Asia the largest and would resolve for ever the insulting advantages given to the Moslem merchant. For us to attain this result, it would be necessary for the Imperial Government to render full support to our merchants should the Khivans deviate or hesitate to carry out the agreement. And, in order to make a promising start in realizing these advantages, I insisted that the agreement commence while the Embassy was still in Khiva. This desire was fulfilled.

In spite of their weakness in comparison with the greatness of Russia, the ignorant and spoiled Khivans were blinded by the fact that they absolutely believed in their inaccessibility and did not see the need to make concessions. Their blindness expressed itself in odd and impertinent demands for us to lessen the tariff on Khivan goods; about setting up a common frontier (which they had promised to Colonel Danielevskii in 1841); about their imaginary rights in possessing the Ust-Urt, the Aral Sea, its shores and even the Syr Darya; and about the return of Khivan citizenship of the Karakalpaks who had wandered over to our part of the steppe.

Indignant and perplexed by their insolence, I immediately began to make similar unexpected demands. I told the Khan that I would be forced to present new demands which did not concern future trade relations, and demanded, for example, compensation for the pillaging in 1847 and 1848 of caravans on the steppe after the signing of Act of Friendship in 1841. In addition to compensation for this violation, I demanded that the Khan cease harboring our criminals and desist from issuing Khivan Firman (law) to Kirghiz and Turkmen tribes who were Russian citizens. I emphasized, however, that "we had remained silent about these matters in order to prove our peace-loving and friendly intentions. We wanted to forget the past and believe in a better future. But the unorthodox claims of the Khan forced us to make demands apart from trade questions".

Concerning the questions of establishing the eastern frontier between Russia and Khiva along the Syr Darya and changes in the existing demarcation line, according to the instruction given to me in St. Petersburg, I avoided an answer. I pointed out that the Khan had been informed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that I was not authorized to discuss these questions.(5) Seid-Mohammed was not satisfied with the question concerning his suppression of rights

(5) Before the arrival of the Embassy the Khan dared to announce in writing through his emissary his (imagined) rights to the left bank of the Syr Darya protesting against our military detachments there and our collecting of the tent tax from the Kirghiz. We answered that our Kirghiz had roamed across to the left bank of the Syr Darya, not their Kirghiz, so it was illegal to collect the tax.

throughout his whole kingdom up to the left bank of the Syr Darya. Wanting to establish his rights in our eyes and delude the Kirghiz who roamed on the Iany Darya river, he secretly sent some Khivan officials who spread rumors that the Kirghiz had been formally recognized by Russia as being under Khivan sovereignty. Although the Kirghiz gave us this information when I still was in Khiva, I was officially informed about these "tricks" only after leaving the capital of the Khanate and crossing over to the right bank of the Amu Darya. The Khan wanted to prove his domination over the Kirghiz and felt that because the nomads did not recognize themselves as Russian citizens, he could freely tax them.

It turned out that the Kirghiz were losing their patience due to the continual extortion by Khivan officials. The Kirghiz had learned that the Embassy would most probably move to the Syr Darya and to Fort #1 through Daukara. They intended to use our movement as a cover to leave the Khanate and enter our steppe.

The Khivans noticed such stirrings among the Kirghiz and at the end of my stay in the Khanate, began to come out against the movement of the Embassy in the direction of the Syr Darya (which they had originally recommended to me in place of the trip through the valley of the Amu Darya to Bukhara). On the one hand, the Khivans wanted us to leave Khiva by way of the steppe which would, however, facilitate the movement of the Kirghiz nomads. On the other hand, in order to please the Emir of Bukhara, we were not permitted to use the valley of the Amu Darya to enter his lands. So how would we leave Khiva to get to Bukhara? The Khan spread malicious rumors to the Bukharans about our motives, hoping to upset our relations. When he became convinced that I couldn't be cajoled out of going to Bukhara by one of the two prohibited routes he demanded that we leave Khiva by the same route we had entered, via Kungrad to the Ust-Urt Plateau and back home to Orenberg. He averred that in no way would he permit me to go to Bukhara via Daukara, nor by the caravan route directly to Karakul, nor by the Amu Darya.

I wrote my father on August 9:

"I am happy but I confess I am terribly bored. My negotiations go extremely slowly and I really don't know when I will get out of this terrible country. I have been to see the Khan twice and he received me with respect. But nevertheless it is senseless to send a diplomatic Mission to a Central Asian Khanate to draw up a treaty with the local authorities thinking you are dealing with an equal independent state".

"Communication often is no good because the Khivans intercept our messengers and show a great curiosity in reading our correspondence. The Emir of Bukhara has gone off to war and his absence may extend by several months my stay in the Bukharan territory".

"Our topographical work on the Amu Darya was very successful. In truth the main goal of the trip has been accomplished. The rest, is a superficial luxury".

"The First Minister (Kush-Beg) is giving me some kind of party in a week. I intend to give the Khivan officials a dinner in our garden along with some fireworks. They have promised to let us go several days after this exchange of amenities. Thus, I expect to be on the road within two weeks. I received encouraging news from Bukhara through my scouts and I think we will go there if I receive (in eight days) a favorable and positive answer to my official request which was sent from Khiva to the first Minister to the Emir of Bukhara. It will probably be necessary to send on our ships, for return to the homeland Struve, Doctor Pekarskii, Duchinskii (who was included by Katenin, unknown to me, now he is on the staff of the convoy) and even the Chief of the convoy, Burenin. All were healthy for a long time but have broken down in one way or another. The Emir of Bukhara has led his troops against Kokand and carries on a very destructive war. This is most unpropitious for me because they think that military activity can last for three or four months and I then will have to sit in Bukhara all that time in expectation of returning home. If he should return home victorious it will be difficult to talk with him, but on the other hand if the campaign does not justify his hopes then a defeat will put him in such bad spirits that he will be even more unpleasant in his relations with us than he was before. This ill-starred war might delay my return home by several months because it would be necessary to spend the winter in Bukhara and begin the return journey (as Kovalevskii figured) only in the early spring. For me that is awful but because of my debt to serve the state I can not arbitrarily go to Bukhara unless the Emir desires to receive me and expects my arrival ... Because the local reports are extremely hostile and inconsistent I write very little to the Director of the Asiatic Department, Kovalevskii, and I am afraid to report about what we are hearing in order not to delude the Government".

"Because I asked for the Khan's guard list I hope that these lines reach you. My travellers are in despair from our continuation of our local stay in view of our forthcoming extremely long and arduous voyage through the steppe. As for me, I am the same as usual. I bow resignedly to the will of God and try with a bold spirit to overcome the problems that I faced. If success would be possible, then the moral trials, deprivations and all the things that we have put up with will have been worth the effort. But it is difficult to sustain an unchangeable boldness of spirit, which up to this time hasn't left me at all when I am convinced that the official goal of our Embassy, i.e. concluding friendly treaties with the two Khanates and the acquisition of the right to sail our ships on the Amu Darya could not be attained by those means which we had been bound to adhere to. But my conscience is completely clean in this regard because I have tried to achieve those things that seemed completely

impossible and they have told me that no one in the situation we were in could have accomplished more. Nevertheless one expects that the authorities do not recognize our service and strength. The environs and those who intrigue (so many of those have gone home) try to exploit any case in order to criticize, belittle the results and raise themselves up in their own eyes. I have already had a chance to learn about the world and the value of things".

"Nothing will surprise me in this relationship because unfortunately we have very few people who have taken the time to make a deeper study of reality and to value that conscientious labor. We have an appreciation that derives from our very first accidental impression. I am sorry that Butakov did not want to yield me the sailor Kovalevskii (as was hoped in Petersburg) in order not to deprive himself of support from his uncle in Petersburg. I wanted very much to have him in the Embassy. They say he combines mind and ability with an excellent character. Pekarskii will be in Petersburg and will give you all the details. He is o.k. but he lets his imagination carry him away".

"Although I will be upbraided in a philosophical or better to say in a Christian way for speaking about my faith, I often tell myself that it was stupid from my point of view to exchange a quiet and joyful life with my family for such an existence and continued moving about for no good reason. All this seemed unsatisfactory. The only result which awaited me: the love of the most precious things in life, time and health, and undeserved but inevitable failure. There remains for me only the comforting knowledge of my complete debt until the end and that I must not pull back from any kind of obstacles nor burdensome trials, guilty to the will of God and attempting to give full service to the fatherland".

"August 15 in the country home of Kush'Beg they gave me a party in the name of the Khan. I attended with all of my retinue and 30 Cossacks from the convoy. But the Khivan party was simply outstanding.(6) They say that we ate 20 poods of sugar. At 4 a.m. I found myself in an argument with three Khivan ministers after the entertainment. These confrontations don't do anybody any good. When you get Khivan officials up against the wall, all their used up reasons and arguments leave them silent and they just

(6) Rumors floated about the night before that Kush-Beg was going to entice us to his place for the party, surround the Embassy with his military guards, suddenly disarm us; then they would murder us as they had Bekovich in 1718. But if we didn't accept the invitation they would consider us cowards. So we all went with concealed bonded weapons. All came off peacefully and the Cossacks got a great reception from the Khivans for their singing.

never come up with any logical presentation of facts and conclusions".

The dinner served as a pretext for continuing my conversation with the Khivans who had been instructed to question me how I would improve relations. Finally, they announced the Khan had accepted all my suggestions for the treaty, with the exception of permitting ships to sail on the Amu Darya, and agreed to my departure to Bukhara. I answered that in order to render an account to the Tsar I was bound to learn the reason why the Khan would not give us permission for free navigation. A negative reply, I went on, might be taken as a sign that the Khan seeks the enmity of powerful Russia.

The Khivans began to see that they could be in big trouble if they did not voluntarily agree to my demands. They explained that they were afraid of the Emir of Bukhara and could not dare permit an agreement about free navigation until they had gotten the approval of the Emir who strenuously opposed any Khivan-Russian agreement about the river. The Khivan Khan, they claimed, would send a messenger to explain all this to Bukhara but nothing could be done until he returned.

When I objected, they finally offered to send a fully accredited official with us to Bukhara who would be instructed to sign a peace treaty in Bukhara once the Emir agreed to free navigation. Obviously the appearance of a Khivan official in our retinue in Bukhara would be most inappropriate. Therefore, I strongly opposed this strange suggestion and announced that I would not agree to the conclusion of a peace treaty unless it included our rights to free navigation on the Amu Darya. I concluded by requesting that the Khan give me a fixed and positive answer to this question.

Until August 21 my demands and explanations caused the Khivan officials and the Khan to waver, leading me to believe that I had persuaded them to sign my prepared draft of the conditions which stipulated that free navigation of the Amu Darya for our ships would begin in 1859. Unexpectedly, my proposals were thrown into confusion.

As I wrote to my father:

"I was so close to forcing from the Khivans an agreement accepting all our proposals when arose suddenly a new problem which frightened not only the authorities but the Khivan population and made them renege on the free navigation of our ships on the Amu Darya. Butakov too openly and without proper precautions carried out surveys and soundings of the river and stupidly gave asylum on the "Perovskii" to a run-away Persian slave who had escaped from Kungrad. On the manual labor of these Persian slaves is realized all the income, all the wealth of the landowners of this country especially of the most influential officials. In this country of exclusively landowners these slaves are almost the only agricultural workers".

"The successful escape of one Persian taken under our protection could serve as a bad example for these thousands of unfortunates who can not save themselves by defecting because of lack of will, because this region is surrounded on all sides by a very inhospitable desert which is difficult to cross for a lone pedestrian. Butakov, in view of today's exceptional circumstances, did not think that one person, a foreigner to us, could create such unexpected difficulties for the Embassy and compromise the success of our conversations. But the defector boarded a Russian ship, by agreement of the Commander, and was drawn by the Russian flags; the dignity of the fatherland would not permit Butakov to turn him over to the Khivan authorities. The Khivans demanded that I surrender the Persian. I refused and they refused to permit our ships free navigation on the Amu Darya, claiming that if they granted that privilege we would carry away all the Persians from them because of our friendship with the Shah. I had convinced the Khivans already to accept conditions which would be advantageous for our commerce such as 1) lowering the tariff four times from what it had been; 2) equalization of trade relations of the rights of white Christian Russians with Moslems; 3) permission to send to Khiva our temporary commercial agent, and perhaps out of vanity might have concluded with the Khan a Treaty of Friendship more advantageous to us than the treaty of 1841 which was never fulfilled by the Khivans.(7)

"Honesty and feelings of debt forced me to conclude that the conditions being offered us were not worth a diplomatic treaty. It would not be in conformity in my opinion to the situation in which Russia found itself in this area of the world. If I had thought only about receiving an award or even only about praise from Headquarters then I could have easily concluded my stay even earlier as my predecessor (Danilevskii) had done. But I preferred to fight to get them to agree to the main condition, the opening of the Amu Darya to navigation by our ships. I am leaving with what I arrived with. Let that remain an open and basic pretext for our activity next year. So our relations with Khiva are as they were before, impossible and humiliating. At least this is my personal view. In Bukhara even less success probably awaits us because there can be no success until the Khan begins to act differently. It is just awful that it takes 18 months to cross back and forth over the desert and you are losing precious time in your life doing that negotiating with the most ignorant of people, in relations with the most outrageous government in the

(7) It is amazing that in Khiva when we asked to see a copy of the 1841 Treaty signed by Danilevskii not one single Khivan official or trader had ever heard of it! They do not know the contents of it either although it was signed by the Khan. What an amazing state of affairs.

whole world. They say sin is "free". God must know a better way to spend our time which is given to us not for the sake of humanity but for the spiritual preparation for a new form of life. I console myself. I think that I will get through with unwavering firmness and with the hope that God's aid is not useless for the soul".

On the same day I wrote my father (August 22), I received information that the Emir of Bukhara and his enemy, the Khan of Kokand, sent Seid-Mohammed a letter which advised him not to permit our ships free navigation in order to avoid continuous danger from Russia. This announcement conclusively affirmed the Khivan's decision not to agree to a written document guaranteeing free navigation. Attesting to the impossibility of overcoming this opposition by diplomatic means, keeping in mind that my first priority was to avoid a rift with Khiva, and recognizing that a written document would be worthless, I considered it more in conformity with the dignity of Russia to refuse any long-winded fruitless negotiations and seek a quick and, if possible, peaceful departure from Khiva. I informed Kush-Beg and the Vizier about my decision.

Meanwhile, so as not to be in debt to the Khivans for entertainment, I gave a dinner for all the chief officials and advisors of the Khan on August 23. The dinner was set on the stone lined upper terrace in the garden of our Embassy. After dinner we released a small balloon which greatly amused the Khivans and was considered by the Moslems to be a "devilish flything". We also set off fireworks brought from Orenberg which entertained everyone immensely. The party ended with the exchange of presents by the guests, and in front of each guest was placed a sugar loaf as a token of farewell.

We made ready for our departure from Khiva and hired the camels. On August 24, when I had already gone to bed, the Adjutant of the Khan appeared on our premises with an invitation for me to visit the Khan immediately for personal conversations. He requested that I come alone, without the retinue and without arms. During our stay in Khiva, Azbirgen and other Kirghiz continually informed us about the plans of the Khan to "exterminate the Russian Mission and convoy or at least seize the 'Embassy' and 'entice' it into the Palace, and not let them out alive if they will not agree to all the Khivan demands". Knowing the treachery and the ignorant savageness of the Khivan ruler, I nevertheless decided to disregard the personal danger in order to prove to the Khan that I was not afraid of him. I told the Adjutant that in spite of the ungodly hour I would come with my interpreter and secretary, and would appear in full dress uniform of the personal staff of the Tsar with my sword.

I brought a few really rough looking, intrepid Cossacks who were ready for anything and carried two loaded revolvers in their pockets. In case of an unfortunate outcome of the conference I gave Kiulevein (the next senior diplomatic official) orders placing him in charge. To the Chief of our convoy, Burenin, I gave an envelope to be opened one hour after my departure from our lodgings which contained orders to wake everybody, prepare for battle, and

wait the outcome of my night conference, and act according to the orders we had for saving the Mission and returning to Russia. However, my orders were not to be carried out if I appeared within the hour.

My things, family portraits and money, I moved to the safe-keeping of my trusted servant, Dmitrii Skachkop, who tearfully tried to convince me not to take the risk and "not to believe Asiatics who wanted to exterminate us and then we will all disappear".

The conditions for the conference were not attractive and the Khan's Palace that night resembled a den of robbers. Near the gates of the Palace protruded two enormous stakes upon which were impaled tortured victims of this barbarous government to scare me personally and to intimidate my nervous system. The unfortunate executed ones were illuminated by the glow of a big bonfire and bonfires of somewhat less size were scattered about the courtyard and behind the gates up to the long corridors leading to the inner court where the audience was held. These fires lit up the path and revealed armed warriors in their tall Turkmen hats positioned along the whole route of our procession inside the Palace.

I found the Khan in a small court sitting on a raised dais made of clay and covered with rugs. He sat so high up that I could not reach him! At his side stood people armed from head to toe. My conversation with the Khan was of an extremely sharp and acrimonious character because he announced that he would not permit navigation of our ships on the Amu Darya unless I agreed to a frontier line between Russia and Khiva on the Emba river and the Syr Darya. This meant that I would have to recognize the Ust-Urt and the Kirghiz and Turkmen nomads to the frontiers of Persia as being in Khivan territory.

With indignation, I opposed this wild proposal. The Khan insolently remarked that I should be more tractable and less aggressive, because I was completely in his power. I answered with a categorical denial and added that I had many supporters close to the Tsar. No one dared to carry out the orders of the Khan, and every time one of the guards approached, I pulled my revolver out of my pocket. The Khan saw the raised barrel of the revolver and noticed a flash of indignation in my eyes. In conclusion, I told the Khan that I saw further conversations as useless, I bowed and taking advantage of all the commotion, headed for the exit of the Palace where Burenin and the other Ural Cossacks (who had entered the Palace on the pretext of bringing in my special chair) stood ready with drawn revolvers in order to keep the Khan's personal bodyguard at a respectable distance.

In the courtyard I heard the most terrible cursing in Russian and the hoarse agitated voice of Dmitrii who, with two or three Cossacks, pushed the Khivans and Turkmen away from me. Threatening with drawn sword and revolver, he announced in a throaty voice that he would "cut all those Khivan swindlers into pieces if they would not permit him to get to the Baron". It seemed that earlier when I had left our quarters, a great uneasiness arose. The junior officers armed themselves, saddled their horses and began to

ask Burenin to lead them to rescue me. The Chief of the Convoy agreed to permit Dmitrii, with four or five of the most ardent and loyal of my Cossacks, to go. Having left their horses at the gate with two Cossacks, they furiously burst into the fenced in area and raised a terrific turmoil, pushing back all the Khivans who got in their way.

The affair could have turned out extremely badly if my audience with the Khan had continued. We finally managed to get into the dark corridor of the Palace and the Cossacks gave a loud shout, "Huzzah", expressing their happiness at seeing me unharmed. We managed to get on our horses and return home.

At sunrise, Divan-Beg appeared as if nothing had happened and attempted to explain that everything that had taken place during the night was a misunderstanding of the worst sort. He announced that the Khan would let us depart peacefully and without delay. On August 25, the Khan sent me presents for the Tsar and granted a farewell audience that very same day in the evening. Noticing that the Khan's letter was sealed, I asked a Khivan official for a copy.

You can imagine my surprise and indignation when having waited in vain all day for an invitation to visit the Khan, I finally learned that in order to avoid an unpleasant scene and the necessity to give me a positive answer about the question of free navigation, he had left for his country palace instructing one of his officials to bid me farewell. I wrote a rather curt note to Kush-Beg demanding a positive answer from the Khan on my proposal and a copy of his letter.(8)

On August 26, about 1 p.m., Divan-Beg came and announced that he did not dare deliver my letter to the Khan. Having received news that the Khan had returned to Khiva inconspicuously, I immediately sent the Secretary and Interpreter directly to the Palace in order to get a copy of the Khan's letter to the Tsar. Taken by surprise by the appearance of my emissaries, Kush-Beg (9) was forced to receive Kiulevein, my Secretary, and explained that the Khan did not want to give me a special farewell audience alone because the Khivan emissary, Fazil'-Khodzhei, was not received by the Tsar in St. Petersburg more than one time. Concerning obtaining a copy of the Khan's letter, I was informed that it was not the custom in Khiva and that Fazil'-Khodzhei was not given a copy of the Tsar's letter to the Khan in St. Petersburg. Kush-Beg added that the recently sent letter to me contained in brief a repetition of all that was known to me; that the Khan could not agree to free navigation for Russian ships in the Amu Darya until Russia finally recognized the border between her lands and Khiva.

(8) Maybe we wouldn't sign a treaty nor conclude formal conditions but an answer of some kind had to be given the Russian Ambassador.

(9) Kush-Beg lived at the Palace was an extremely clever and fierce Uzbek. He slandered the Vizier, who was favorable to Russia. Kush-Beg was beginning to run all the affairs of the country.

I felt that my affairs in Khiva were ended, especially since the goal of our expedition had been achieved by the careful investigation of the Amu Darya. The signing of a Peace Treaty with such an ignorant and ill-willed ruler as Seid-Mohammed would have been incompatible with the dignity of Russia because it did not secure full use of the commercial advantages which should have been granted in writing. Therefore, I decided not to beg the Khan for a final audience but simply departed Khiva on August 28, directing the Embassy through the town of Khanki to the Amu Darya, crossing the river and continuing on to Bukhara along the right bank of the Amu Darya while not paying any attention to the dissatisfaction and hostile activity of the Khivans.

From the bank of the Amu Darya just before the crossover at Khanki, on September 2, I dispatched the official news with two Kirghiz messengers to Governor General Katenin at Fort #1 on the Syr Darya. I reported my departure for Bukhara in the last letter to my father from the Khivan Khanate:

"Doctor Pekarskii left Khiva on August 30. In two months time you will see him and you will be able to get all the details of what has happened here in the last 3½ months. In order to avoid an explanation with me and to give me a positive and intelligent answer on my strong insistence about the free navigation, the Khan became afraid to give me a farewell audience and I simply rode out of town. Not wanting from my side to be satisfied with such a document which would not have been acceptable to Russian interests, I decided to depart Khiva, August 31, for Bukhara. The Khivans, afraid that they might have to pay for such a change around (not signing a Treaty), intend to send to Russia a new Embassy which will be instructed to accept all the proposals made by me without exception. Finally I did not achieve the desired result in my negotiations and I am far from satisfied with the lamentable conclusion of my painful visit to Khiva but I am convinced that I acted in good conscience and honesty and that a better ending could not have been achieved without concessions which would have risked lowering the dignity of Russia in the eyes of the Asiatics. Yesterday, September 1, we arrived in Khanki where, as a sign of my dissatisfaction with the Khan, I refused the farewell banquet prepared for us in the name of the Khan and did not go into town, but went right past it to the bank of the Amu Darya where we had set up our bivouac. Today early in the morning we began our difficult crossing to the left bank. I don't expect anything good to happen in Bukhara... Thank God I am healthy because at this time here there is an outbreak of intermittent fever and typhoid fever. We have a few in the convoy. Each morning we have been forced to feed our detachment quinine crusts".

In my report from Khiva to the Director of the Asiatic Department Kovalevskii, I wrote:

"The Khivans, under the pretext that they want Russia to

have friendly relations with them want permission to send an Embassy to Russia to determine the border between Russia and Khiva along the Syr Darya and Emba rivers and to bring back to Khiva a large number of artisans and mechanics to instruct the Khivans in various trades and handicrafts and even for the construction of a ship on the Amu Darya. As a trade off the Embassy will convey hopefully the Khan's agreement for the fulfillment of the above mentioned conditions: the free navigation of our ships on the Amu Darya and the permanent stationing of our commercial agent in Khiva. Darga has been appointed the Khivan emissary. He is an influential, intelligent, clever and devious man who has enormous influence and an advantageous position and is distinguished from all the other Uzbeks by his pleasant manner and civility. He occupies the second highest position among Khivan officials. Darga was the one in charge of our stay in Kungrad until our departure for Khiva and then was appointed to forward our sick people to the "Perovskii".

"In spite of the fact that this Khivan Embassy to Russia will be more important than any previous one, still I would advise not permitting Darga farther than Orenberg in order to show the Khivans that we will never tolerate their daring to refuse us or raising questions about expanding their borders to our account. In such a circumstance it would be incumbent to announce to the Khivan emissary in Orenberg or still better in Fort #1 that not one Khivan Embassy will be accepted by the Tsar until the Khivans prove that they know how to appreciate the sending to them of a Russian agent by the presentation to the Tsar of a written agreement from the Khan without temporizing after the fact".

CHAPTER IV

BUKHARA

{The Amu Darya was the key waterway in the Bukharan Emirate, the second khanate visited by Ignatiev. However, the Bukharans had no access on the Aral Sea. They had to traverse the inhospitable, hostile Khivan Khanate if they wanted to reach the Aral Sea, the shortest possible route to European Russia. The city of Bukhara was served by the Amu Darya. Similar to Khiva no steam navigation appeared on the Bukharan part of the river, either. Bukhara being 250 miles up river south of Khiva was even more inaccessible from European Russia than Khiva and was even more of a closed society. On the other hand it lay closer to British India via Afghanistan and British economic interest was much more in evidence than in Khiva.

When Ignatiev's Embassy entered Bukhara the Emir was involved in a war with a third khanate, Kokand, located in the Ferghana Valley. The Emir was not in the country to welcome Ignatiev. However, instead of seeing the Russians as enemies they were welcomed as allies in Bukhara's struggle with Kokand as well as the secret undeclared war with Khiva. None of these facts Ignatiev was aware of before he reached Bukhara.

Because the Emir was not in the country Ignatiev's Embassy was kept under house surveillance in the city of Bukhara for three weeks. Upon the Emir's return Ignatiev received an audience but he did not get a written peace treaty. On the other hand the Emir would permit the "Perovskii" to come up from the Aral Sea for trade purposes on a trial basis. Thus Bukhara's closed society would be opened by "gunboat diplomacy".

On October 31 Ignatiev was permitted to leave for the return journey to Russia. His return route would steer clear of the Amu Darya and Khiva. The Emir dispatched his personal ambassador to be resident in St. Petersburg who was to accompany Ignatiev home. This gave Ignatiev insurance for his trek through the desert. Also Ignatiev got the Emir to permit him to return the Bukharan diplomat by steamer on the Amu Darya the next year. This precedent Ignatiev hoped would legalize Russian navigation on the Amu Darya. That this never happened was not Ignatiev's fault.

Neither in Khiva or Bukhara was a treaty signed by Ignatiev}.

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On the eve of our departure from Khiva, I sent a report to Kovalevskii summarizing the events and circumstances of our sojourn in Khiva. I detailed the problems of the Embassy's relationship to the Flotilla and with Butakov in General; informed him of problems with the damaged gifts; discussed our sick personnel and their transport and described the situation created by the runaway Persian slave. My report also touched upon navigation potentials.

I also wanted to explain the actual meaning of the diplomatic treaties which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had approved in vain (1841) and wrote:

"The Treaty concluded by Danileveskii in 1841 was a political bluff because the treaty in Khiva did not have a European significance. It was never observed and was practically unknown in Khiva. If you want, the concessions forced on the Khivans in the present time could be considered incomparably more important and realistic than those which were made in 1841. It wouldn't do any good to conclude a diplomatic treaty without the right of free navigation on the Amu Darya in order to present to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a scrap of paper attached to the Khan's seal without any significance for us because of the absence of a guarantee of fulfillment. I hope Your Excellency will not censure me. Maybe in Petersburg they will find that I erred in these activities but I remain convinced that we entered in good conscience, consistent with a feeling of trust, at least to my mind we did not chase after tawdry results".

Despite the fact that all our information from Bukhara was indirect, word reached me that the situation in Bukhara would not be favorable, and that the Emir of Bukhara opposed free navigation on the Amu Darya. Under these conditions it was necessary to make inquiries about the actual state of affairs in Bukhara and how we would be received. It was rather difficult to achieve this because the Khivans watched over us vigilantly and took measures to block direct relations between us and Bukhara. Through the merchant, Panfilov, and two other Kirghiz I found several efficient Kirghiz who were loyal to Russia and who were not viewed suspiciously by the Khivans. I sent them to Bukhara with my official, confidential and personal letters to the Vizier in Bukhara, Tokhsab-Mirze-Aziza.

The Kirghiz were instructed, as I told Tokhsab in a personal letter, to present our views and describe our activity in Khiva. We disclosed the intrigues of the Khivans trying to make the point that suspicion and fear were not good reasons for refusing the right of free navigation.

Soon after the arrival of my emissaries, Tokhsab answered me in a very cautious fashion and announced that the Emir instructed him to invite me formally to Bukhara. This answer was sent by an indirect route and arrived when I already was on Bukharan lands. But our messengers had time to return first by the direct route to Khiva and they told me about the polite reception Nasrulla gave them in

Bukhara and that they had related to him all the necessary information. This strengthened me in spite of the obstacles and treacherous tricks of the Khivans. We would go from Khiva to Bukhara on a route never before travelled upon by Europeans.

Of our journey through Bukhara, I wrote my father:

"For 22 days I haven't written you nor even taken my pen into my hand so many things have been going on. But we made the difficult march and during the stops I had time only to rest, in order to be in good shape every day because day after day, without a day's rest we went for eight or nine hours on horseback. As soon as we entered into the Bukharan Khanate I had more leisure time because the dangers that had threatened the caravan were over. Now I was surrounded with Bukharans who never took their eyes from me, observing every move I made so that it was impossible to get a moment alone".

"Repeatedly I have had the chance to be convinced what the strength of the soul can attain even in a weak and sick body. I dare to think that this time the experience was fuller and more successful than ever. I had a terrible sore in my left leg which made it hard for me to sit comfortably in the saddle for more than an hour. I had travelled on horseback more than 300 miles, without a day off, not permitting myself, as an example to the others, to sit for even a minute in the tarantass which my horse pulled. A large number of sick and weak who had been cured during the expedition (at first there were not less than 16 to 20 every day) made it necessary for me to give my tarantass to them as well as two government carts in which with great difficulty we had dragged those sick who did not have the strength to withstand the movement of the horse or camel. I severely forbade the healthy and those half-sick, who could still ride horseback, to make use of the carts or else sit in them temporarily. In order to set an example, I had the responsibility to establish the orders in case of a predicted attack on us by the Turkmen. During the whole march I rode at the head of the convoy. Travelling across the Ust-Urt which previously had so terrified the Orenbergers was a pleasant stroll like an outing in the St. Petersburg suburbs in comparison with our awful trip on the Amu Darya and the just completed trek from Khiva to Bukhara, so hard but which luckily ended on a favorable note. We remembered with satisfaction about our Kirghiz steppe and the high plateau of the Ust-Urt which can terrify only those who had never come out on the flowering part of our steppe. Everything on the earth has a relative significance in comparison with other subjects. Already in Khiva they were predicting that the Turkmen would attack us when we arrived at the Bukharan frontier. The ferrying across the Amu Darya was extremely difficult and took two whole days. At the time of our first marches evil rumors were received as if a confirmation. On the one hand, we heard that

the Khivan Khan ordered an Honor Guard, which was to accompany us, to attack us secretly together with 300 Chaudury (Turkmen who were just visiting the Khanate), who were to be talked into pursuing us for the sake of plundering our caravan. On the other hand the rebellious Kirghiz leader Dzhan-Khodzha had to come from the Kizyl-Kum in order to attack the Embassy in view of a guarantee against detachments of our troops which have been pursuing him. Only one thing was sure, the route to Bukhara was not secure, robber bands of nomads pillaged trade caravans. Two of them were attacked by Turkmen tribes just arriving from Merv right in front of our position and their camel drivers who survived the attack met up with us and depicted the real or unreal dangers that threatened us and thereby disturbed our Kirghiz. The Khivans did not hide their bad disposition toward the Embassy, made sly remarks right in front of our people that they were surprised that the Khan had been so stupid as to let out of his hands a Russian caravan carrying a lot of money and rich presents for the Emir of Bukhara which he could have appropriated for himself. At the time of our march, many false alarms were raised, and each time we were ready to go into battle. In order to remove suspicion from himself the Khivan Khan twice sent messengers to overtake us, and tell Min'-Basha, the chief of the convoy, that the Turkmen were making preparations to attack us. The Governor of Chardzhoi sent me news that several bands of Turkmen had crossed over to the left bank of the Amu Darya for pillage and were located on the same route on which we were traveling. The Khivan Commander of the convoy, Min'-Basha, tried every way he could to prove to me that we were surrounded by dangers but that he would do everything in his power to protect us. Placing all hope in the Almighty and suspecting that all of this was just a Khivan "trick" which was meant to embarrass and bewilder me, and force me to take a more circuitous, but less dangerous route in order that we not follow along the Amu Darya to Bukhara, (1) I strictly adhered to my original route. The rumors only forced me to march, however, with extreme caution and with full military security as we would go through enemy territory. I spread out my travellers and held the convoy under my own personal command so that at a time of danger I would be able to issue the orders for defense against the horsemen of the steppe. We only travelled in daylight, but at night we set up the square at bivouac always seeking a good place for defense. We started out usually not later than 6 a.m. and stopped for

(1) No European had ever been on that section of the Amu Darya. Ignatiev wanted to do his investigative work for the future here and the Khivans didn't want him there at all.

bivouac at 3, 4 or even 5 p.m.; the key to stopping was a suitable location for defense and a watering hole. The Kirghiz served us as scouts and I sent them far ahead of us as well as on the flanks of the caravan. Our camels usually walked in four parallel columns in close formation which obviously slowed down the movement of the caravan but made it possible at the first sign of danger to set up the camels in the square for the best defense of the caravan. The convoy followed in close order, covering the caravan from that side which at any given moment we could expect a sudden appearance of the enemy. At bivouac the tents' position was in a four cornered formation (a square) while further off our heavy bundles and packages were located. The horses spent the night at the tethering post in the middle of the square. In order to make the horses according to a whistle hustle into the square, and not race out into the steppe, I insisted, from our very first marches to the Emba, that they could only be fed oats in the center of the square. A special whistle signalled them especially for this. The horses became so accustomed to this sound that hearing it they galloped headlong into the center of the square.

"The four sentries on the flanks and the picket of the Kirghiz convoy located further ahead, in a suitable position for observing the approaches to the caravan, gave us enough protection so that we could spend the night peacefully. Only once did Turkmen appear, and we got away from them by using fire-crackers ("the devil's fire"). Up to that time they had never seen them so this made a long lasting impression on them and we in friendly fashion parted. We had so well prepared our defenses and the morale of the convoy was so high that I must confess almost balefully that we would have welcomed (to talk about it in later years) a real Turkmen attack which we would have repelled, I am sure, with honor because of the spirit we all possessed at the time. Actually we engaged in skirmishes openly with the Turkmen with weapons in our hands; these incidents we preferred to our visits in Khiva and Bukhara where we were under the control of such hostile, devious and unconscionable people. Three hundred Chaudury (Turkmen) were incited by the Khivan Khan, Seid-Mohammed, to hurl themselves on us with the goal of pillaging us. But learning through scouts, who were formerly in our Khivan convoy, about our vigilance, about our steadfast observance of military precautions also about our arms (just before our departure from Khiva I deliberately demonstrated to the Khivans the excellent marksmanship of our revolvers which they had known nothing about) and the distance our rockets would fire (on the third march after crossing the Amu Darya, I, under the pretext of an inspection, to make sure the rockets had not become damp, ordered two of them fired), the Turkmen decided not to fool with us but to attack

the peaceful auls (2) of the Kirghiz (they considered them citizens of the Khan) so that they would not return home empty-handed from their roaming. They were afraid of attacking us because we possessed such unknown, terrible weapons to them. I can not praise enough the morale and loyalty of my little detachment. We crossed the Amu Darya with a third of our convoy sick or extremely weak because of the fever which people get the first time they enter into this inhospitable region especially in fall. Despite the typhus, despite the difficulties on the route and the sentry duty, the unbearable heat in the day and the coolness of night, despite the need to be continually on our guard in expectation of an unlooked-for attack and the need to be aware of our unfavorable Khivan convoy, we were still continually gay and bold of spirit. I insisted that our balladeers sing continually during the march. I conversed and joked with the junior officers to build up their spirits. I gave them tea breaks twice a day in order to arouse their spirits. Very little vodka remained and could be used only in extraordinary circumstances".

"On September 12, we crossed the frontier into Bukhara territory at Kukertli and bid farewell to the Khivans but not until September 16 did we meet any human settlements. After our crossing of the Amu Darya we halted only once during the day on September 15 because the evening before I received a very polite letter from Tokhsab (really the Vizier because he administered foreign affairs and finances), who in answering the note which was sent from the Amu Darya about my expected quick arrival, expressed his desire to become acquainted with me to carry out any special desire I might have, but he begged me to slow down the movement of our caravan in order that we do not reach Karakul province before he had had time to inform me of the direct reply from the Emir to whom he had sent my letter by messenger. Having arrived, in spite of all the wariness, I was met and led by deputies who had been sent by the Commanders of the nearest Bukharan fortified towns, Ust and Chardzhoi (the former on the right bank, the latter on the left bank of the Amu Darya). On the last march the Commander, himself, of Ust met me and welcomed me with honors (in Asiatic fashion), entertaining us with an exhibition of clever horse riding along with wild music and offering us all an excellent repast at the bivouac".

"Not until September 17 did we leave the banks of the Amu Darya and enter the sand dunes which separated the valley of the Amu Darya from Karakul. Therefore, in spite of all possible and unexpected hindrances, the absence of the promised steamship and the failure of the Flotilla,

(2) Nomad villages

I, nevertheless, fulfilled everything they demanded of me in St. Petersburg in connection with the geographic and topographic goals. We spent 40 days on the Amu Darya, made surveys and investigations of the Taldyk delta (work of Mozhaiskii, Zalenin and Nedorezov) as far as Khanki. From Khanki we travelled on the banks of the river, making eye surveys almost to the high land at Chardzhoi, i.e. until the turn-off of the caravan trail to Karakul from Bukhara. In the preliminary plans I was supposed to go on the steamship "Perovskii" exactly to that point which we reached along the river. It is true that the ship could have gone farther without me, but it is not my fault that we failed. It is impossible to fulfill that task this year. There is no need to refuse the realization of this navigation but we should persistently resume pursuit of that goal next spring as I will insist on my return to St. Petersburg".

"We were the first Europeans to have seen the Amu in the stretch between Khanki and Ust' and as the first Europeans who have travelled in this location we have studied and investigated the river for a distance of 2/3 of its length. In the early 18th Century an Italian (whom the Khivans had considered a craftsman in designing clocks) travelled along the banks of the Amu nearly 1/3 of the way from Khiva to Bukhara and then turned off via the caravan trail directly to Bukhara not reaching Kukertli. I am disappointed, as far as I know, that there is no trace, no description of this interesting trip".

"Passing the long stretch of undulating sand dunes we came out into the valley of the Zarevshan River and were received triumphantly in Karakul on September 19. Several officials (of whom two were very important, close relatives of Tokhsab) were sent from Bukhara for our meeting. They fed us different kinds of Bukharan sweets, candy and jam. For all those goodies I gave presents to all, without exception, those officials who had come to meet us, spreading the value of the gifts according to the rank of importance and significance of the official which makes a thin, ticklish and unsuitable calculation for Europeans. After an exhausting march on September 20 we made only 12 miles the next day in order to bivouac the last time before entering Bukhara a bit over a mile from the city walls. The rest of that day (Sunday) we prepared ourselves for our entrance to the Bukharan capital. We distributed the packs and luggage in order to dress up the convoy and the rest of us put on our parade uniforms and cleaned up. All wanted to show off a bit not only for himself but also the horses which had been given a better quality of grain the last few days".

"At about 10 a.m. on September 22 we moved. They told me that Monday was a bad day for entrance into the

capital and for the beginning of business especially in such a country where much can happen to us. Nevertheless we bravely sat on our horses proving that we did not believe in prejudices but believed everything depended on the mercy of God. For the triumphant entry into the city, Tokhsab sent me an Argamak (Uzbek horse), young, frisky and of steel-grey dark color. A saddle was placed on him, which was velvet trimmed, the stirrup were laced with gold and silver and the bridle was silver. Our procession was organized in the following pattern: 12 Orenberg Cossacks, three in a row, two convoy officers went ahead of them. They were preceded by several police armed with long poles and they beat the population about the head clearing them out of the way. The streets were full of crowds of people. Behind the Orenberg Cossacks eight officials of the Emir rode, the ones who had met me. They were dressed in bright colored robes. Behind this retinue by several paces, behind the most important Bukharans, I pranced unwillingly, sitting on a very tall (by comparison with our Kirghiz and Bashkir horses) Argamak; the stallion would not let any one near it, but behind me at a respectable distance were all my military and civilian retinue in full dress coat. Ten Ural Cossacks in their beautiful tall hats and 12 rather improvised dragoons (bowmen sitting on horses) concluded the procession. Our caravan went separately so as not to unsettle the general impression. The weather was beautiful and the crowds of people were countless. Upon arriving at the house they had assigned to us we were for the last time entertained by the officials who had met us and accompanied us. These Bukharan banquets were repeated weekly beginning in Karakul twice a day, at 7 a.m. and 2 p.m. and if we were moving somewhere then we had to halt in order to make preparations for entertainment on the road. We were served at first a different assortment of sweets; then they served us a meat dish and pilav (rice) which I found very tasty. All was finished off with tea".

"The house in which we are staying is very large, with several courtyards, and is located a short distance from the Emir's Palace. I occupy a room on the second floor in this cross-beamed structure which divides the outer courtyard from the middle. From this room with windows on both sides and a terrace like a balcony, with lanterns I am able to see all the courtyards and the living quarters of my travellers, the convoy and even the horse stables".

"The next day after arrival, Tokhsab paid me an official visit. His entire retinue accompanied him. I received him in my full dress coat and offered him breakfast according to the local custom. After the necessary welcoming compliments I introduced him to all the members of the Embassy and we had a long business

conference which touched on military and commercial matters and the conclusion of a peace treaty. According to the local views and established custom it is not accepted for foreign embassies to leave their domicile and show themselves on the street before they have been presented to the Emir or, at least, before receiving some kind of response about what they should do. I just hope that the Emir has not taken it into his head to force us to wait for him in Bukhara for the entire winter while he remains in Khodzhent, the town he is now besieging and hopes to take. I would hate to receive a note from him that he can not receive me until the end of the war with Kokand. Already five months have been lost in my life without any tangible results. You know that I am practical about my life, especially since I served as military attache' abroad; I am accustomed to make use of every minute of the day, not wasting any precious time needlessly. Here I am forced to spend days on end without any intellectual occupation, without work. We are becoming the worst ignoramuses and from all this are becoming very lazy. For five months we have done nothing but ride horseback or walk on foot, or sit motionless in a boat and we have been continually tired. Then after all that we come here (Bukhara) where all we do is rest, eat, sleep and argue with these cattle-like people. I can't imagine what kind of shape I will be in if we have to endure this for another six months!"

"O, I forgot to tell you that during our trek from Kniva to Bukhara we were greatly entertained by a huge comet which was visible to us for more than a month".

"I am much more satisfied with my travellers now than I was at the beginning of our march. Kiulevein has become hard working and very conscientious. But there is almost no one from my group, with the exception of the interpreter and on certain occasions (as for example in Khiva), Kiulevein whom I can make use of with the Asians because I myself must conduct all business, directly with them through the interpreter who speaks the local language. Kiulevein handles my reports and correspondence and writes up a journal containing political information and he fulfills his duties as Treasurer in excellent fashion because he is so thrifty. Other members of the Embassy collect information dealing with their special interests but a good half of my travellers don't do anything because there is absolutely nothing for a person to do who is unprepared for this kind of trip".

"I am expecting very sad consequences of our unfortunate travels because upon returning to St. Petersburg, without doubt, I will be the target of jealousy and spite. Usually they vent their spleen on people in Petersburg who show unusual selflessness and patience which I

myself feel at this time. I am completely healthy and bold of spirit".

"They are saying here that under the guise of being Indian and Afghan traders, two secret agents of Great Britain are hiding. They have much more freedom than we do and make suggestions to the Bukharans. They have much money at their disposal and they take advantage of the fact that they are considered ordinary merchants. We have assigned two Kirghiz through Panfilov to follow them but so far I am unable to find out anything".

"Soon you and Kovalevskii will have to consider our marches! There is just no hope for an end soon to my local residence. Kovalevskii has obviously forgotten that he sent me out here for no more than a year and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expects that it will be necessary to lengthen my trip to 13 months. I am very sorry that what Kovalevskii said was for your benefit, to quiet your nerves. You have discontinued sending me any more newspapers and magazines which my travellers and I made much use of in Khiva".

Exaggerated rumors about the attempt of the Turkmen and the campaign of the band under Dzhah-Kodzhi in the sands of Kizyl-Kum, near the route of the Embassy, reached Fort #1 and Governor General Katenin was convinced that we had all been annihilated by the Turkmen. In Orenberg they hastened to accuse me of reckless courage, cried over my early death and sent this news on to St. Petersburg. The Tsar in very touching expressions, noted in Katenin's report that he was sincerely sorry. Many believed the information and unfortunately considered it their duty to inform my parents.

When we entered the populated part of Bukhara on September 16, the Commander of Ust met us with a large retinue and received me in the name of the Emir of Bukhara. In our honor his horsemen entertained us with a *Skaohka*, which involves a horseman grabbing a lamb and racing at full speed while attempting to get away from a crowd of horsemen who try to take his catch away. A wild chase begins around the person who is being honored by this spectacle and the cleverness of the chief participant (the rider who has the lamb) is that as he twists and turns to stay away from his pursuers he never rides out of sight of the spectators. At a precise moment, the rider with the lamb shot past the other horsemen like a whirlwind, rode up to me and tried to hand me the lamb. I threw a handful of gold coins at the feet of the horsemen who were distinguished by their cleverness and boldness. They leapt over each other; flew across ditches, bushes and every kind of obstacle, headlong, twirling their turbans from their heads while ruthlessly prodding their horses. The horsemen are not armed for this but the whips which they use to urge the horses on are stout enough to deliver strong blows to an adversary.

The situation of the person being honored is not easy

because all the horsemen in the Skachka ride at full speed, in compact fashion as one, right at him to prevent the bearer of the lamb from getting close enough to throw the quarry at his feet. Those who participate display amazing dexterity. Not one ever stumbled and despite the mad riding, the horseman who first scooped the lamb from the ground never let it out of his hands (despite amazing equestrian feats) and threw it right at my feet (although in the struggle for possession of the lamb its hind leg was torn off). I had the imprudence to praise not only the deftness of the horseman but the surprising quality of the horse which outjumped all the others and which was so sensitively attuned to the desires of the rider; knowing exactly what to do in the Skachka. The Commander of Ust presented it to me as a gift; and no matter how much I protested, he made me accept it. It would not have been a good thing in the eyes of the local people to insult the Commander, a Bukharan official, and refuse the gift. For these occasions I also had presents for the Bukharans which I had bought in Paris and London.

Tokhsab was involved in a variety of tasks, having been given Power of attorney by the Emir in his absence. He was the first minister in the capital and among other things, was the chief collector of taxes for the government treasury. His office also handled commerce and diplomacy. During his visit to me an Honor Guard from the convoy of the Embassy gave him military honors and after the entertainment I gave him presents from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and personally presented him with gifts.

He told me that the Emir had instructed him to find out the actual goal for the Embassy and why we did not come (as Russians had previously) directly from Russia via the Syr Darya, but on a roundabout way through Khiva. I explained the reasons and told him we had to stay in Khiva much longer than we had wanted.

In detail I pointed out the advantages which Bukhara could gain from our friendship. I also made some quite proper suggestions about the intrigues of the English in Central Asia, in China and especially in Afghanistan, their method of activity in India and in general about their predatory policy of self-interest.

In Khiva they assured us that in Kokand there were several officers sent by the East-India Co. to train infantry and artillery as well as to build several forts.(3) The emissary who arrived in Khiva stated that the English sent arms to the Kokanese while offering the Khan a defensive and offensive treaty under the protection of England. I referred to these rumors in a conversation with Tokhsab and turned his attention to the necessity to spy on the British to make sure they did not send arms to Kokand. I also gave information as to the degree of Khivan ill will toward Bukhara and

(3) Because this is only what Khivan officials told me at the height of our disputes with them, I consider most of it to be a lie designed by the Khivans for their own purposes in their conversations with us. I wrote my impressions of this to Kovalevskii but desired to check up on these rumors in Bukhara.

the Emir, and how their perfidious scandalmongers wanted to sow the seeds of mistrust between Russia and Bukhara in order to promote their own self-interests.

I also informed Tokhsab of the intentions of Seid-Mohammed to impose a tax on Bukharan caravans which cross into Russia through Khivan territory and hinted that closer relations between Khiva and Kokand would be directed at the Emir. Our conversation continued for a long time and touched on many subjects. We discussed the power and vastness of Russia, the past war, the Sepoy Rebellion (1857) and the Anglo-Persian War.

I also took the occasion to formalize our demands, which included:

1. The liberation of Russian prisoners.
2. A decrease of the customs' tariff by 50% for our merchants of the Orthodox faith and a cessation of the absurdity of charging the Moslems 25% less than the Christians.
3. The introduction of a fair price for goods and protection of our merchants from the tyranny of the Bukharan officials.
4. The stationing of a temporary trade agent.
5. For housing our merchants, agent and a warehouse for Russian goods the Bukharan Government should assign a special caravan-sarai.
6. Free navigation for Russian ships on the Amu Darya should be permitted for the transit of goods from Russia to Bukhara and back.

Tokhsab and some of the other officials expressed strong doubt concerning this last demand because they felt free navigation could hardly be advantageous to Bukharan merchants. I pointed out, however, the great advantages that would accrue to the Bukharans in permitting us to transport their goods on the river on our ships. While I did not want to force the issue, I stressed the benefits to them (as a pretext to get navigation rights for the Flotilla) and once the Emir saw such benefits he could change his mind in a year or so. I hoped he would permit his merchants to use our shipping next spring.

Tokhsab questioned me about the reasons for the special protection rendered by Russia to the Shah and the Persians and asked about the British seizure of Canton (China). In conclusion, I again reviewed current trade advantages and possible improvements which could be realized by securing better access for trade.

Everything that was said, down to the smallest detail, was written down by the clerks of Tokhsab, who at each unclear point, asked me over again what I had said and in a half-voice made a notation to the secretary so that extra special attention was paid to what was written down. Obviously all this was done for the report that would be given the Emir. Hoping to avoid misunderstanding which could occur from inexact editing and misinterpretation of my

words, Tokhsab and I agreed that the demands of Russia would be written down separately.

At his departure Tokhsab warned me that he did not have the right, without permission of the Emir, to receive my reciprocal visit and that he could ask the Emir for it and stated that he did not know where and when it would be possible for the Emir to meet us. And, according to custom, foreigners could not walk about town until they had permission from the Emir or until an official reception. I agreed to these conditions, for I wished to gain a favorable position with the Emir.

We were unable to leave our quarters until October 4. A messenger of Tokhsab's had returned from the camp of the Emir with a favorable reply and announced that he would not demand me to come to his encampment, feeling it was more polite to receive me in the capital. He also requested that I remain in Bukhara until the end of his campaign.

From that day on until the end of our stay in Bukhara the members of the Mission and the convoy walked and conversed about town freely. Some went about dressed in Bukharan garb, but I considered it more in keeping with the dignity of Russia not to permit a degrading change of clothes when we left our quarters. I refused to put on a Bukharan outfit and ordered everyone to wear a Russian uniform in the town. In order to comport myself in the dignity of an ambassador and thus gain the respect of the Asians, I did not stroll about town and only once just before our departure did I tour the main part of the city, view the mosques, the Madressahs and the caravan-sarai.

After the visit of Tokhsab, we had daily conversations with his trusted officials who came to me with various information. I wanted to shorten my stay in Bukhara because if talks were not concluded before winter, then we would have to wait several months until the spring feed appeared on the steppe. Thus, I wanted to meet with Tokhsab and his officials as often as possible to prepare the ground for the formal talks with the Emir when he returned from combat.

From the time of our arrival in the populated areas of Bukhara as well as in the capital we were received with hospitality, especially after October 4. The Bukharan officials generously and concernedly tried to satisfy our every wish and even invited us to the baths which pleased us very much. All my travellers were cured in Bukhara and felt better with the exception of several sick and weak junior officers who had not escaped the ravages of the fever brought with us from Khiva.

I finally received mail from St. Petersburg brought by two messengers from Fort #1. It seemed that on receiving my first reports from Kungrad, they were afraid that I had pushed our relations with the Khivans to the breaking point. The Director of the Asiatic Department, Kovalevskii, wrote me according to his instructions from Gorchakov, the Foreign Minister, that they wanted me to conclude my visit to Khiva on a friendly note. Meanwhile I was to

oppose any imposition of some kind of tariff on Russian goods which would be carried on the Amu Darya.(4)

I answered that I was happy to have foreseen and fulfilled the wishes of the government, leaving Khiva in a peaceful fashion while preventing my quarrels from reaching the stage of a complete break. I finished my report by stating that next spring the "Perovskii" would definitely be sent with a barge and towboat to Chardzhoi under the pretext of a trial shipment of Russian goods. Concerning the state of negotiations in Bukhara, I expressed doubt as to their success:

"The Emir will not agree to a formal Peace Treaty in writing because I was unable to promise what he wanted other than vague friendly assurances ... I will try to agree with your instructions. Soon I expect strong censure in Petersburg, but I strongly hope you will defend me because you have all the facts from my reports.(5) However, it was unjust and unfair to refer to us in that way but I was convinced that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will not let us down. We had completed, thank God, favorably an arduous journey, made especially difficult by the sickness which developed during our long stay in Khiva. My travellers with the exception of one Ural Cossack remained unharmed. The presents for the Emir and Tokhsab arrived in their original luster. The presents for them had been planned badly. Also they were poorly wrapped. All were damaged".

On October 5 I made an official call on Tokhsab in the company of all my travellers and a part of the convoy and immediately had problems concerning correct observance of Bukharan etiquette (I did not wish to subordinate myself to all their demands and by persistent rebuffs, pushed aside all misunderstandings right up to our departure home).

While all this seemed rather trifling and a mark of childish caprice, every detail of local etiquette had inordinate significance in the eyes of the natives. Woe to the European agent who forgot or violated Asian formalities because he would play a pitiful role in the eyes of the natives thus disregarding the dignity of the government.

Our brilliant (in the eyes of the Bukharans) procession moved along in the direction of Tokhsab's residence. We actually

(4) Up to that time there was no trade on the river of Russian origin. It came by caravan over the desert.

(5) The Orenberg Governor General and Captain Butakov intended to visit Petersburg in the winter in order not to be subjected to charges of faulty preparation for the expedition. Both were disposed, according to the news we got from Fort #1, to blame each other, but more so the Chief of the Mission.

went through the whole town, directed by the Bukharans to stop in at the bazaars and pass by the main caravan-sarai so that the merchants and the countless crowds could enjoy the unprecedented spectacle.

The Vizier received us in a very jovial mood and came to meet me at the entrance to the inner courtyard. He entertained us with sweets, tea and lunch, and gave us gifts as a token of friendship. The presents, for the most part consisted of gowns for me and my travellers. During our conversation he informed me that the Emir would respond to my proposals at a personal meeting. Concerning my demand for our merchants to be permitted to travel to different towns for the purchase of goods, the Vizier assured me that our traders would not be restricted to Bukhara. Wishing to convince me, Tokhsab announced that the salesman, Panfilov, had travelled during our stay to various villages and the city of Kermin to make purchases.

Referring to the pricing of goods, the Vizier told me it was not necessary to give me any special conditions in writing. He told me that the advantages I requested for our merchants would have definite negative consequences for the Bukharan merchants. Thus the Emir would not agree to my proposal without considerable concessions on our part. This and other conversations with Bukharan officials and merchants led me to believe that their demands were excessive. For example, they wanted a 5% export tax for goods en route to the Nizhnii-Novgorod fair, but no import duty on the higher priced European goods on the merchants' exit from Russia. I decided not to tell the Bukharans what my instructions permitted me to concede: the free exodus of Bukharan families from Russia and a special booth at the Nizhnii-Novgorod Fair on the Volga. Since these concessions were completely harmless for our trade they could be raised at any time if future negotiations took a more serious turn.

The next day Tokhsab announced that the Emir had ended his siege of Khodzhent and was returning to Bukhara where he intended to receive me. He was summoned to Samarkand to give a personal report to the Emir on how we had behaved and his testimony, as it turned out later, was very favorable.

About noon on October 11 the Emir arrived in Bukhara and immediately invited us for a visit. Some misunderstandings arose regarding etiquette but soon all questions were resolved in our favor. When everything was finally arranged, we arrived on horseback at the Palace.

Regarding our procession, I wrote to my father:

"Having returned to Bukhara October 11 at noon, the Emir immediately invited me to his Palace. Several officials and courtiers were sent to me in order to inform me of the ceremonial aspects. It was rather difficult to come to an agreement on that. Everything was worked out and the Master of Ceremonies arrived to escort us to the Palace. A large crowd blocked all the streets and the square in front of the Palace and our procession was

dressed up actually for a triumphal, if you like, a theatrical entrance. Two of our best looking Cossacks on grey horses led the procession, preceded by a convoy of Bukharan Police; 36 soldiers and Cossacks came after them carrying the gifts of the Emperor on red cotton pillows; then on horseback the 10 Masters of Ceremony and other courtiers. Behind them at considerable distance I came on a magnificent Argamak richly decorated with gold cloth over its flanks. Near me Kiulevein carried on a velvet pillow the Imperial credentials, and behind also on horseback came all the members of the Embassy, the officers and junior officials of the convoy. Two of my collaborators threw money to the crowd along our route. The crowd surged forward in spite of the resistance and the proddings with sticks by the police. They fought each other and some were killed as they struggled to get near our procession so they could grab the money thrown at them. The Emir was very polite and even loquacious to the great surprise of the Bukharans who usually trembled at his terrifying mien. He extended his hand and shook mine in European fashion. Up to that time he had never done that. His clumsy handshake was noticed; his grasp was like being gripped by a sick person".

The middle-aged Nasrullah, who was still very robust, strong and personable with impressive looks, intelligent and shrewd eyes, handled himself with great dignity, but an appearance of cruelty and severity forced all to tremble before him. He received us sitting at the window which faced the "Throne" courtyard of the Palace. He didn't object when, after the exchange of pleasantries which included his reception of the Tsar's letter, and presentation of the Embassy, a Cossack brought my folding chair.

I informed the Emir that the Tsar was ready to support close and friendly relations, and that he wished Emir Nasrullah a long continuity of his successful reign. Then in abbreviated form I laid out the same proposals which I had shown the Vizier before and requested that his Highness hasten to satisfy our just demands and asked for his permission to depart Bukhara before the heavy frost appeared. Extending me his hand, the Emir expressed the desire to strengthen the friendship between Russia and Bukhara and he asked me to convey this feeling to the Tsar. In conclusion he requested me to transmit everything that I considered necessary in a report to which he would quickly respond.

Before the reception and after my departure from the Emir we were offered sweets and food in a side room. I refused the repast and returned home. As soon as we arrived back at our quarters, various Bukharan officials appeared to congratulate us on our favorable and unusual reception by the Emir (by their standards) which never before had been granted to foreigners. But the main goal of these unending visits, judging from the questions asked, was to get my personal opinion of the Emir, the Bukharan Khanate in general, the Palace, the city and existing order. Being watched, my opinions

must have fully satisfied the Emir.

Immediately after the audience with the Emir, I gave him the Imperial presents which had been brought to the Palace with great fanfare. In spite of the fact that the mechanical things had all been damaged and the glass broken, the Emir was evidently satisfied. During the distribution of the presents I found myself in a predicament caused by the carelessness of the list of presents drawn up in St. Petersburg. In particular, the gift from His Imperial Highness, the Heir apparent, to the eldest son of the Emir was offered in order to ensure that the Bukharan Heir apparent would be positively disposed toward Russia. However, I learned that the son is 30 years old and that because the Bukharans consider him intelligent, sober-minded, clever and very energetic, his father was extremely afraid of him and he was held for the most part away from the Emir in Kermin.

I wished to become acquainted with the son of the Emir, but at the same time did not want to disrupt the ticklish relationship. In order to get out of a bad situation gracefully, I agreed to present the gifts and the Tsar's greeting to the son through his father, the Emir. This change of affairs had extremely favorable results for the Embassy and I learned that the gifts were actually given to the Heir apparent. Tokhsab expressed his gratitude and stated that reciprocal gifts to His Imperial Highness would be brought by the Bukharan emissary who would go with me back to Russia.

I took advantage of our good relations and further proposed that all Russians in Bukhara be permitted to return to Russia with the Embassy as a mark of friendship. My words took effect on Nasrullah and immediately after the audience he sternly ordered an immediate search throughout the entire Khanate for Russian prisoners and their offspring. They were to be brought to the capital and turned over to me where I would have the final decision whether to take them back or leave them in Bukhara.

After a few days various people of Russian origin led by police began appearing at the quarters of the Embassy. We questioned them and took down their testimony. It was not possible and necessary to return all of them to Russian soil or even, for that matter, accept them as Russians for many of those who wanted to go back were sons and grandsons of those who had never been in jail. They had become Bukharans and forgot their origins and had become fully assimilated with the customs and laws of the Asiatics. There was no point to resettle them in Russia but we had to prove that a Russian citizen can never be forgotten and that the powerful arm of the Tsar will find him anywhere. We did not desire a forced resettlement of people who had been turned into foreigners and aliens. On that basis, those who became Mohammedans of their own free will, all who were burdened down by large families, and those who did not express a desire to return to Russia were given back to the Emir. I continually acted with extreme caution so that I could prevent any misunderstandings between the Emir, the local population and the Embassy. Eventually twelve individuals chose to return to the Motherland.

Aware that only one of my requests (concerning the prisoners) had been fulfilled and that I had received no answer on my other proposals, I wrote to Tokhsab on October 15 requesting a speedy reply. In this letter I discussed what had been explained many times to the Bukharans regarding tariff reduction, free navigation on the Amu Darya and the appointment of a permanent Russian Commercial Agent in Bukhara. I pointed out that in other Moslem countries, such as Turkey and Persia, our permanent consuls reside not only in the capital of the country but also in the main commercial centers.

To my great surprise and astonishment the Vizier on the next day, October 16, wrote me that the Emir agreed to all my proposals as follows:

"Most Esteemed Mister Envoy" After the usual compliments it will not be hidden from you that my Most Esteemed Sovereign has referred favorably to the arrival of your merchants and has ordered that one or two people may come (the implication is annually); they will pay 10% tariff now but because of our concern for the merchants and out of friendship we condescend to take only 5%. We also agree to clean out one Caravan-Sarai which we will give to your merchants and your officials, for their place of residence until their business is concluded. You will decide whether to arrive by the Amu Darya or caravan via Khiva. Also the Khivans will be hostile to you because of religious reasons but they are also our enemies. If you can find some way to reach our borders, and overcome the hostile Khivans, we will see that you reach the city of Bukhara. If you find some way to eliminate this obstacle (i.e. Khiva), tell us and we will work out together the best way to accomplish it. Now when you will return do not go via that side (Khiva) because some harm will befall you. Therefore, we will have to study the various routes for your return. All of the above I was instructed to inform you from my Most Esteemed Sovereign. May your prosperity last forever"

Because of this most unusual communication I wrote in code to the Director of the Asiatic Department, Kovalevskii, that our affairs were coming to a fortunate conclusion:

"Having returned to Bukhara from his campaign to Kokand on October 12, the Emir received us that same day and listened extremely attentively to us. Negotiations were finished very quickly with my reception today of a written document from Tokhsab that the Emir accepts all our proposals for strengthening friendly relations between Russia and Bukhara. Meanwhile we have been cleared for departure to the homeland. The Emir intends to give us a farewell audience and we are hoping to leave Bukhara in twelve days. The Emir, himself, expressed the desire that I communicate this happy news to Petersburg".

"Since our arrival in Bukhara the health of the junior officials has improved. All the travellers are well and busy".

On October 16 in answer to an inquiry, the Emir permitted me to make preparations for returning to the homeland, after a farewell audience. Tokhsab warned that according to his information, the Khivans intended to threaten us during our return trek through their lands and offered in the name of the Emir, to discuss joint measures for our security on the return trip. At this point, I did not want to bring up the suggestion that, in fact, the Emir needed the Russian Government for its own personal defense. I therefore advised the Emir that the Khan of Khiva couldn't possibly be considering hostile activities against Russia and thus did not need to take measures for curbing the obstinate Khan by subjugating the Khanate. Meanwhile, I hinted to Tokhsab, with an eye to the future, that while we did not have any plan to occupy Khiva now, the treacherous and insidious activities of the Khivans might invoke the necessity for navigation rights on the Amu Darya for the security of our Kirghiz and Karakalpaks leading to an occupation of the delta of the Amu Darya and the City of Kungrad. They answered that by saying that the activities of the Khivan Khan and his relations with Kokand could force the Emir to undertake a war against him and that the Emir would occupy Khiva and divide it between Russia and Bukhara. Not being authorized to enter into negotiations and not knowing the views of the Government and the views of the Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning our occupation of the delta, I steered away from discussion of this subject.

On October 16 I hastened to thank the Emir and the Vizier in writing for their agreement to our requests. I explained to them that although I had already sent the notification to St. Petersburg, in accordance with the Emir's desires, I needed (according to contemporary European diplomatic custom) a letter from the Emir to the Tsar and from the Vizier to the Minister of Foreign Affairs which would serve as confirmation of what I had promised. I then would receive a copy of these documents.

Concerning the hostile attack on the Embassy I told the Vizier that I considered it quite improbable that the Khivans would dare to stop an envoy of the Russian Emperor and if there was any doubt about this then I would threaten them "with a considerable number of military detachments for any hostile plans they might have". Our troops, of course, were stationed on the Syr Darya line. There was no direct evidence from my side, but on the basis of rumors which were being spread in Khiva, Bukhara and on the Kirghiz steppe, the Khivans and Turkmen were going to attack our caravan somewhere on the route to the Syr Darya from Bukhara. The Governor General of Orenberg, A.A. Katenin, upon receiving news of our departure from Bukhara, moved a detachment of two companies and two artillery pieces with 100 Cossacks under the command of Colonel Chernaiev (Mikhail Grigorievich, my former comrade at the Military Academy of the General Staff) from Fort #1

to the river Iani-Darya.(6)

On October 16 I wrote my father:

"I am taking up the pen because of very real and genuine feelings of joy. I received news that the Emir has agreed to our proposal and that six days from now I will receive my Farewell audience with the Emir and 10 or 12 days from now we will depart Bukhara for the homeland. If everything comes out all right and God will give us the strength, I hope to spend my birthday with my family and with special luck reach St. Petersburg by New Years Day".

"It would be good that we will be returning. I am ready for a turn for the better but equally for a failure, too. There is too fine a difference to draw the line between them. Life is so changeable and capricious that one would go crazy if one gave way to either happiness or grief. It is necessary to place the moral balance in yourself".

"Probably by the time of our arrival in Orenberg Katenin will already have gone to St. Petersburg but in any case I do not intend to remain in Orenberg more than three or four days".

"After mutually resorting to various tricks, in several meetings and through written communications my business went smoothly. All our proposals were accepted and John Bull would have to take this new relationship of ours under consideration. If success is complete then I will have to say that it is because of your prayers, precious parents, because conditions were extremely unfavorable especially in Khiva. I would have liked to have horse traded some more with the Emir if possible before my departure but I did not want to change any conditions that might bind our government to any long term agreements. The Emir himself suggested that I send some Kirghiz messengers with the good news to the Syr Darya. You will see that I have aged by ten years but home life will make me young again. I hope that they will be satisfied in St. Petersburg with what we have

(6) M.G. Chernaiev (1828-1898) was a classmate of Ignatiev's at the Military Academy of the General Staff. He fought in the Crimean War during the defense of Sevastopol and later was in the forefront of Russian expansion into Central Asia when the troops he led captured Tashkent in 1865. He twice served as Governor of Turkestan and was twice removed. An ardent Pan-Slavist like Ignatiev, in 1876 he commanded a Serbo-Russian army against the Turks. The novelist, I.V. Turgenev, however, described him as "a cheap copy of Garibaldi". See David MacKenzie, *The Lion of Tashkent: The Career of General M.G. Chernaiev* (Athens, Ga: University of Georgia Press), 1974.

done. As God is my witness I could not achieve anything more in this God-forsaken Asian Khanate. Really I am indifferent to what they will say about me. My conscience satisfies me that my loyalty to the Tsar and the Fatherland and diligence to serve has not weakened and this conviction is enough for me. I don't ask anything for myself and I do not expect anything. Only that they will leave me alone and I will let the envious people and the ill wishers judge me as they wish.... Good-bye".

Tokhsab informed me that the Emir would grant me a farewell audience and had already selected his Ambassador to travel with us to Russia. I now began serious preparations for our journey. We had to hire camels from a number that had come from Orenberg, and it was necessary to prepare 500 canteens (sheepskin smeared with lard to counteract the drastic change in temperature) for carrying water because there was not a drop to be found in the Kizyl-Kum desert. Also, I bought warm Kirghiz boots, leather trousers and sheepskin hats for the junior members of the convoy.

Meanwhile I insisted, both in word and writing, in documentary confirmation from the Emir of his acceptance of our proposals concerning trade and the navigation of our ships. Tokhsab told me he did not dare inform the Emir of my request, because he considered it as already confirmed because it was the personal order of the Emir. He concluded by hinting that if I insisted further that the Emir might take my request as an example of my lack of trust in his word.

Nevertheless, I desired to use every measure at my disposal to acquire a written diplomatic document which would confirm the concessions made by the Emir. Using various pretexts to get at this point on my third try, I pointed out that without the document our Ministry could not act in a responsible manner because the Ministry would never know what the Emir had promised. I also asked for copies of all letters which were sent with the Bukharan envoy because I understood that the Emir would use him to get further concessions from Russia. This would upset my arrangements and I wanted to receive accurate information about the Emir's positions.

As a consequence of my conversation with Tokhsab, the Emir appointed as envoy one of the most respectable of his officials, Nemadzhin-Khodzha. He handled himself very well with people.

I kept in mind that the sly, cunning Nasrullah who had agreed in my presence to the navigation of our ships on the Amu Darya might change his views before the next year. Therefore, I told the Vizier that we would return their envoy to Russia on our ship via the Aral Sea and Amu Darya. The Vizier talked to the Emir and in my presence announced to the diplomat that the Emir gave his permission for his return from Russia by water. I made use of this to arrange with Tokhsab and with several of the Bukharan merchants for a small assortment of goods for a test run by ship from the fortress at Ust' on the Amu Darya across the Aral Sea to Fort #1 on the Syr Darya. Nearby to Ust' Bukharans would construct a wharf, under the direction of our sailors, for loading and unloading goods.

In the last two weeks of our stay the Emir became extremely courteous and listened attentively to everything we had to say. This was out of character with his long reign where according to old times, he would order up executions, tortures and other cruelties without batting an eye. He showed great interest in us and sent musicians, singers, native jugglers an entire puppet theatre and finally a broken down "electric machine" to keep us from being bored.

On October 30 I addressed my last letter to my father from Bukhara:

"I do not want to leave Bukhara until my business is completed. I must get the Emir's agreement in writing to everything that the Vizier and I confirmed. I am concerned that the Emir will renounce some of the agreements I made with the Vizier. I will not conclude a Peace Treaty for the simple reason that mutual concessions cannot be granted here because I do not have the power to grant them for Russia. But I think that I have put Russia in the best position, even better than a formal peace treaty because the advantages which the Emir gets are much less than what we would have to yield if a formal treaty were signed".

"In general I feel we have made too many concessions and given up advantages to foreigners on account of their special interests and to do this for these wild-eyed Central Asians because of our moral weakness and condescension seems stupid. I avoided any concessions from our side, even the ones agreed to in St. Petersburg before I left Russia. Nevertheless I have talked the Bukharans out of the concessions decided upon by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs".

"On October 27 the Emir gave me his Farewell audience and today I received finally the official papers that I had requested. I leave here accompanying the Bukharan Embassy and an Elephant which is a present from the Emir to the Tsar. In the last few days of our visit we have not only been given full freedom but we have become good friends with the Emir who has arranged walks in the city, visits to mosques, madressahs, bazaars, etc. He has sent me his actors, jugglers, musicians and singers in order to amuse us during the long and boring evenings which I spend alone in my room. We often receive small presents. Once in the evening Nasrullah gave me an old electric machine which had gotten into the courtyard. The Emir asked me how it could be improved. He talked about it as if it were a runaway tatar! Can you imagine how such an engine ever managed to be here among these ignorant people. At the Emir's order Tokhsab has written you a letter with polite references to me and sent you gifts (several robes and a Kashmir sweater). This should give you some idea of how I am appreciated here. The bearer of the gifts will be the Bukharan Envoy to Russia who will be traveling to Russia with our Embassy. Usually in Bukhara the status of the Envoy to Russia has been a very low level

person, some kind of lesser courtier. But on this occasion the Envoy is very wealthy and is one of the most important officials with a long lineage. The presents he is bringing to you are better than the earlier ones. They confirm that the treatment I have been receiving here is unheard of in the annals of relations between Bukhara and Europeans. They say I am the first Russian and European to have had any influence here because my predecessors surely had none. They were treated that way because of their lack of will power in dealing with the authorities here. To me it was important that the start of our Asian relationships were less favorable than one would have expected; since then events have warranted my belief that I have done everything in good conscience to fulfill my duty absolutely and that in these barbarian countries I have not tarnished the dignity of our esteemed and great Fatherland".

"They tell me that Butakov is irritated with me because I did not want to reassure him that I would take all responsibility for his imprudence and blunders and fulfill his desires for the satisfaction of his vanity. Under the guise of a stout-hearted sailor the honest man is not foreign to intrigue. He is very clever and educated but too narcissistic and sly which are characteristics incompatible with the responsibilities of a good and useful servant of the Fatherland in this distant land. Since the middle of June he hasn't written me a line. I have no rumors, not a word, although the Flotilla along with its commander was under my command for the whole expedition. I understandably back off quarrelling with him; there were many causes. News has reached me from Orenberg that Galkin (Katenin's appointment to the Embassy) was assured on the "Perovskii", on which he remained through no fault of mine and against my wishes, that I intentionally left him at Khiva in order not to take him with me to Bukhara. I was formally ready to protest this lying slander. I regretted Galkin being left with the Flotilla probably more than he because this can only affect my relations with Katenin adversely; the fact that his appointee to the Embassy was absent. Of course, I would have received accurate and detailed information from Galkin about what was going on at the delta of the Amu Darya between Butakov and the Khivans had he been returned to the Embassy. I confess that these never-ending intrigues and personal complications have affected me very negatively".

"October 31 I hope to depart and cross in good shape the Kizyl-Kum desert. God rules above us. The mercy of the most high will guard til the end. We will soon be with you".

C H A P T E R V

HOMeward BOUND

{The Aral Sea Flotilla played no role in the return trek to Russia. The Embassy moved north across deserts to the east of the Aral Sea. Upon reaching the Syr Darya the Embassy followed the river to the Aral Sea where on November 23 they reached Fort #1 (Kazalinsk). Ignatiev in a harrowing adventure through wintry gales and blizzards arrived in Orenberg on December 6. Less than three weeks later he was in St. Petersburg}.

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Early in the morning of October 31 we prayed and earnestly thanked the Almighty for the end of our sojourn and left town. The Emir wanted me to leave Bukhara riding an elephant which was his gift to the Tsar. When I came out, the mahout forced him to bend his front legs at the knee and utter a deafening roar of greeting. On the march I avoided the elephant as much as possible, for he inspired panic in the hearts of all the horses for a long time. Every time he saw me, he would scatter our livestock all over the steppe. I also found it very uncomfortable to ride the elephant in a military uniform with a helmet on my head. Therefore, I declined the proposal of the Emir, and promised him that I would try it again near the exit of the town.

We were convoyed from town and through the populated parts of Bukhara accompanied by an Honor Guard. Without stopping, we went north to the Bukanskie Mountains and to the sands of the Kizyl-Kum, along the usual caravan route, which led to Fort #1. I immediately dispatched a messenger to Governor General Katenin with the request to cancel the departure of the detachment which was to meet us at the frontier. I felt the outfitting for such a venture was too exorbitant and since it was so late in the year bad weather would be a real factor. Finally I felt the closer we got to the Syr Darya line the more secure our position would become.

The elephant caused great confusion. When he approached the camels they began to fuss and tear at their leashes. Their

yawing caused packs to be spilled and being jostled, they began a furious howling. But after several days this panic ceased and from then on the camels could cope with the elephant.

During the journey we listened to the former Russian prisoners tell the tale of their past life. It was extremely interesting and provided curious information about Bukhara. They also gave very descriptive accounts of the various places we were passing. Several had been stationed outside of Bukhara, and gave us detailed intelligence on areas where no Russian official could ever go. This material was recorded and turned over to the Asiatic Department and the General Staff for further study.

It took us two days to reach Kagatan and we were accompanied by Bukharan officials. On November 1, we were given a holiday in my honor and the Kirghiz did a Skachka more wild than the last one. From the time of our arrival in the populated valley of the Zarevshan river, until November 2 we were still on Bukharan soil. The officials were extremely attentive to our needs during this period.

The Bukharan Envoy met us on November 3 at bivouac time. Nemedzhin Khodzha had done diplomatic activity in Khiva and Kabul and had accomplished various tasks in Gissar, Meiman and the Chardzhoi province. He was held in high esteem by the Emir and was of noble origin. I found him to be intelligent, of unusual respectability, very courteous and of good character. From him, we learned a lot about the relations between the Central Asian Khanates, various local areas, how to reach them, and how the Bukharans view the other Khanates in general. I advised the Director of the Asiatic Department that he would make requests similar to those of the former Envoy at the time of the Coronation (1856), namely, lowering the tariff for Bukharan imports, permanent shops at the Nizhnii-Novgorod Fair, and the right of the Emir to assign the shops to the various merchants.

I suggested that Nemedzhin (and later made it an order) decrease the size of his retinue. When they crossed into Russia we would have to foot all the bills and I remembered how expensive past embassies had been because the Bukharans would include everyone they could if possible. Anyway, all of them were spies, and I permitted only fifteen people including the Envoy and his servants to make the trek.

When we were approaching the Bukanskie Mts. on November 10, we met a Kirghiz messenger who had been sent from Fort #1 by Katenin who stated that contrary to my request they were sending a detachment of 250 men with two field guns and two machine gun detachments. The detachment was to meet us at the Iani Darya not at the Bukanskie Mts.

On November 12 I wrote my father:

"They have sent an Honor Guard to chaperone us from Bukhara to the north. Until yesterday (Nov. 11) the weather had been clear and unusually pleasant. Yesterday it got very cold suddenly and frost fell.

Tomorrow we go out on the sands and we have to cross the desert without water for three days. When we were in Bukhara I collected several hundred water bags (canteens of sheepskin smeared with lard) so that I hope we will have no problems with water. On the trace from Bukhara we have already made two marches through areas without water. The return trip is much more fatiguing than I imagined. I hope to arrive at Fort #1 by November 25 and rest up no more than three days before going on. There has been more fuss with the Embassy travellers than with the entire caravan and convoy. The countless numbers of the Mission, the different kinds of elements; so many of them are just not accustomed to undergoing these hardships. They are not used to the deprivations. In order to try out all modes of transportation and forward movement I am travelling on an elephant. The horses have not accepted the elephant and are terrified in its presence. Every time the elephant approaches me he makes a low bow and greets me with his trunk. The elephant has become accustomed to everything and recognizes me from afar".

"I strongly requested the Commander of the Syr Darya line not to send a detachment to meet us since it was unnecessary. My request was not fulfilled and today I received news about the arrival on the other side of the Kizyl-Kum of a large steppe force of 250 men with auxiliary support. I am really sorry for these poor people because the weather will be bad and conditions not favorable for them. My supplies were so abundant that I had left over at least six boxes of full provisions.(1)

As we were leaving the Bukharan territory Kirghiz nomads were sighted in the area leading to the Syr Darya. They were afraid of the Khivans and the Kokand brigands who had come out from Tashkent and plundered one of our auls. We were in difficulty because the camel drivers were afraid to go on the assigned route and we had not seen water. After 2½ days, the camels instinctively felt that an exit from the desert was at hand and that water must be nearby. Without any encouragement from the camel drivers they began to pick up the pace. The camels and the horses appeared happier, raised their heads and seemed to smell the moist evaporation of the far off Iani Darya. But when we descended a gentle hillock and a silver band of water appeared, no one could hold back the animals. They hurried as if in a race and leapt all over each other to reach the promised land.

About two miles from the Iani Darya I met the Commander of the detachment, Chernaiev, who was Deputy Commander of the Syr Darya line and bivouacked near the detachment. An unusual feeling

(1) I bought these provisions on my own money to make up for the unsatisfactory supplies gotten in Orenberg. When I arrived at Fort #1 I had five months supplies left and I gave this to the Treasury at Fort #1.

possessed us when we first heard the soldiers' singing in the distance. We felt right at home, outside of any danger of Asiatic treachery. Wishing to gain some political advantage for this senseless rendezvous, I forced the question in front of the Asiatics just where our frontier with Khiva, Bukhara and Kokand lay. As soon as we arrived at the bivouac I invited the Bukharan Envoy to my tent and congratulated him on his arrival on Russian soil. I entertained him and then conducted him on a tour of the detachment, showing him our infantry and artillery and explaining to him this was the Border Guard which serves as an Honor Guard on the demarcation line set by the Iani Darya.

Nemedzhin-Khodzha (and the Emir) considered the frontier to be the Syr Darya. He was extremely surprised but I explained to him in detail that the grandiose designs of the Khivans are based on nothing, and that the presence of our detachment showed that we were in control of the territory. In order to convince him of the soundness of my explanations I began, in the next few days, to question in his presence Kirghiz whom we would meet on the way as to whether they were Russian or Khivan citizens. All answered that they were Russian and always had been. I told the Bukharan Envoy that we could announce a joint claim over the Kizyl-Kum desert because some of *our* Kirghiz roamed there in the winter but that we preferred a clear-cut demarcation line like the Iani Darya. Nemedzhin-Khodzha was disturbed by the news of this new Russian boundary and sent a messenger to carry this bad news to the Emir.

We learned from the Kirghiz about the disorders and civil strife which occurred after our departure from the Khivan Khanate. Kumgrad had fallen. To me the situation confirmed the stupidity of concluding a treaty with Khiva. I hastened to inform the Director of the Asiatic Department about the state of affairs in Khiva and pointed out that it was doubtful that the Khan would send an Envoy to Russia. Because of the extreme weakness of the Khivan Khanate, our proposal for sending a ship and a barge up the Amu Darya next spring to Bukhara would probably meet with less opposition.

When we approached Fort #1, the Syr Darya was covered with a crust of ice and we had much work to do in order to ferry the elephant to the opposite shore. The intelligent animal had become the favorite of my convoy and Chernaiev's detachment. He volunteered to pull a stuck cart and once dragged a cannon, cleverly putting his trunk under the axle of the gun carriage and pushing it into the other movable part of the assembly. Stepping warily on the thin ice and feeling instinctively that it wasn't strong enough, the elephant began to roar and abruptly turned back and refused to cross again. It was necessary to lay straw and wait until the ice got strong enough, then the elephant finally obeyed his keeper and crossed to the right bank of the river. Because of a very cold winter and violent snow storms we left the elephant at Fort #1 until spring, along with the two Argamaks which had been sent to the Tsar from the Khivan Khan.

At Fort #1 the Bukharan Envoy inspected the steamer, "Perovskii". We agreed that next year before his return to Bukhara he would warn the Khivans about the navigation of our two ships on

the Amu Darya to the fort at Ust'.

As soon as I arrived at Fort #1 on November 23, the Commandant handed me envelopes in my name from St. Petersburg. In one of these, our Embassy was ordered to proceed under convoy to Orenberg via the fort at Orsk. I received personal orders to turn over my command to Kiulevein because I was to speed home to St. Petersburg for a special assignment to China. You just can't imagine what a startling impression this made on me, having just returned out of the hands of the Khivans and Bukharans. The thought of a new burdensome trek across the whole of Siberia to the Empire of the Son of Heaven was staggering. In spite of the uncertainty I faced in this new and probably extended departure from the Homeland, I boldly accepted the order and was fully prepared to serve the Tsar with strong conviction.

I gave a farewell dinner for all my travellers and officers of the convoy where I gave awards for meritorious service on the trip. I returned 25,000 rubles (hard cash) to the Commandant of Fort #1 and gave 14,000 rubles to Kiulevein to complete the journey from Fort #1 to Orenberg. We originally started with 67,000 rubles.

I bought a tent, five camels with supplies and hired two Kirghiz and one Cossack as guides for the trek to Orenberg. General Zalesov, who was hurrying home to see his new bride (he had married just before we left St. Petersburg), my valet on the trip, Skachkov and my cook came with us on hired horses and a sleigh. We began an extremely hazardous journey for that time of the year. There were no roads, and snow was everywhere. The trip through the Kara-Kum desert was not too bad although cold and windy; but upon leaving the desert for the steppe the cold became intense and terrible snow storms (*Burany*) usually hit us toward evening. Once, our Kirghiz driver who walked beside the cart completely disappeared from sight, and despite our shouts, got lost and was never seen again. The other Kirghiz in this same storm slipped off his camel to look for a path, disappeared, and most likely froze to death. We crawled over deepening drifts, but it was getting dark and we were exhausted.

For 24 hours we had not eaten; the camels and horses were frozen and could hardly move their legs. It became impossible to find our way and without our driver it seemed inconceivable we would survive. Therefore, I called for a halt and attempted to boil some tea. We got the fire going, but our hands were so frozen we had to kick the kettle into position on the fire. I had wanted to make use of a keg of rum but it had turned into a large chunk of ice. Nevertheless, we did get to drink a cup of snowy tea which seemed tasty and wholesome. Then our little bonfire went out and we were left in complete darkness with the never ending howling and whistling of the hurricane-like winds. We remained here 18 hours, so covered with snow that it was impossible to move. I tried to get the life force back into the travellers, encouraging them with words and jokes, and hitting them on the hands and legs to keep the blood moving while preventing them from falling asleep. There were moments when I thought that no matter what I did, it would be in vain and we would never get out of this alive.

Skachkov had hiccups and was already so stiff that I could hardly keep him alive. One of the two remaining Kirghiz was completely frozen. Finally the *Buran* began to let up and we began to look around. Villagers from a nomad aul noticed signs of our presence and after a short time helped us dig out of the snow. By evening we had made it to the Ural Fort and the good Commandant was surprised that we were alive. He knew from experience how to handle people with frostbite and did not let us eat for several hours.

From the Ural Fort we continued the journey on a change of horses on a mail route to the Orsk Fort and then directly to Orenberg. Snow storms and blizzards pursued us, but none were of the intensity of the storm before the Ural Fort. I arrived in Orenberg December 6, my Name Day, about 10 p.m., and still in my traveller's attire appeared at the home of Governor General Katenin where there was a meeting. From rumors circulating on the steppe, Katenin thought I had perished during an attack by a band of Turkmen on the caravan. At any rate, he could not believe that I had reached Orenberg so speedily from Bukhara and upon seeing me dressed like some Asiatic, he began to cross himself as if I had come from some other planet. He became very embarrassed when he recognized me and heard that as soon as I had given him my report I would be off to St. Petersburg. Katenin wanted me to wait in Orenberg and then go with me to St. Petersburg in several days. I did agree to delay one day to discuss activities in the khanates.

I left Orenberg and reached Moscow very quickly over the mail route. From there, I took the train to St. Petersburg and arrived by Christmas. My arrival was completely unexpected particularly in light of Katenin's report stating that I had perished on the steppe at the hands of the wild Turkmen. When I burst into my father's study and found him drinking tea, he became so agitated that he began to make the sign of the cross from afar as if he were being pursued by a ghost.

After January 15, 1859, I no longer occupied myself with the affairs of Central Asia and focused on the Far East. After a difficult winter trip, Kiulevein arrived in Orenberg and turned over everything that was in his command including my papers and servant. They arrived in Moscow just prior to my departure to Siberia and reached St. Petersburg after my departure.

Regardless of final results, history will record that in 1858 a handful of Russians in spite of various obstacles, misunderstandings and contradictions made a trek to Khiva and Bukhara and returned via the Syr Darya, proving the possibility of a summer campaign to Khiva over the same route selected by Perovskii in 1839. We returned with a knowledge of the hitherto inaccessible Amu Darya; completed a broad survey and collected information about the area; gained knowledge of the neighbouring khanates; repaid according to the Tsar's order, the Emir of Bukhara and the Khan of Khiva, for visits their emissaries had made earlier to Russia; liberated Russian citizens proving to the Kirghiz and our frontier settlers that neither the Emir, nor the Khan could hide our defectors and deserters nor hold our countrymen who were sold into slavery.

The Embassy completed its task in the shortest possible time and got away with a modicum of expenditures. We were even able to return funds to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Orenberg Governor General. The chief underlying result of our Mission to Central Asia in 1858 was that it lifted the fog hiding the khanates from the eyes of the Russian government, which appreciated and recognized the true value of "diplomatic relations" with Khiva and Bukhara. Information gleaned by our Mission and the honest destruction of former "illusions" regarding the khanates called for a sharp shift in the character of our relations with these treacherous and perfidious neighbors.

The Tsar in the most flattering way appreciated our activities in Central Asia in 1858. He wrote on the summary of the trip which I had drawn up for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "I read this with great curiosity and satisfaction. We must do justice to Major General Ignatiev in that he acted cleverly and intelligently and achieved more than we could have expected".

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

What did Ignatiev's Embassy to Khiva and Bukhara accomplish? He proved that a summer campaign via the steppe, desert and Amu Darya was possible; this made up for Perovskii's failure in 1839. The Embassy gained enormous knowledge of the Amu Darya for a length of 360 miles through hitherto unknown territory. The knowledge of peripheral areas was gleaned by Ignatiev making future military operations less hazardous. Some Russian prisoners were released but not as many as had been thought might be there. But the release of the Russian prisoners had an impact on the nomads who could see that the balance of power was tilting in Russia's favor in the frontier areas. Visits to Russia by Bukharan and Khivan emissaries had been repaid. Russia was not tricked into making any major concessions. Of course, no formal treaties were signed but Russian commercial representatives were to be stationed in Bukhara as well as a caravan-sarai which helped in increasing trade. The main result of the mission was simply stated by Ignatiev:

"The Embassy completed its task in the shortest possible time and got away with a modicum of expenditures. We were able to return funds to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Orenberg Governor General. However, the chief result of our Mission to Central Asia in 1858 was that it lifted the fog hiding the Khanates from the eyes of the Russian government who finally appreciated and recognized the true value of "diplomatic relations" with Khiva and Bukhara. Information gleaned by our Mission and the honest destruction of the former "illusion" we had of the Khanates called for a sharp shift in the character of our relations with these treacherous and perfidious neighbors. Our voyage had provided a more complete understanding and analysis of the basis of the Khan's power so that we may deal more astutely and correctly with it in the future".(1)

Ignatiev was genuinely proud that he had completed the trek in the shortest possible time and had so frugally administered the Embassy that he returned funds to the government. The Tsar congratulated him and his career as a Tsarist diplomat was launched in a major way.

General Zalesov who accompanied the Embassy and was a close confidant of Ignatiev's gave an interesting critique of the *Mission to Khiva and Bukhara*. These remarks were made in 1895 just prior to the publication of the memoirs.


"I read with great interest your "Notes" and in front of me has risen a picture of our wanderings. Turning to the details I will permit myself to remark:

1. Having brought out the personal and real characteristics of Katenin and Butakov it would follow, that you would depict Kovalevskii, about whom we discussed ceaselessly.

2. For a characterization of the Khivan Khan and Bukharan Emir it would be important to remark on the following: the Khan accepted the organ and all day long ordered his Minister to play it, and having played, requested the Head of the Mission to send for someone to fix it. One of our soldiers, a blacksmith, came to fix it. Then the Khan offered him to stay on as Minister but the soldier wouldn't! The Emir, in his turn, took a great interest in a rubber cushion which had been one of the presents bestowed on him by our Embassy and he continually forced one of his ministers to dance a jig on it. The Minister took great comfort when finally all the air went out of the cushion and he could retire from dancing".

"Your 'Notes' unquestionably are of historical value. In them one can refresh one's memory completely about the activities of the Embassy. For this latter goal it is necessary to give a sketch of Kovalevskii and also to point out what diplomatic negotiations meant to the Khan and Emir. To the latter they meant nothing. The account of the blacksmith and the cushion gives the most poignant example of the kind of people with whom the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was dealing. The Ministry thought negotiations could be carried out in European fashion. Generally speaking I found your descriptions complete, just and interesting".

Ignatiev's Embassy to Khiva and Bukhara must be placed in historical perspective. In the mechanics of intervention in the short run the results of this trek were not significant. In the first place after Ignatiev's return Governor-General Katenin of Orenberg Province showed little inclination to take the initiative in seizing lands in Khiva and Bukhara immediately. He was just as aggressively inclined as Ignatiev but felt that the battleground should not be the Amu Darya lying to the south of the Aral Sea but rather he felt Russia should extend itself along the Syr Darya eastward where it already had a string of forts established. The idea of joining the Russian advance along the Syr Darya with Russian forces farther to the east (Alma-Ata) seemed much the more practical means of enhancing Russian power in Central Asia. The main target of Katenin's plans was the city of Tashkent which lay to the east of



◄• Cherniaev in 1864
 - - ◄• Verevkin in 1864
 0 100 200 mi

the Aral Sea.

The information gleaned by Ignatiev about Bukhara and Khiva came at a time when Katenin and others had already made up their minds that the Syr Darya expansion was the number one priority for the Russian Empire. Imagine his consternation when Ignatiev threw off this idea with his insistence that penetration of the Amu Darya should be the most important consideration. Ignatiev's plan of opening up the Amu Darya in 1859 and even later seemed ill advised to Katenin. Thus he helped veto the ploy of having the Bukharan Ambassador return to Bukhara by Russian steamer from Fort #1;(2) if this voyage had been carried out Russia would have gained a tremendous economic advantage because riverine access from Bukhara for trade north into Russia was non-existent before the advent of the "Perovskii". Also this economic orientation carried out by Russian ships would have severely damaged Britain's attempts to orient Bukharan trade south to Afghanistan and India.

Ignatiev always had the ear of the Tsar and his final report should have persuaded the higher authorities to carry through his ideas regarding the Amu Darya. One other point should be stressed. Ignatiev insisted on the construction of a Russian fort in the delta of the Amu Darya. Later this would be accomplished.

Katenin and the military trying to keep their hands in both areas did send Chernaiev to Kungrad in 1859 to take advantage of the intrusion of the Turkmen Sultan into the affairs of Khiva. This was not a major invasion but rather a kind of reconnaissance. Captain Butakov and his Aral Sea Flotilla briefly returned to the Amu Darya. The point is after 1858 Russia's prime concern was the extension of the forts along the Syr Darya and the "closing of the lines". When this had been concluded in 1865 Russian forces reverted to the aggressive policies along the Amu Darya. Within a few years both Kiva and Bukhara became protectorates of the Russian Empire after costly military campaigns.

In evaluating the long term significance of Ignatiev's Embassy one is overcome by a distinct feeling of destiny. For the first time in Russian history the Tsar gained sound knowledge of a military and political nature concerning the khanates. The Tsar looked on Ignatiev as a son. He avidly read his dispatches and insisted that Ignatiev's father read him his son's personal letters from Central Asia. In this way the highest official in Russia got an extraordinary detailed education on the khanates. No other European (especially English) head of state was as well versed in Central Asia as he.

The Tsar's paternal interest in Ignatiev irked Katenin no end. He felt helpless because there was no way for him to get his point of view across as long as Ignatiev was around. Katenin would be vindicated because in 1859 Ignatiev was sent to China and even though he returned to head the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 18 months later the wheels were already in motion to make the "closing of the lines" the chief priority.

Once the die was cast the whole argument concerning

Russian expansion into Central Asia was academic. Both rivers flowing into the Aral Sea came under the control of the Russian Empire. Does it really matter whether temporarily Ignatiev's plan was eclipsed by another one? Within 15 years both rivers and the khanates on them lost their independence and were no longer societies closed to Russians.

Economically the takeover by Russia meant that the tariff question had ended on favorable terms for Russian merchants. It gave Russian Christian merchants equality with Moslem merchants in the khanates. The khanates became with some small exceptions just another province of the Russian Empire. It also meant that Britain would have to rethink her priorities about her economic interests in the khanates.

In the long run with their independence snuffed out St. Petersburg inherited a huge new population of Moslems. Before the conquest of Central Asia Moslems in the Russian Empire existed in the Caucasus and along the banks of the Volga to Kazan. Now, however, their numbers were doubled. Thus Russian foreign policy would have to take this fact into consideration when dealing with the Middle East.

In the 20th century in Central Asia as the economy was modernized and transformed by the industrial revolution the area of the khanates which would include the Uzbek Republic today has become a model for the Moslem countries of the world. Could Moslem societies break with feudalism, the traditional past, and emancipate themselves? Communism under the guidance of Moscow provided one answer.

Today Moscow needs to control a very restive Moslem population and make sure for Central Asians that there is no alternative to Moscow's leadership. This is the reason for the extermination of Afghan independence. Although Afghanistan was almost 90% a Soviet satellite before 1978 it still held a western oriented intelligentia which was a thorn to Russian administrators. To Central Asian Moslems holed up in the USSR Afghanistan proved there could be an alternative political system for Moslem peoples who wanted to transform their societies from feudalism to a modern industrialized state.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan of December, 1979 was supposed to end whatever factional opposition there was to a Russian dominated Administration in Kabul. Like Shamil in the 1850s the renegade Moslem fanatic who defied the Russian Empire for years in the Caucasus so the Afghan rebels hope to prove to the world there can be an alternative to Moscow's authority.

The Russian preoccupation with Central Asia as an object of imperialism in the modern sense must be seen as starting from Ignatiev's Embassy to Khiva and Bukhara in 1858. For political purposes it is so important to educate the public about the significance of an area or region which has strategic value. The Lewis and Clark Expedition to the American northwest educated Americans on the east coast about the enormous potential of the Columbia River valley.

Before Ignatiev's visit Russians had as much or as little knowledge of Central Asia as western Europeans. Certainly no other European country sent so impressive a group of picked specialists (disregarding the dilettantes) who were knowledgeable about the culture, history, economics of Central Asia; even an astronomer was included. No other European government showed such intense curiosity about the area. The British government felt it must protect the right of free trade for its citizens in Central Asia. However, there was no concern on the part of London about trying to understand the history or culture of the area. The khanates were too isolated and too inaccessible for the English to have any kind of serious cultural or political interest other than economic. If they had been able to get steamships on the Amu or Syr Darya the situation would have been different. The Aral Sea and the rivers emptying into it were waters closed to all nations but Russia.

After 1858 Russian public officials from the Tsar down as well as the general reading public were much better informed about the khanates. It was clear Russia stood to gain enormous economic advantages from a takeover of Central Asia. Ignatiev was responsible for changing Russian attitudes about the area. There can be no doubt that his success can be partially attributed to his high connections. A lad of 26 could hardly be taken seriously for such a project by seasoned, toughened frontier fighters like Katenin and Butakov if the individual did not have massive backing from the top.

There is another quality about Ignatiev and that is his utter gall. He refused to be intimidated and knew exactly how to make a show of force at the critical time. He was fearless because he knew that with a snap of his fingers he could get immediate Russian military intervention. No previous Russian mission to Central Asia had that kind of authority. The earlier ones were organized from a much lower level in the bureaucracy. Ignatiev insulted the khans which must have been a novel experience for them and he got away with it. It has been said that Ignatiev was the first person either Khan ever met whom he had to deal with on a basis of equality.

Ignatiev as an Ambassador to Central Asia has a position in world history. He is Russia's example of the European Imperialist among the natives of the under developed world. He opened up the backward, inaccessible, isolated khanates the same way that Commodore Perry opened Japan in 1854. Perry brought the west and modernization to Japan. More than that he showed the Japanese that time was running out for them if they wanted to survive. The Japanese who were living in a closed society in the 1850s accepted the challenge, or putting it more bluntly saw the hand writing on the wall and transformed their whole nation from feudalism to a modern state. However, to the rulers of Khiva and Bukhara modernization was too giant a step. They were not up to it. In this analogy one thing is clear Ignatiev and Perry both were visiting closed societies and they came from more advanced countries.

Lord Curzon in India, the Vice-Roy, would have been appreciated by Ignatiev as would Cecil Rhodes but the latter was much more of an entrepreneurial type. Apparently Ignatiev had no

desire for riches for himself; all he wanted was credibility and plaudits from the Tsar, that he had "served the state" well.

Ignatiev had enemies, of course. He was an extremely vain person. He fit the mold of an aggressive diplomat who was motivated by a cause. Pan-Slavism was his bag. He was no egalitarian but a Russian who stated over and over that the natives were inferior and white Christian Europeans were superior. Further he felt that Russians were superior to other Europeans because of their faith in God and the Tsar. Ignatiev really believed and that was why in later years as well as in Central Asia he was so cock sure of himself and one who was convinced that Russia was destined to rule the world. His strident Anglophobia could never be concealed. Without England Russia would rule the world.

There can be no doubt that the mid 19th century was the heyday of Imperialists like Ignatiev. If he had lived in Stalin's Russia it is doubtful if he would have wielded such enormous authority in foreign affairs or have had the opportunity to make decisions on his own.

In many ways Ignatiev was a dilettante. His fastidiousness was overbearing and he often got completely carried away with details. We can excuse some of these traits on his callow youth. However, he did have the knack of writing and he cleverly said what should be said in order to thwart his enemies whom he felt were plotting to slander him in St. Petersburg when he returned to Russia. Without the Tsar's backing he would have been nothing. Ignatiev perceived an enemy under every bush in the Court in St. Petersburg.

Ignatiev's boundless energy and his fanatical devotion to God and the autocrat made him believe that no matter what the hardship he would have the strength of character to achieve his goal. He was the right choice to lead the Embassy through the deserts of Central Asia to Khiva and Bukhara.

Such eternal Russian types have existed throughout the ages. In the 19th century in Ignatiev's case the thesis was to expand Russian control over Central Asia. This act would help remove the stigma of the defeat in the Crimean War. After 1856 Russia was in a very weakened position vis-a-vis Europe but Asia was easy pickings for any European trained army. Ignatiev who had participated in the Treaty of Paris which had ended the Crimean War took this as his goal, too. Who could have been more of a starry eyed believer than this 26 year old who put "service to the state" as the highest goal of an individual.

In Stalin's Russia a person with Ignatiev's zeal would have found outlets as an economic planner in the Five Year Plans; these zealots were attempting to transform the economic system by constructing huge industrial projects in the Urals and Siberia. Communism is the economic and social religion, the faith, of 20th century Russia. The fanatical Communist and Ignatiev have something in common. Both desire to "serve the state" whether it was Tsar or Chairman. No matter the faith was "Mother Russia".

1. Ignatiev, N.P., *Missiia v Khivu i Bukharu v 1858 godu*. S.P. 1897 pp. 274-5.
2. "The Bukharan Envoy didn't get even with me, since I have gone to Peking, but rather with our Foreign Minister and especially with Kovalevskii whom Nedmedzhin-Kohdzha in my presence to the question about returning to Bukhara on the steamer answered in a positive fashion. Katenin, according to the words of our interpreter, Batarshin, heard the same response and finally at a triumphant audience with the Tsar he stated that 'without fail' he would return to Bukhara by steamer. When he got to Orenberg after the Envoy returned from St. Petersburg no one knew how to force him to keep his promise and fulfill the program as he had agreed last year. Either the officials weren't concerned enough or simply they did not want to complete the program which I had drawn up and which the Minister of Foreign Affairs (before my departure) had thought so much of. Thus practically speaking the Embassy of Nedmedzhin-Khodzha was a failure. Governor General Katenin wanted to prove that it was necessary to get his approval, alone, as Chief of the region and he alone would give the orders for Central Asia. He also stated that my Embassy to Khiva and Bukhara had not brought the desired results. He wanted to expend more money for the lengthening and strengthening of the Syr Darya line while neglecting the Amu Darya. Unfortunately, this usually happens! And from an inflated ego what could one expect? All the information we had collected in Central Asia passed inevitably through his hands. He will realize his own goal, losing sight of the fact, that I can not be responsible for this calamitous situation since the Tsar has sent me to China. In Asia and everywhere tomorrow's politics does not often resemble today's. In order to achieve favorable and solid results one must persistently pursue the objective and consequently according to a well thought out and accepted plan. To change something because of a personal fantasy, or viewpoint, is very harmful to the Government. With us, unfortunately, so much depends on the personality of the Government official involved and the personal relationship of him to the officials who do have power".